114 Ark. 300 | Ark. | 1914
Defendant was not the owner of the stallion, but arranged with the owner, who lived in another locality, to let him have the stallion to stand at his farm during that season. The undisputed testimony of the defendant is that the owner of the stallion agreed to send the animal over on the last of March, but failed to send him until the fourth day of April, when defendant was away from home. Defendant had a son nineteen years of age, who, according to the testimony, looked after his father ’s stock during the latter’s absence. The plaintiff took his mare over to defendant’s farm on April 8 and she was served by the stallion in the absence of the defendant, and the latter’s son attended to it.
There is a sharp conflict between the testimony of the plaintiff and that of the defendant’s son concerning the incidents attending the service. The plaintiff testified that the young man held himself out as having authority to handle the stallion and as having sufficient experience to do so; but, on the other hand, the young man testified that he had had no experience and did not claim to be able to handle the stallion, but that he attempted to do so at the urgent request of the plaintiff himself. At any rate, the mare was injured while being served by the stallion, and the evidence is sufficient to establish negligence on the part of defendant’s son in handling the stallion.
In a Michigan case, almost identical with this one upon the facts, Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, held that the injury under the circumstances described was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence. Peer v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 224.
A text book on the law of animals lays down a 'different rule, to the effect that under such circumstances it devolves upon the owner of the injured mare to prove negligence. Ingham on Animals, § 106.
Without attempting to reconcile those conflicting views of the law, it is sufficient to say that in this case the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in drawing an inference of negligent conduct from all the circumstances proved in the case, including the manner in which the mare was injured.