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Cottman v. State
912 A.2d 620
Md.
2006
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*1 applied special when it for tenant’s mind prior on the ap- mind when it Appeals’s Board of and on the exception pur- For Oil’s example, Shell special exception. proved by the exception was described pose seeking special existing as “to approval upgrade in its Appeals’s Board islands; ... installing pump filling station gasoline canopy; landscaping of a new addition construction ...; freestanding sign of a new front of the station installation of the station and ...; of the exterior service renovation enclosure; areas; instal- ... installation of a trash bay service site and improvements of new ...” and other lighting lation terms approval expressed The Board’s upgrades. existing of the “upgrade” a “modernization” permitting thing proposed by not one Shell Regretfully, station. filling According- Board came to fruition. approved by ever nonconforming that the use there is no affirmative evidence ly, best, inten- despite good At was abandoned terminated. nonconform- tions, ongoing status of the change quo no in law or fact for the use ever occurred. There is basis ing of Appeals contrarian result. The Board Majority opinion’s it got right. and the Circuit

I affirm would Circuit County. Montgomery RAKER authorized me state

Judges and GREENE in this dissent. they join expressed views

912 A.2d 620 Nathaniel COTTMAN Maryland. STATE of Term, Sept. No. 1 2006. Appeals Maryland.

Court of 8, 2006.

Dec. *3 Burns, Jr., (Nancy E. Asst. Public Defender S. George Defender, brief), Baltimore, Forster, on for Petition- Public er/Cross-Respondent. (J, Curran, Jr., Atty. Joseph Asst. Kelly,

Edward J. Gen. brief), Baltimore, MD, Atty. Respondent/Cross- Gen. Petitioner. WILNER, BELL, C.J., RAKER, Before:

Argued GREENE, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and JJ. GREENE, Judge. *4 2, 2004, trial in non-jury after a the Circuit Court

On June (“Petitioner”) Cottman, County, Nathaniel Jr. for Baltimore cocaine, conspiracy of distrib- was convicted distribution cocaine, as a and of cocaine. He was sentenced possession ute years prison, possibility offender to ten without the repeat remaining for of cocaine. The convic- parole, distribution filing After merged sentencing purposes. tions were appeal Special Appeals, notice of to the Court of both timely argument Petitioner and the State waived oral and submitted respective their cases on brief. 18, 2005, in August response

On to Petitioner’s request, trial, judge granted trial Petitioner a new thereby vacating underlying judgment of conviction and sentence. As we shall explain further this was not entitled to opinion, State file a notice of trial. appeal granting the order a new On 31, 2005, October not having by been informed counsel of that event, intervening Special Appeals the Court of filed its writ- opinion affirming ten the Circuit Court’s initial judgment sentence. On November to the prior mandate,1 issuance of Appeals’s the formal request- ed that opinion withdraw its and dismiss moot, light the Circuit Court’s decision to grant him a new trial prior filing to the of the of Special Appeals’s opinion. written On December the Court Special Appeals denied both of Petitioner’s requests. petition

Petitioner filed a for writ of certiorari2 in this Court and the State filed a cross-petition.3 granted peti- We both Throughout opinion, 1. we referenced the “unofficial mandate” "formal mandate” Appeals. By Court of unofficial mandate, we referring judgment are to the unofficial of the court as very opinion. indicated at the end of its Because this mandate is not Court, by certified the Clerk of the it constitutes the court's unofficial judgment. judgment formal mandate mirrors the court's unofficial separate but is a by document certified and filed See Clerk. Maryland Rule 8-606. 8-606, “Mandate,” Maryland Rule entitled states: (a) To Any disposition evidence order of the appeal, Court. of an dismissal, including voluntary by shall be evidenced the mandate of Court, which shall be certified the Clerk under the seal of the Court and shall constitute the of the Court. presented following 2. Petitioner petition issue in his for writ of certiorari: Special Appeals failing Did the Court of opinion err in to withdraw its dismissing and not after the Circuit Court had prior Petitioner a new trial opinion to the issuance of the of the Court Special Appeals? question presented 3. The cross-petition the State in its was as follows: *5 (2006). 894 A.2d

tions. Cottman the of is whether this Court issue now before The main the appeal to dismiss when it failed erred Appeals Special the informed that being after reported opinion, the withdraw trial. The Circuit a new Petitioner had Circuit Court trial while a new granting its order issued pending was and sentence appeal a of new granting The effect court. appellate the intermediate in the and conviction original judgment to vacate the trial was Any issue appeal. the basis that constituted trial court a new grant or effect of the propriety regard with not have been could appeal, matter on trial, subject as to the (1) was noted appeal for two reasons: decided trial; practical as a of a new grant long before granting propriety to the matter, regard with the issue notice prior raised not have been trial could context, of a new grant the trial court’s Thus, in this appeal. court should that the an event trial constituted mandate. The trial issuing consideration taken into and, under trial a new jurisdiction had fundamental trial rendered circumstances, of a new granting Al- moot. the Court appeal pending its to allow had discretion Special Appeals though the Court stand, it had no choice issues to on the moot opinion reported dismissed. that the was in its mandate to reflect but FACTUAL BACKGROUND a.m., 5:45 undercover approximately August On lot of the Moore, parking into the Detective, drove Earnest A County. in Baltimore Complex Apartment Park Kingsley Benson, come yelled “hey, woman, as Ms. later identified man to Detective Moore’s here,” with a over and then walked Petition- the man as later identified Detective Moore vehicle. its Appeals, prior to issuance of the Court [W]hether to vacate its order [C]ircuit [C]ourt have directed the mandate should pending it interfered with the a new trial because granting Cottman appeal. Moore, According er. to Detective Ms. him Benson asked he a police whether officer. After Detective Moore stated *6 officer, that police he was not a Petitioner you asked “are sure you’re police”? not When Detective Moore answered negative, Petitioner walked two feet forward to the left fender road, up vehicle and looked and down the while Ms. stayed Benson next to Detective Moore. After some addition- discussion, al pulled Ms. Benson a small from bag cocaine tongue exchange underneath her for a marked twenty- transaction, dollar bill Detective Moore. After the De- tective provided Moore a surveillance team a description with subjects. of both The stopped surveillance team Petitioner later, and Ms. A Benson. short time Detective Moore re- turned to the area of previous sale and identified both Benson, Petitioner and Ms. who were then formally arrested. police The not any did find or drugs money on Petitioner’s person during the search to incident his arrest. 2, 2004,

On June the morning that Petitioner’s trial was to begin the Circuit Court for County, Baltimore Petitioner’s appeared counsel before the judge’s designee administrative request a continuance. Petitioner’s counsel argued that he just had located a critical witness for the defense and there- fore needed more time. The judge’s administrative designee motion, denied the noting that the trial had already been postponed four times. The case then proceeded to a trial on the merits.

Detective Moore testified at trial that Petitioner’s actions were consistent with those of a lookout in a typical drug deal Petitioner and Ms. Benson walked off together after Detective Moore away. noted, drove Detective Moore howev- er, that he never saw Petitioner and exchange Ms. Benson or drugs money with each other.

The trial judge determined that Detective Moore’s testimo- ny “very credible,” and that Petitioner had aided and abetted the drugs. distribution of He therefore found Peti- guilty cocaine, tioner of distribution of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine. Prior to sentencing, Peti- identity one of mistaken this incident was argued

tioner offered Petitioner judge he was innocent. and that examination, his own a polygraph to take opportunity the court would understanding with the expense, that he was if showed polygraph him a trial judge June this incident.4 On involved with distribution. prison for years to ten sentenced excerpt how the issues before transcript demonstrates following 4. The when occurred on June These discussions this Court arose. sentencing. upon trying agree a time for parties were therefore, today. go forward we can't THE COURT: So honor, may [Attorney if I on the Your Petitioner]: MR. GLASS 1 was told is this witness which advised me there [Petitioner] record. get get postponement to him here today able to but I was not about phone time. That he number at the have his address nor did I case, testify basically prove his basically that witness to wants *7 point, evidence has At this him that he cannot. and I advised quite person was unaware don’t think he completed and I been —the when the got a chance to let him know date so I never of the court was ... court date minute, Sir, Mr. Cottman. I me. Wait a COURT: excuse THE it, you’re happy but I asked not with verdict is in and understand the testify your right or remain you any questions about you, do eye "Judge, So if said I do not.” me in the silent? You looked you point, should have asked it. you any question about it at that had listening to what speak. I was He told me not to MR. COTTMAN: my lawyer saying. was advice, know, you maybe gave you good but if he COURT: You THE it, question was then. to raise the question about the time had a Honor, person did do. The this crime I COTTMAN: Your MR. testify that he did actually willing to come in and did the crime is it. me, going to do this in Mr. Cottman. I was COURT: Excuse THE very, very heavy penalty, I would any anyway because this is case polygraph examina- you ask to have a possibility this have offered —to done, a new trial. a motion tion for file head, you you your have to listen to nod Wait a minute. Before polygraph polygraph ... if in fact the pay for the me. You have to you’re being they results and show that operator me the test shows this, going I'm not you say you weren't involved in then when honest say everyone that —I will say you guilty, and I want to hear are not bring judge jury and to either you’re to a new trial entitled before sir, you, say you testify. want to this to any But I witnesses want it, way you can beat you do there’s no fact did if in polygraph. MR. COTTMAN: I understand. added.) (Emphasis thereafter, Shortly Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Special Court of Appeals.5 25, 2005, July

On while Petitioner’s pending was still Special the Court of Appeals and before that court filed its opinion, he filed the Circuit Court a request appropriate relief based on the results of the polygraph examination. The Circuit Court hearing held a request, and on August 18, 2005, issued an order granting Petitioner a new trial. Petitioner, however, did not notify promptly the intermediate appellate court of this 31, 2005, event. On October more than two months after the Circuit Court Petitioner a new trial, the Court of Special Appeals filed its reported opinion, Cottman v. 165 Md.App. (2005), 886 A.2d 932 which it expressed its view on the question of first impression: whether a defendant may be convicted distribution of a (CDS) controlled dangerous substance on an aiding and abet- ting theory of culpability. It affirmed the previous judgment of conviction and sentence the Circuit Court. On Novem- ber Petitioner requested, in writing, that the appellate court vacate its opinion and dismiss the appeal, on the basis moot, the issues were because the Circuit Court had granted Petitioner a new trial before the Court of Appeals filed its opinion. Petitioner subsequently filed a law, memorandum of arguing that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to him award a new trial while pending and that the State had waived claim any to the contrary.

The Court of Appeals directed the respond State to *8 to Petitioner’s 17, 2005, memorandum. On November the State did so and acknowledged that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to make post-judgment rulings Petitioner’s criminal case. argued, however, It the intermediate appellate court should vacate the order of the Circuit Court granting Petitioner’s new trial because the Circuit Court’s Pending appeal 5. the Special Appeals, in the Court of Petitioner subse- funds, quently acquired necessary the polygraph underwent a examina- tion, passed the examination. court. De- appellate the of the On frustrated actions

order Petition- 15, 2005, of denied Special Appeals the Court cember The intermedi- issued its formal mandate. requests er’s to the its mandate affirm purported appellate ate 3, 2004, which had subse- of June Circuit Court’s of a trial. The Court grant the new quently been set aside to vacate did not direct the Circuit Court of Special a new trial. its Petitioner granting order

DISCUSSION A. Granting The Circuit Court’s Order Petitioner a New Trial First, not this to the issues that are before point we not before the Court of properly Court and were appellate nor the intermediate Neither Court Appeals. the propriety to rule on the of jurisdiction court obtained trial, a granting Petitioner post-trial Circuit Court’s order initial subject not the matter the because that order was addition, trial grant In of the new whether appeal. subject matter on is not an issue appeal with the interfered issue, likewise, courts appellate before the because initial subject matter of the Because these appeal. not the appeal, neither two matters are issues vacate, jurisdiction nor this has Special Appeals reverse, order a new trial.6 granting or affirm the (2002 Vol.) 12-302(c) Repl. § the Courts and Judicial 6. Md. Code Proceedings provides right the State limited Article said, may presented have issue "[u]nless criminal cases. We statute, properly categorized be as one of the actions enumerated in the Manck, power State v. State has no seek review.” (2005) (holding State did not Md. grant statutory right court’s trial to strike the State’s notice of intention to seek defendant's motion case, present penalty capital prosecution). In the death in a murder statute, right provided by right State had is not because 8-201, Court's of a new trial. Rule "Method appeal the Circuit (a), securing Special Appeals,” "By review —Court of section notice *9 facts, Notwithstanding these we will discuss the issues to address the contentions of parties help elucidate, both and to provide for, and background information the main issue before this Court: whether the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to dismiss the appeal and withdraw its reported opinion, after Petitioner notified the appellate intermediate court that he had been a new trial. contends the Circuit Court jurisd had motion,

iction7 to th6e new trial despite pending his appeal. that, He relies on the proposition as we first stated State, v. Pulley (1980), 287 Md. A.2d “a circuit court is not divested of fundamental jurisdiction8 to take post- judgment action in a merely case because an appeal is pending State, v. Jackson judgment.” 612, 620, 358 Md. (2000).

The State concedes that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to entertain post-trial matters general under the rule in Pulley, even after an appeal is filed. The State also Jackson, however, that, cites convey because of a limitation appeal,” provides 8-204, "[ejxcept provided only in Rule securing by method review the Court of filing of a prescribed notice of within the time Rule 8- State, e.g., 160, 168, 202....” Secretary See Munson Co. v. 294 Md. (1982) 448 A.2d (stating 939-40 party that "[a] to a trial court proceeding ... is not entitled to seek direct review and valid, reversal of the trial court’s unless timely he has filed a appeal”). F., order of We contrast Emileigh the current case with In re (1999), 355 Md. 733 A.2d 1103 where a appeal by second order of case, a child's mother in a CINA taken after the trial court’s order that jurisdiction, permitted terminated this Court to review that order and vacate it. " “jurisdiction,” 7. applied term when large courts 'is a term of comprehensive import every judicial embraces kind of ac- ” Pulley tion.’ 412 A.2d (citations omitted). jurisdiction” 8. “Fundamental power means residing “the in a court to action, judicially given determine question presented to it for a decision, subject over the proceedings.” matter of the Emileigh In re F., 415-16, 355 Md. at (citing Pulley, 733 A.2d at 1105 287 Md. at 1244, 1249-50). 412 A.2d rule, have jurisdiction the Circuit Court general to the did *10 this a trial. relies on to The State grant not may that the court statement Jackson “[w]hat Court’s jurisdiction a manner that affects do to exercise that is or appeal appellate the matter of the the subject either effect, the that, precludes hampers proceeding itself — Jackson, it.” acting on the matter before court from appellate that the 620, A.2d 477.9 The contends Md. at 751 at State 358 the Petitioner a new trial while granting Circuit Court’s order appellate the actions of the pending was frustrated appeal be court, and the Circuit order should therefore that Court’s null and void.10 vacated or rendered contention, as it to this disagree applies with the State’s We out, Pulley since points As Petitioner we have held case. to jurisdiction are not of their stripped that trial courts appeal an is simply pend- action because post-judgment take “ trial that have said that the judgment. from We ing ‘[i]f the proceed pendency ... to the of during court does decide from it, by law, or one obtained stay absent a appeal, required court, authority the ‘funda- an has the to exercise appellate authority parties the for 9. cite Jackson v. State as We note that both distinguishable this case and is assertions. Jackson is their dicta, case, because, actually in that the trial court denied the motion Jackson, court a new trial. In we examined whether the trial subject appeal matter on when it denied Petitioner’s interfered with the appeal pending. at was We request for new trial the time an address expressly the issue in Jackson that we are asked to avoided Jackson, explicitly today. In we stated need not consider "[w]e appeal granting the for new would whether an order motion trial indeed, would, subject ground the That have been to reversal on noted. interesting 751 presented some issues....” 358 Md. have (2000). A.2d appellate power court vacate an 10. We reiterate that the has no generally, In re appeal where is no of that order. See order there F., (1999) (demonstrating Emileigh 733 A.2d 1103 appeal required put squarely the of is that order before notice Thus, court). granting appellate propriety the as to the a new issues appellate proceedings properly before trial and its effect on the are Peterson, State v. 553 A.2d this Court. See also Md. n. court’s (pointing propriety 677 n. out that the the trial proceed pending appeal opposed power pending action us). appeal was not before ” Peterson, 315 Md. possesses.’ it jurisdiction’ which mental 419, 412 at Pulley, Md. (quoting 553 A.2d at at 1251). trial interfered with a new grant of whether the issue us, nor properly is not before subject matter if that issue Even Special Appeals. it before the Court appeal, persuaded we are not subject of this proper were trial interfered with a new that the Circuit Court’s conclusion appeal. reach this subject matter We court not re-decide the merits case the trial did because court; it upon the issues before pending or rule ipso for an We simply appeal, eliminated need facto. taken, that, an

“consistently taken view when act with to matters not may continue to reference trial *11 of, affecting, not the relating subject to the matter matters Peterson, 80, Md. 553 A.2d proceeding....” 315 at appellate trial the substantive issues of at 676. Had the court revisited case, matter whether subject appeal the or had the on been trial, trial should have Petitioner a new our the might answer be different. prior opinions

This is consistent with this distinction Appeals where a circuit court’s Special the Court appeal. the on subject actions did not interfere with matter See, (holding 287 412 A.2d at 1248-49 e.g., Pulley, Md. trial denial of appeal that Petitioner’s immediate of the court’s deprive motion the trial court of its his to dismiss did “ adjudicate controversy to the relat- jurisdiction’ ‘fundamental cause”); Jackson, the ing subject th[e] to matter criminal (concluding Md. at 751 at 477-78 that the Circuit 358 A.2d denial of Petitioner’s motion for a new trial while her Court’s did not interfere with appeal pending her convictions Folk subject Md.App. the matter on appeal); (2002) that retains (holding 791 A.2d 152 a circuit court the rule on motion for a jurisdiction fundamental to a defendant’s trial is in the Court of appeal pending even when an F., re Emileigh In Md. Appeals). Cf. (1999) Court interfered (holding the Circuit matter subject proceeding by with the on a CINA minor, closing jurisdiction the case and over terminating the custody because the fairness of question procedure used to custody pending determine was still properly and the issue was raised appellate court because there was a second order from which taken). an appeal was

Furthermore, if the properly issue were before the correct, appellate courts and the State’s contention our were observation in if a trial Jackson dictates that post-judgment court’s decision affected subject matter of a pending appeal, “may subject it be to it is not appeal, reversal but Jackson, void ab lack jurisdiction initio for to enter it.” atMd. 751 A.2d at 477. also County See Comm’rs of Retail, Inc., Carroll County v. Carroll Craft 862 A.2d circuit (stating any ruling by a subject court that interferes with the matter on jurisdiction”). “reversible on not void for lack of appeal, Un der reasoning, grant Circuit Court’s of a new trial void, automatically, would not be rendered if even we deter not proper Moreover, mined that it was to grant new trial. presented State has not us other any why reasons as did Circuit Court not have Petition authority grant Thus, er a new trial. we conclude the Circuit Court had jurisdiction fundamental a new trial propriety and the of that subject order and effect on the matter pending appeal subject were neither then nor now *12 review.

B. Special Appeals’s of Denial Request of Petitioner’s We must next examine properly the issue before us this case: whether the Court of Special Appeals should have decided on appeal the issues when the trial granted court a trial, new before the appellate intermediate court filed its opinion, and whether the intermediate court acted

743 its withdraw request it denied Petitioner’s when properly appeal. dismiss the and opinion him a granted that once the Circuit Court argues re- trial, any judgment no to be longer existed there judgment, the final eliminating contends that

viewed. He According to appeal moot. rendered the the Circuit Court of Petitioner, task charged are not with the because courts questions, or the Court deciding moot abstract opinion and its dismissed should have withdrawn Appeals appeal. Petitioner’s moot time that the was not at the

The State counters case reported opinion, filed its the Court existing controversy still an between because there remained insufficiency The State contends that Petitioner’s parties. the controversy claim still in when the of the evidence untena- making its Petitioner’s mootness claim opinion, filed disagree. ble. We view,

In the in Petitioner’s became moot our him new trial. that the Circuit Court We stant grant generally recognized effect said “[i]t as if a new trial is leave the cause the same condition ing Cearfoss, v. Snyder no trial had been held.” previous 607, (1946); Toney, A.2d see also Cook (holding that when the Md. judgment elimi granted, new trial was verdict were back in the same condition entirely put nated the ease was held). if ever a court a new no trial had been When orders trial, is to “the beneficial incidence of order procedural lost, parties, in law of the which was equality reestablish position litigants them restoring v. Balt. Transit beginning jury.” trial before a State (1939). Co., Because the 9 A.2d Md. judgment of a new trial eliminated Circuit Court’s conviction, remained for the longer there affirm, reverse, vacate, rendering thus Special Appeals moot. *13 744

It is “[a]ppellate well settled that do not courts sit to give opinions on propositions questions, abstract or moot appeals which for present nothing else decision are dismissed Ficker, 500, as a matter of 506-07, course.” State v. 266 Md. (1972) (citations 231, omitted); 295 A.2d 235 See also In re C., 432, (2006) (citations omitted). 906 Kaela 394 Md. A.2d 915 a moot We consider case “when there is no longer any existing controversy parties between the at the time that the case is court, before the when longer or the court can no fashion an C., 452, In re remedy.” 432, effective Kaela 394 Md. 906 A.2d Karl, 915, 927; 402, 410, 898, In re 394 Md. 906 A.2d 902 (2006); 341, Seay, 365, 1049, v. GMC 879 A.2d 1063 (2005); See also Hammen v. Balt. County Dep’t, Police 373 440, 449, 1125, 1131 (2003); Lee, Md. A.2d 818 v. Robinson 317 (1989) 395, (citations omitted). Md. 564 A.2d 397 holdings cases, Consistent with the of those we conclude that Circuit Court’s a new trial eliminated the contro versy parties, subject between the which was the such appeal, that the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals, law, read, as a matter of should have “appeal dismissed.” Elections, 39, v. Lloyd Supervisors 206 111 Md. (1954) (noting “not sit give courts do opinions propositions on abstract or moot questions, ap which peals present nothing else decision are dismissed as course”); Peterson, matter Md. at 553 A.2d at 677 “ (stating further ‘[generally moot, when a case becomes we order that the case be dismissed without our expressing views controversy.’ merits Nev ertheless, prohibition there is constitutional which bars [appellate] th[e] its views on expressing [e]ourt of a merits case which moot during appellate becomes pro (citations omitted). ceedings.”) GMC, See also 388 Md. at 879 A.2d at 1063 (quoting Reyes George’s Prince County, (1977)); A.2d 12 Md. Bishop v. Governor of 521, 524-25, Maryland, Md. 380 A.2d (citations omitted). points public

The State policy benefit by report- served judicial ed point decisions. The State’s taken. well There *14 which is published opinions, is a benefit derived public to “willing decide appellate courts are sometimes the reason ... that are appears important ‘it there where questions moot of expression merit an of interest raised which public issues in the litigants courts guidance for of our views the ” In Robinson, (citing at 397 A.2d future.’ Md. 181, 190,473 No. Special Investigation re (1984)). Hammen, Md. at 818 A.2d at See also moot actions generally this Court dismisses (explaining that on the but that we retain the without a decision merits our on the merits of authority express views constitutional circumstances). have, on prior moot action While we some occasions, questions our the of moot discussed view on merits case at important such discussions were the issue when cases, pursuant appeals future we nonetheless dismissed those of mandate, represents judgment the mandate the to our the Court.11 should have dismissed the Special Appeals

The Court of mandate, it disposition and reflected that its once granted Circuit Court had Petitioner a new learned the Peterson, we example, trial.12 For certiorari Special misapplied of had Appeals decide whether the Court 4-346(c), provides which that a revocation of Maryland Rule “ sentencing be probation hearing judge, ‘shall held before the ” Peterson, 76, 553 A.2d at practicable.’ whenever 315 Md. at Maryland supra providing language 11. See footnote the of Rule 8- states, part, the the which mandate “shall constitute judgment of Court.” the Appeals yet Special its 12. We note that the Court had not issued requested opinion its mandate when Petitioner court vacate 8-606(a), appeal. According Maryland dismiss Rule judgment the clerk of the court mandate certified constitutes Special Appeals enter formal the court. The Court did not its mandate, however, six after until December more than weeks requested opinion Petitioner that the court withdraw its and dismiss the Appeals yet appeal. That Court of its had issued requested opinion, when that the court withdraw its mandate provides support for further our conclusion that something “appeal should have read like pending.” dismissed as due to of new trial moot while 674. Peterson probation violated his and had a probation revocation hearing conducted a judge who was not the sentencing judge, despite objections of Peterson’s counsel. The Court of Special Appeals held that the judge presid- who ed over the violation probation hearing 4- violated Rule 346(c) because he made no findings as to practicality having the sentencing judge preside over the proceedings. petition State filed a certiorari, writ of which we granted. Despite the certiorari, issuance of the writ of anoth- er probation hearing revocation was held before another however, judge; party objected. neither Upon our review of case, we determined that it was “clear that present *15 appellate proceedings ha[d] become moot” par- because both agreed ties to appear before the non-sentencing judge. Peter- son, 79-80, 315 Md. at 553 A.2d at 675. We therefore stated “ that there was ‘no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so there no longer any [wa]s effective remedy ” which the court provide,’ c[ould] but asserted that “there is prohibition constitutional which bars this Court from ex- pressing its views on the merits of a case which becomes moot during proceedings.... so, however, We will do ‘only in the rare instances which demonstrate the most com- ” pelling Peterson, circumstances.’ 79-80, 82, 315 Md. at (citations 675-76, omitted). A.2d at We concluded that represented circumstances “one of those ‘rare instances’ in which the Court should express its views on the merits of a Peterson, moot case.” 82-83, 315 Md. at 553 A.2d at 677. As result, 4-346(c) this Court examined Rule to discern the legislative intent and concluded that disapprove “[w]e Court of Special Appeals’ construction application ... of 4-346(c). Rule If moot, this case were not we would reverse the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment____” Peterson, 315 Md. at 553 A.2d at In mandate, 679. our we reflected our holding mootness by vacating the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with directions to vacate the judgment of Peterson, Circuit Court. 315 Md. at 553 A.2d at 681. Similarly, Chertkov 335 Md. 642 A.2d 232 (1994), we examined whether a sentencing court could alter a both it had sentence, parties, consent of without the agreement. expressly- binding plea to a We imposed pursuant to we address whether would first determined sentence the court’s modification of right had a State right. have such a that it did not and thereafter concluded Chertkov, 166-71, A.2d at 235-37. Nonethe Md. at less, “[o]rdinarily our decision dismiss we stated that When, however, the matter inquiry. would end our our on a raised, ruling cannot because of and which we reach issue, importance, of substantial we will make threshold is one Chertkov, at 642 A.2d at 237. exception.” Md. We an plea a binding as to whether expressed therefore our views imposed modifying a trial court from an agreement precludes sentence, dismissing appeal. our mandate and then issued Chertkov, 171-75, general 642 A.2d at 237-39. See 335 Md. Robinson, the issue (discussing 564 A.2d 395 ly Md. for future even guidance litigants, provide before the Court moot, remanding that it was though acknowledged we grounds to dismiss on case to the court below with directions Hammen, mootness); 818 A.2d 1125 issue, moot, on the basis that the (addressing although an future, reflecting in the but then issue could reoccur mandate). moot in the issue’s status argues reported that the opinion responded State *16 aiding in Maryland of first and

question impression —whether to one of a CDS abetting possessory is sufficient convict that, of importance. offense—that Based the State maintains, Special Appeals required the Court of should not be Chertkov, appeal. to Peterson to dismiss the Similar and there is reason the Court of could issue opinion provide an to the issue guidance elucidate cases, impor- future if it decided that the issue before it was discuss, though tant to even the issues had become enough however, appellate opinion, moot. The intermediate court’s would, most, at the court would still constitute dicta because moot, by dismissing to the were the have reflect that issues See, in disposition e.g. that its mandate. appeal reflecting State, Lodowski v. 490 A.2d we in (asserting say posture what this may “[w]hile dicta, obiter be characterized as we feel an to urgency speak hope avoiding appeals the burden of further with discussed”). Therefore, to respect the issues though even court appellate apparently intermediate to let stand decided opinion, its would still published mandate reflect “appeal dismissed” because the issues before the had By become moot as to Cottman’s parity reasoning, case. mandate accompanied by also should have been a consis- end, tent editorial at its change opinion, where the appears unofficial it “mandate” because otherwise would be proper inconsistent with the formal mandate. argues

The State ample further Petitioner had Maryland under the appeal, time Rules dismiss but his essentially right waived his his appeal waiting dismiss for the Court of Special Appeals Maryland to file its opinion. Rule 8-601 states specifically appellant may dismiss “[a]n an without Court permission by filing notice of time any filing dismissal before the opinion Court.” to the According because the Circuit August 18, Petitioner a new trial on he had than more time to his enough dismiss before October 31, 2005, the date when the Court of Appeals filed its opinion. that, instead, The State contends ignored provided by Maryland the timeline Rules because he to obtain hoped a favorable result from the of Special Appeals, eliminating the need for a new trial. The State maintains that to order withdrawal the filed would opinion seeking reward Petitioner for to obtain simultaneously relief separate two courts.13 and, 13. importantly, promptly Petitioner could have more should have Special Appeals writing notified the Court of that his motion for new granted. comply trial had been Because Petitioner did not with Rule 8-601, the intermediate required court was not to withdraw Moreover, opinion. authority its this Court has no to order that the Special Appeals opinion. Court of withdraw its We reach conclu- *17 judgments because opinions. sion this Court reviews rather than with the State that Petitioner should have are in accord We Maryland in Rules and set forth the followed the timeline Rule appeal, (by accordance with 8-601 timely dismissed his the of the court before the dismissing permission without 2005). Had he its on October appellate opinion court filed latest, so, at the October dismissing appeal done his proceedings in of on November further instead unnecessary.14 the have Notwith- appellate courts would been case, cannot “waive” life into a moot because standing, party a may on something appellate that an court notice mootness is own, if raises the issue. Because the issues party its even no moot, appellate intermediate court could appeal on were the a affirming reversing judgment not have issued its mandate opinion. the that it filed that no existed at time its longer Special the of the case before the Court of posture Given expression that court choose to maintain the Appeals, could by leaving reported its on the novel issue raised its legal views books”; however, authority opinion “on the it did judgment affirm or reverse the of the Circuit Court. prior

CONCLUSION jurisdiction to The Circuit Court retained its fundamental trial, though appeal Petitioner a new even the Appeals. the that the pending We hold erred, law, denying Court of as matter request to after he had been Petitioner’s dismiss trial, granted a new as the new trial rendered moot the challenge judgment appel- to the of the trial court before the Although court. the Circuit Court late trial, ability Special Appeals the Court retained case; however, an on the express opinion novel issue of the intermediate court could not provide remedy longer existing an effective there was an ability gives 14. We the Petitioner note Rule 8-601 dismiss permission any point without the before the prevent opinion requesting does not the Petitioner from is filed. It mootness, appeal, grounds after the court dismiss its opinion is filed. *18 750 parties Therefore, between the at that time.

controversy i.e., mandate, judgment, court’s its should reflected the moot status of case and directed that the appeal be dismissed. THE

JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED; REMANDED CASE TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO THE APPEAL THE DISMISS ON OF GROUNDS MOOTNESS. BALTIMORE COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS IN AND IN THE THIS COURT COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.

RAKER, J., specially opinion concurs and files an in which C.J., BELL, joins.

WILNER, J., in part concurs in part dissents and files BELL, C.J., an opinion in which joins part. Judge, BELL,

RAKER which concurring, C.J., joins: I join in the majority opinion and in the judgment. My opinion concurring Judge is directed at concurring Wilner’s that, opinion in which he states not an although issue for Court, review before test results polygraph per are se Conc, inadmissible, unreliable, no evidentiary and have value. 755-56, op. at 912 A.2d 635. Given the movement law country around state and both federal courts related to the admissibility polygraph test results since Inc., Pharmaceuticals, Daubert v. Merrell 579, Dow 509 U.S. 2786, 125 (1993), 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 469 I think it a big mistake position to take on an any us, issue not properly before particularly one that has not been briefed nor argued. courts,

In the federal permit circuits do not evidence polygraph any results for purpose are now in minority. See, Cordoba, (9th e.g., 225, v. United States 104 F.3d 228 Cir.1997); Posado, (5th 428, United v. States 57 F.3d 434 Cir.1995); Piccinonna, 1529, v. United States 885 F.2d 1535- (11th Cir.1989); Johnson, 37 v. 918, United States 816 F.2d (3rd Cir.1987); 637, 923 v. United States 512 Mayes, F.2d (6th Cir.1975); n. 6 v. Infelice, 1358, United States 506 F.2d nom., v. United (7th Cir.1974), denied sub Garelli cert. (1975). L.Ed.2d 802 States, 95 S.Ct. 419 U.S. excluding poly rule per maintain a se most states Although Porter, 241 Conn. evidence, see, v. e.g., State graph (R.I.1996) Odell, 457, 459 (1997); 672 A.2d In re Gard, 191, 198 Ill.Dec. curiam); 158 Ill.2d People (per (1994); 1026, 1032 Perkins v. S.W.2d 632 N.E.2d 11-707 of Evidence Mexico Rule New (Tex.App.1995), 94-95 without generally admissible polygraph evidence makes restric parties significant and without prior stipulation *19 noted, Scheffer, in v. United States Supreme tion. The (1998), 413 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 118 U.S. follows: is evidence polygraph no consensus that simply

“[T]here community remains day, To this the scientific reliable. tech- extremely reliability polygraph about the polarized Sanders, Saks, D. & Faigman, Kaye, D. M. J. niques. †, 14-2.0, § 14-7.0 § n. and Evidence Modern Scientific Imwinkelried, E. (1997); 1 P. & Scientific see also Giannelli 1993) (2d (hereinafter 8-2(C), pp. § 225-227 ed. Evidence Imwinkelried); on Strong, 1 J. McCormick & Giannelli (4th 1992) (hereinafter § ed. McCor- p. Evidence mick). tests polygraph Some studies concluded Abrams, See, e.g., accurate and S. overall are reliable. (1989) (reporting Handbook 190-191

Complete Polygraph involving laboratory studies accuracy overall rate ‘in to be question technique’ polygraph common ‘control poly- have found that range percent’). of 87 Others accurate- significantly less graph tests assess truthfulness rate of suggest accuracy studies ly scientific field —that is ‘little better question polygraph ‘control technique’ coin,’ is, of a obtained the toss than could be Lykken, The Scientific Status percent. Iacono & See Against Techniques: on The Case Polygraph Research Evidence, Tests, supra, in 1 Modern Scientific Polygraph (hereinafter 14-5.3, Lykken).” § Iacono at & 309-10, 140 L.Ed.2d at 523 U.S. S.Ct. Scheffer, 413. in

My point this writing concurring opinion is not that reliable, in polygraph they tests are fact or that should be evidence, admitted into or be for admissible other purposes idea, other than I adequate at trial. have no without an studies, record and a review the literature and how I would out come on the issue. I simply poly- believe whether graph techniques have made sufficient technological advances State, (1980), v. Kelley since 288 Md. 418 A.2d 217 admissibility seminal of polygraphs Maryland, case and (1978), Reed 391 A.2d 364 the test in Maryland evidence, admissibility novel or scientific fully below, cannot be decided without a developed record with arguments briefs and in this Court. This case is not the one per to reiterate a se rule of inadmissibility, certainly never, never, the case to tell trial judges never consider polygraph exercising tests their discretion toas whether to new trial. The issue is simply not us. before Chief BELL Judge joins has authorized me to state that he concurring opinion. WILNER, Judge, concurring in part dissenting part BELL, C.J., joins which in Part A only:

A. I join in the and judgment agree entirely with the Court’s (1) holdings that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to trial, consider and Cottman’s motion for new notwith- (2) standing pendency of appeal, the the upon grant- the motion, ing of that of Special jurisdic- the Court lost Appeals tion appeal over the and had no choice but to dismiss it once informed that the new granted. disagree, trial had been I however, with the Court’s conclusion that it was not also incumbent appellate on the court to opinion. withdraw its It occasions, that, is true on rare an appellate may consider opine on an issue that is technically moot—where the (1) issue is an especially important one and likely the issue is to recur posture but because the is likely which it recur, will usually be moot the time it appellate reaches an reason, guidance is court, for other some criteria. none of those required. This case meets motion for new Cottman’s granted When the Circuit Court from which judgment trial, effectively it eradicated moot, just there not because The case was appeal was taken. Appeals could no effective relief that was mootness, but, is definition grant, which the traditional for the that, anything to be there ceased beyond because It as if was left. was judgment to review. No appellate court was noted or appeal trial had before new been opinion before the affirmatively dismissed had been in the addressed important There issue was filed. was non-appealable an likely equally to recur in opinion that was from the upon guidance none which context and had no necessary. opinion The Court’s simply article. It than law review precedential more value longer that no regarding the court’s view recited law, but, common to enhance the nothing existed. That does that, upon I rather, being hold detracts from it. would trial, obliged grant of the new the court was informed of the its opinion but withdraw only dismiss refusing to do so. well, it its discretion and that abused B. of the granting

I also to comment on separately write jurisdiction I that the trial court had do agree trial. the correctness of its did, and, although it I realize that what review, inappropri- and therefore is action is not before us resolving appeal, ate for the Court consideration of note that are points worthy I think there are two subject concurring opinion. of a first properly the the circum- apparent anomaly providing that relief under non-jury and rested stances of this case. The case was tried credibility entirely judge’s almost on the assessment Moore, only witness. Moore testified Detective the State’s *21 accomplice that, Cottman and a female August on testimony very precise, a His was bag sold him cocaine. Cottman, both later the scene when and he identified officers, Moore, uniformed by Cottman, summoned arrested Cottman, who, and in court. in an attempt unsuccessful trial, a postponement defense, obtain an claimed alibi did testify not offered evidence. In announcing his verdict guilty, judge stated that he found Detective Moore’s testimony to “very be credible.” the judge credible,

Had not found Moore’s testimony be Cottman, for, he could not lawfully convicted although drugs purchased by placed evidence, Moore were into there was no corroborating Yet, evidence of agency. criminal court, having credibility made that determination and having sentenced Cottman to ten years prison, offered to consider him a granting passed new trial if he a polygraph examination by administered by someone trained either the Army FBI or the Security a Agency. passed poly- Cottman graph examination by administered not someone trained the FBI or the Army Security Agency, but the judge, based on parte an ex assurance from one of his colleagues that the agent was qualified, a granted Cottman new trial nonetheless. that,

What me strikes anomalous about this is if the function polygraph examination way was in some to diminish Detective Moore’s credibility showing Cottman person ie., who sold him the to support the cocaine — alibi defense for he which offered no evidence at trial —and the judge accepted the result for that purpose, which would be its relevance, only remedy trial, should not have been then, but an acquittal, there would necessarily, be a reasonable doubt as doubt, to Cottman’s guilt. very uncertainty, impelled the judge new trial Constitutionally required that acquitted. Cottman be What would left to retry? be is just

This one why illustration of trial ought courts not be granting motions for making pivotal new trial or judicial other decisions on based the results of a polygraph examination. clear, This occasions, Court has made numerous polygraph inadmissible, test are results not because of some evidence, technical rule of they but because are unreliable.

755 217, (1980); 298, 302, 219 State, 418 v. 288 Md. Kelley See (1985), 487, 513, 1, 14 cert. State, 495 A.2d Md. 303 Johnson v. (1986); 868, L.Ed.2d 907 denied, 88 106 S.Ct. 474 U.S. (1988); 266, 278, 663 State, 539 A.2d 312 Md. Bohnert v. (1992); Hawkins, 604 A.2d 326 Md. State v. (1992). In 617 A.2d Patrick v. has reliability of such tests Hawkins, “[t]he we iterated that satisfaction,” our that “[i]n and to our not been established detector, the lie trier of fact is justice, the system of criminal function to be disallowing in that we have been steadfast and trustworthy.” to be a we have not found by usurped process may be Whatever their use 275, 604 A.2d at 492. 326 Md. at prosecutorial or even for purposes investigation for police in value court. decisions, they evidentiary have no by whether offered are inadmissible Polygraph results or help to hurt They cannot be used State the defendant. and untrustworthy are precisely they because defendant’s case I wholly impermissible, It is value. evidentiary found, believe, has that this Court judges to use evidence law, to untrustworthy a matter of be as a fact and as decisions, discretionary unreliable, judicial even making us, I unhesitatingly would If the had been before ones. issue new trial in this case an granting have held that the is discretion, is that there problem abuse of it was. which it. nothing, decisionally, that we can do about Raker cites several Feder- concurring opinion, Judge In her al that “circuits that do proposition decisions for the any now purpose results for are permit polygraph evidence light supposed that in of that minority” suggests evidence, polygraph inappropriate shift in it thinking about “never, never, never consider Maryland judges to tell discretion as to whether exercising tests their polygraph new trial.” reading The first is that responses. my I have several such shift. Judge any Raker not reveal the cases cited does (9th Cir.1997), Cordoba, v. 104 F.3d In United States results were admissible. polygraph court did not hold Quite contrary. The court pointed out that firm its hostility it, to polygraph evidence had led with conformance Frye States, v. (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. United hold such inadmissible, evidence was se per Frye but overruled, standard had been with respect Federal court proceedings, Pharmaceuticals, Daubert Dow Merrell 579, 113 2786, 125 (1993). U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d The District *23 Court, following the Ninth precedent, Circuit had excluded polygraph evidence by inadmissible, offered per Cordoba as se and court vacated and remanded the case for trial court to review the evidence under the Daubert standard. Ninth clear, The Circuit court very made however, that this holding, not “[w]ith we are expressing enthusiasm for of unstipulated admission polygraph evidence” problematic because inherent “[t]he nature such evidence Cordoba, remains.” United States v. supra, 104 F.3d at 228. It agreed with the comment of the Fifth Circuit Posado, (5th United States v. 57 Cir.1995), F.3d that do not “[w]e now hold that polygraph examinations are scienti fically valid or that will they always fact, assist the trier of or any this other individual case.” Not is only that decision the antithesis of an endorsement of evidence,

polygraph but more so is what occurred following the remand. two-day After a hearing, the District found that the evidence was inadmissible under Daubert —that (1) although capable of testing subject review, and peer reliable error rate conclusions were available for real-life (2) polygraph testing, there no general acceptance of it in the scientific community courtroom pur- fact-determinative (3) poses, there were no standards, reliable and accepted standards, without such there was no toway ensure proper protocols to reliability. measure The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed that Cordoba, decision. United States v. 194 F.3d (9th Cir.1999). so, In doing it major commented that “[a] why reason scientific debate over polygraph validity yields conflicting conclusions is that the validity of such a complex procedure is difficult to assess may vary widely from one application to another.” Id. at 1059. It expressly also con- that “the relevant scien- District conclusion firmed the Court’s exams as accept polygraph community generally did tific used as evidence a trial.” rehable be being sufficiently Id. 1061. Raker antedated by Judge other cases cited Federal approach now follow the those courts

Daubert. Whether subject evidence polygraph the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and least, pre- At the very to Daubert is unclear. analysis cases, suspect. are inquiry, some further Daubert absent is determination Feder response any second My may al be admissible under polygraph courts evidence analysis ago, seven months quite Only Daubert irrelevant. State, (2006), 392 Md. A.2d Clemons test, allegiance to the unanimously Frye maintained its done earlier in Wilson v. years it had four (2002). Court, day day even if one either Finally, —some —this our approach by reversing earlier adopting Daubert Frye holding polygraph cases and evidence satisfies the *24 admissible, test, day that such is that should conclude evidence now, any is us yet upon us. Were the issue before absent in the six community dramatic shift within the scientific last in years, presumably applying we would be influenced Supreme Frye test the statement of United Scheffer, States v. 523 U.S. S.Ct. (1998), “there is simply

L.Ed.2d consensus is To polygraph day, evidence reliable. scientific reliability community extremely polarized remains about statement, by That polygraph techniques.” way, support of a Rule Evidence holding Military made inadmissible, polygraph which made evidence se per legitimate justice process served interests in the criminal unconstitutionally preclude did not the defendant offer- ing evidence his defense. that, I adhere to the view until such time this Court

So polygraph to reverse itself and hold that evidence chooses admissible, should, judges Judge trial Raker’s reliable words, “never, never, never polygraph consider tests in exer- cising their discretion as to whether to grant a new trial.” They judicial should no more base decisions on polygraph results than reading on a of the runes or astrological charts. here, Given what occurred with great respect for Judge Rak- view, I er’s think this is precisely the case make that point, at least in a concurring opinion. Judge joins

Chief BELL in Part onlyA of this opinion.

912A.2d 637 Grogrieo Saturio FIELDS Maryland. STATE 34, Sept. Term, No. 2006. Maryland. Dec. 2006.

Case Details

Case Name: Cottman v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Dec 8, 2006
Citation: 912 A.2d 620
Docket Number: 1 September Term, 2006
Court Abbreviation: Md.
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