PRINCE CHARLES COTTON, SR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. EDWARD T. SHELDON, WARDEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
CASE NO. 9-13-48
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
March 3, 2014
2014-Ohio-756
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court, Trial Court No. 10-CV-0318, Judgment Affirmed
Prince Charles Cotton, Sr., Appellant
Peter L. Jamison for Appellee
{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we elect, pursuant to
{¶2} Plaintiff-Appellant, Prince Charles Cotton1, appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County denying his “motion to rescind unauthorized actions by the clerk‘s [sic] of courts“. On appeal, Cotton argues that the trial court erred because the judge was biased, cited his own personal opinions, failed to cite case law, and misapplied the law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶3} On April 13, 2010, Cotton filed a writ of mandamus in the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County. Cotton alleged that Defendant-Appellee, Edward Sheldon, the Warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, did not have a valid sentencing entry and asked for his immediate release. On December 15, 2010, Sheldon filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating that Cotton‘s complaint was barred by res judicata and that he did not fully comply with
The Court further finds that the issues raised by the Relator in his Writ of Mandamus should have been raised on direct appeal or by post-conviction action.
In addition, the Court finds that the Relator‘s action in this case fails for failure to comply with
ORC §2961.21 [sic].IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Relator‘s Writ of Mandamus is hereby dismissed. Costs are to be paid by the Relator.
(Docket No. 42, p. 2)
{¶4} Cotton also filed, with this court, a petition for “Writ of Procedendo Ad Judicium,” which we denied in a judgment entry filed on March 11, 2011. In the judgment entry, we ordered Cotton to pay court costs.
{¶5} On May 31, 2013, Cotton filed a “motion to rescind unauthorized actions by the clerk‘s [sic] of court” arguing that because he was indigent, he should not have to pay the court costs associated with the two aforementioned cases. (Docket No. 46, p. 1). The trial court subsequently denied his motion on August 27, 2013, finding that because Cotton‘s litigation was civil in nature, it did not relieve him of the obligation to pay court costs.
{¶6} Cotton timely appealed this judgment, presenting the following assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE JUDGE WAS BIAS AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICE. [SIC] WHEN THE JUDGE RULED IN FAVOR OF THE NONE [SIC] MOVING PARTY. [SIC] WHEN NO OPPOSITION WAS FILED[.]
THE JUDGE WAS IN ERROR, AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICE. [SIC] WHEN THE JUDGE CITED HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION WHEN THIS ACTION WAS UNCONTESTED[.]
Assignment of Error No. III
THE JUDGE WAS DISCRIMINATING AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICE. [SIC] WHEN THE JUDGE FAIL [SIC] TO CITE ANY CASES TO SUPPORT HIS RULING[.]
Assignment of Error No. IV
THE JUDGE WAS OPINIONATED, AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICE. [SIC] WHEN THE JUDGE MISAPPLIED THE LAW, WHEN NO RESPONSE WAS FILED IN THIS CASE IN CHIEF[.]
{¶7} Due to the nature of the assignments of error, we elect to address them together.
Assignments of Error No. I, II, III, & IV
{¶8} In his first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Cotton essentially argues that the trial court erred because the trial judge was biased, cited his personal opinions, failed to cite any case law, and misapplied the law. We disagree.
{¶9} First, Cotton fails to explain or demonstrate how the trial judge was biased. Further, we do not see where in the trial court‘s judgment entry the judge
{¶10} Cotton also argues that the trial court misapplied the law. Pursuant to
[t]he department of rehabilitation and correction, upon receipt of a certified copy of the judgment of a court of record in an action in which a prisoner was a party that orders a prisoner to pay a stated obligation, may apply toward payment of the obligation money that belongs to a prisoner and that is in the account kept for the prisoner by the department.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶11}
{¶12} Therefore, it is apparent that even though Cotton is indigent, he is still required to pay court costs. Further, the clerk of courts has valid judgment entries from both of Cotton‘s above-mentioned cases and is entitled to withdraw money from Cotton‘s prison account.
{¶13} Although not clearly stated in an assignment of error, Cotton also seems to argue that he was entitled to default judgment since Sheldon did not respond to his “motion to rescind.” However, Sheldon was not required to respond to Cotton‘s motion, which was a nullity.3 Cotton‘s case against Sheldon
{¶14} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing Cotton‘s motion to rescind and we overrule Cotton‘s first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error.
{¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to Cotton in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr