56 Ga. 201 | Ga. | 1876
Caroline Cottingham, widow of James D. Cottingham, deceased, brought suit against William J. Weekes for the unlawful killing of her husband. The declaration was demurred to on the ground that no right of action existed in case of the homicide of the husband in favor of the wife, except against railroad companies which, by negligence, caused the death of deceased. The single question is, does the right of action exist in all cases. The act of 1850, Cobb’s Digest, page 476, gave to the legal representative of the deceased the right to sue for damages in such cases, and that act applies generally to all persons guilty of homicide. The Code gave the right to sue to the widow in lieu of the legal representative of deceased: Code, 2371. By reference to our reports it will be seen that the question was mooted whether the act applied at all to railroad companies. It was held that it did: 24 Georgia Reports, 362; but this ruling did not restrict the general right in other cases and against other defendants. It simply applied and extended against corporations as artificial persons, a right of action which the statute gave against persons generally, and which nobody doubted existed by the terms of the act against all natural persons. Nor does the act of 1855-6 take away this right of action against natural persons guilty of homicide. It extends the right to cases against railroads eo nomine and restricts the right of recovery to certain persons; to the widow first; if no widow, to the children; if none, then to the legal rep resen (ative: Acts of 1855-6, page 155. Section 2971 of the Code is as broad as the English language can make its provisions; nor is it restricted by section 2972. That, in terms, applies to torts less than homicide, because the plaintiff’s ordinary care is al
Let the judgment be reversed.