112 N.Y. 299 | NY | 1889
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *301 The scheme of the testator, as disclosed by his will, was to devote his entire estate, after payment of his debts, to the establishment and perpetual maintenance of a public library, to be known as "The McIlvaine Library." This scheme he sought to accomplish by constituting trustees, in whom and their successors, indefinitely, all his property should presently or ultimately be vested in trust for the purpose specified. The testator, at his death, owned a library and other personal property and real estate in the states of New York and Ohio. By the first section of the will he gave his library, books, pamphlets, maps, documents, papers and all things thereunto appertaining, "to the mayor of the city of New York and the president of the New York Academy of Medicine, and the president of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of New York, and their successors," to have and to hold the same in trust forever for the uses and purposes of a public library, with special direction that it should be open to the *305 "public of all classes," for their free use, without any restrictions, except orderly conduct and good behavior; and that "the said library be forever maintained as a separate, exclusive and distinct institution, to be forever known as `The McIlvaine Library,' and be kept free from all amalgamations or admixtures with any other library, collection or institution." By the second section the testator gave and devised to his executor all his real and personal property, except the said library, and directed him to sell and dispose of the same, and out of the proceeds,first, pay his debts and funeral expenses; second, invest sufficient to produce an annual income of $400 to be divided among certain life annuitants, the principal sum on their death to fall into his residuary estate; and third, to pay over all the rest, residue and remainder of said proceeds to the "trustees of my said library hereinbefore named," who were directed to invest such proceeds in purchasing or renting "suitable accommodations" for said library and in certain specified stocks or securities, and use and devote the income from such investments to its establishment and maintenance.
The validity of the trust attempted to be created in the will is the question in controversy. It is conceded that the will is to be construed as a will of personal property only. It is plain that the direction to the executor to convert the real and personal estate, except the library, into money for the purposes of the will, viz., the payment of debts, the investment of a fund for the payment of annuities, and the residuary gift (which, in terms, is of the proceeds of the sale), operated as an equitable conversion of the real estate into personalty as of the time of the death of the testator. (Fisher v. Banta,
On the remaining question, whether the testator intended to constitute the individuals who, in succession from time to time, should occupy the position of mayor of New York, president of the New York Academy of Medicine, and president *308
of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of the city of New York, his trustees, to establish and manage the library, or, as is claimed by the respondents, he intended that the corporations of which such persons should be officers, should take the bequest and administer the trust in their corporate capacity, we entertain no doubt. The language used is inappropriate to express an intention to vest the title to the fund in the corporations themselves, while it is very apt as a designation by description of presumably suitable persons who, in succession, should be the trustees to carry out the purposes of the trust. The testator desired to perpetuate his own name as the founder of a public library, and made careful provision, that it should be separately kept and maintained without, as he says, "admixture or amalgamation with any other library, collection or institution." It was the persons described by their official designation and their successors whom he constituted trustees. The corporations with which they were connected were of unlimited duration and, presumably, could have no successors, but the individuals who should be the chief officers at any time would be succeeded by others. It was certainly quite natural that the testator should believe, in view of the object of the gift, that some, at least, of the persons designated would be willing to assume the position of trustees of the library during their official tenure. This arrangement would be likely to secure a safe and efficient management; while, on the other hand, to impute to the testator the intention to make the three corporations specified the trustees would charge him with the construction of a complex scheme, the administration of which would be attended with much difficulty, and tending to subvert his primary purpose of making the library a separate and independent institution. The three corporations, acting by separate and independent boards, would be a very cumbrous machinery for conducting a public library. The other view of the testator's intention is the natural one, and is in precise accordance with his language, and where the language of a will is plain and unambiguous, we are not permitted to wrest it from its natural *309
import in order to save a provision from condemnation. The law permits a testator to tie up his property, upon certain prescribed limitations, and one of them forbids a perpetuity; and in interpreting a will, with reference to this condition, "we must do exactly in the same way as if the rule against perpetuity had never been established, or was repealed when the will was made, not varying the construction in order to avoid the effect of that rule, but interpreting the words of the testator wholly without reference to it." PARKE, B., in Dungannon v. Smith
(12 Cl. Fin. 599). (Van Nostrand v. Moore,
The respondent cites a class of cases, of which Manice v.Manice (
We are of opinion, that the Special Term gave the proper construction to the will in question.
This leads to a reversal of the judgment below, and an affirmance of the judgment of the Special Term.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly. *310