Defendant, Dr. Edward D. Jackson, Jr., appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs procedural due process claim against Jackson. Because we conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due process claim, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Dr. Richard Cotton, was employed as the Director of Continuing Education for South Georgia College (SGC). In June 1997, two employees of SGC filed complaints with the EEOC and the Georgia Commission on Equal Opportunity charging that their supervisor, Cotton, had sexually harassed them. The President of SGC, Defendant Jackson, received the charges on 9 June 1997. The next day, Defendant Jackson notified Plaintiff of the charges, suspended him with pay, and told him to stay off campus until the matter was resolved. Plaintiff was told that he could file a response to the charges.
The SGC Director of Personnel/Affirmative Action Officer, Paula Dell-Beasley, conducted an investigation into the complaints. Dell-Beasley also received sworn responses from Cotton about the claims. Cotton alleges that he also told Dell-Beasley he wished to submit additional affidavits. But, before receiving the additional affidavits from Cotton, Dell-Beasley submitted her findings to President Jackson. Dell-Beasley reported that Cotton had violated the sexual harassment policies of SGC and of the Board of Regents. Also, she said that Cotton had created a hostile work environment.
On 16 July 1997, President Jackson sent a letter to Cotton informing him that his employment would be terminated effective 31 July 1997 and that the terms of his suspension with pay would continue through that date. Upon receiving the termination letter, Cotton requested a hearing. President Jackson told Cotton that he would hold no hearing, but that Cotton could request that the Board of
In addition, in response to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s and the Georgia Commission on Equal Opportunity’s requests for the College’s position on the sexual harassment complaints, President Jackson submitted, on 17 July 1997, four letters stating that “Dr. Cotton’s actions in creating a hostile work environment are his own personal actions in direct violation of College policy and beyond the boundaries of his job responsibilities. South Georgia does not condone Dr. Cotton’s behavior.” These documents were also allegedly placed in Dr. Cotton’s personnel file.
Cotton sued Jackson and members of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in their individual and official capacities. His complaint asserted claims under state and federal law. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted Defendants’ motion on all claims except one: Plaintiffs section 1983 procedural due process claim that Defendants had deprived him of his liberty interest in his reputation without the opportunity for a name-clearing hearing. This interlocutory appeal concerns only the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for Defendant Jackson.
DISCUSSION
We review the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds de novo and conduct a two-step inquiry. First, we ask whether the violation of a constitutional or statutory right was even alleged. Second, if a violation were alleged, we ask whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Hartley v. Parnell,
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jackson effectively ruined his reputation by labeling him as a sexual harasser and by terminating his employment without giving him an opportunity to be heard. We have said that—although damage to reputation, standing alone, does not provide a basis for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—when reputational damage is sustained in connection with a termination of employment, it may give rise to a procedural due process claim for deprivation of liberty which is actionable under section 1983. See Campbell v. Pierce County, Ga.,
In this case, we conclude that because adequate state remedies were available to provide Plaintiff with the opportunity for a name clearing hearing, he has failed to state a procedural due process claim. In McKinney v. Pate,
Assuming a plaintiff has shown a deprivation of some right protected by the due process clause, we — when determining if a plaintiff has stated a valid procedural due process claim — look to whether the available state procedures were adequate to correct the alleged procedural deficiencies. See McKinney,
As applied to this case, our inquiry concerns whether adequate procedures were available to Plaintiff to protect his right not to be deprived of his liberty interest in his reputation by state action without the opportunity for a name-clearing hearing. The parties dispute whether, under Georgia law, adequate remedies were available. We think that there were.
Defendant initially contends that certiorari to the state courts was available to Plaintiff and that this process was an adequate state remedy. We agree with Defendant that certiorari is generally an adequate state remedy. See Narey,
The basic distinction, under Georgia law, between an administrative and a judicial act by officers other than judges is that:
[A] quasi-judicial action, contrary to an administrative function, is one in which all parties are as a matter of right entitled to notice and to a hearing, with the opportunity afforded to present evidence under judicial forms of procedure; and that no one deprived of such rights is bound by the action taken.... [T]he test is whether the parties at interest had a right under the law to demand a trial in accordance with judicial procedure.
Id. at 359 (quoting South View Cemetery Ass’n v. Hailey,
In this case, none of the acts in question — the termination of Plaintiffs employment without a hearing and the Board’s later denial of Plaintiffs request for a hearing — were judicial acts. Plaintiff was not, as a matter of state law, entitled to notice and a hearing before these acts were taken. He was not given the opportunity to present evidence to the decision makers under judicial forms of procedure prior to these acts being taken. Plaintiff had no right to demand a trial in accordance with judicial procedure. In the light of Georgia authority, we conclude that the acts in question were not in the nature of judicial acts. See Starnes v. Fulton Co. Sch. Dist.,
Just because under Georgia law certiorari will not lie does not mean that there were no adequate state procedures available to Plaintiff. We will assume that Plaintiff is correct in arguing that no other specific legal remedies are available to him.
Because we believe that the writ of mandamus would be available under state law to Plaintiff, and because we believe that mandamus would be an adequate remedy to ensure that Plaintiff was not deprived of his due process rights, see Jackson v. City of Columbus,
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. Plaintiff argues that McKinney does not apply to this case because McKinney dealt with a property-interest procedural due process claim and this case deals with a liberty-interest procedural due process claim. We see no reason for distinguishing between the two kinds of procedural due process claims. Cf. Zinermon v. Burch,
. This directive is not an exhaustion requirement. See McKinney,
. Although we express no opinion on the availability of other remedies under Georgia law, we note that, even if other state law remedies are available to Plaintiff (for example, a state law defamation claim or an action seeking a declarator/ judgment), our ultimate conclusion would not change. The availability of those remedies, if they are adequate to protect Plaintiffs right to have a name-clearing hearing, would preclude a procedural due process claim. And, if they are inadequate to protect Plaintiff's right to a hearing, then mandamus would still be available to Plaintiff, and he would be precluded from bringing a procedural due process claim.