220 Mo. 284 | Mo. | 1909
This is an action for damages from personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, its agents, servants and employees, commenced and tried in the circuit court of Pemiscot county.
At the June term, 1905, the plaintiff filed an amended petition, in which he stated the incorporation of the defendant and then alleged that on November 4, 1904, while he was walking northeastward on the railroad tracks of the defendant, within the village limits of the village of Steele in Pemiscot county, Missouri,-an incorporated village, duly incorporated under the laws of Missouri, where the track was level
At the same term, the defendant filed its answer,,, admitting its incorporation, denying all the allegations: in the petition, and further replied that the plaintiff at the time he received his injuries voluntarily exposed himself to danger on the tracks of the defendant and was a trespasser and under the influence of alcoholic stimulants to the extent that he was in a .drunken condition, and if he was injured as alleged in the petition, such injuries were the result of his own carelessness and not the carelessness of the defendant.
The replication of the plaintiff was a general denial of the new matter set up in the answer.
At the same term the cause was tried before a jury and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for five thousand dollars. In due time the, defendant filed its motion for a new trial, which was by the court overruled.
After the jury were sworn, the plaintiff by leave of the court amended his petition by striking out the-damages, to-wit, fifteen thousand dollars and three-thousand dollars for special damages, and inserted in lieu thereof eighteen thousand dollars as general damages. To which amendment the defendant excepted at the time.
The evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to prove that he lived a mile and a half from the* village of Steele; that on November 4, 1904, he went:
Woodward, a witness for plaintiff, testified he lived in Steele, and kept a boarding house; he saw the engine and there was no headlight on it, could have seen train approaching for some distance if the engine had been lighted, could easily have seen it for three-quarters of a mile, was sure there was no headlight. He passed in front of the engine and rode upon it that night. On cross-examination, he stated that the plaintiff was taken from under the train before he arrived at the place of injury. The train did not whistle nor was any bell rung. He had often seen foot-passengers travel up the track during the eight years he had lived in the neighborhood, they used it as a footpath, and traveled it very frequently. It had been used as a footpath ever since the track was built. The company kept a depot agent at Steele.
Dr. Swearingen treated plaintiff and testified that amputation was necessary. One of his legs was ground half way to the knee. His right foot and leg were ground off. He also had bruises on his back and side and his left ankle was dislocated, he was badly bruised in his hips and lumbar regions and had a gash on his head. On cross-examination the doctor identified the plat and location of the streets and crossings.
J. R. Jenkins testified that he lived three or four hundred yards from where they brought Cotner and put him off at Wall’s. He could see down the track from his house and did not see any headlight. The railroad was the only passway in that neighborhood in the winter time, and the only way they could get to Steele. There was an agent at Steele, who knew that the right of way and track was used by pedestrians. The track was used by pedestrians both day and night.
Boscoe Wall testified that he lived about three-quarters of a mile up the track from Steele when plaintiff was hurt, saw the train that night, it was then even with his house, and it came there for his father to go up for plaintiff. There was no headlight burning that night, and there was no headlight burning on the train on the second trip. He was a brother-in-law of the plaintiff. The train came up to his father’s house and got him and then backed down and brought plaintiff back. He was sure there was no headlight; the night was dark, but not cloudy.
W. T. Wall, for the plaintiff, testified he saw the engine first at his house three-quarters of a mile above Steele, and was told that it had run over Cotner. He got on the engine and went down with them. He stated there was no headlight, and thought if there had been one he would have seen it as he went down to Steele on the engine with fireman in the cab and found the plaintiff there injured. He was the plaintiff’s father-in-law, and they came to his house with the engine for him and he got on it and went back to Steele. He had lived there for about four years and plaintiff lived about one-quarter of a mile from him. He knew the place where plaintiff was hurt, and the train could have been seen south for a distance of a mile and a half, he thinks. He knew the track was used as a footpath, and he had seen others use it for that purpose. ' William Beed on behalf of plaintiff stated that he was acquainted with the plaintiff and saw him the night he was hurt and left Laden’s saloon with him. Plaintiff went one way and he went the other. Witness had gone nearly a half a quarter be
This was substantially all the evidence on the part of plaintiff.
On the part of the defendant, Charles Johnson testified that he lived at Steele about two years, and in November, 1904, he was barkeeper for Coleman & Gibson. He had known plaintiff five or six years, saw him the night he was injured; he was in the saloon drinking right smart; he was intoxicated and was not walking right straight, but was not boisterous, saw him take several drinks, and sold him a bottle of whisky about ten o’clock that night. He was asked what plaintiff’s habits were about lying down when he got full. His answer was that he did not know, he never saw him down dead drunk. On cross-examination, he stated that he did not know what plaintiff did with the whisky he sold him that night. He sold him several drinks during the day, but did not remember whether it was in the morning or afternoon. Plaintiff was not so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.
J. P. Lee testified that he was marshal when plaintiff was hurt and had known him about six years,
Gibson & Coleman’s gin was south of the depot near the crossing of the Mississippi Valley Railroad and the Steele Supply Company’s gin was right opposite it on the other side.
Laden testified that he lived at Steele, was a saloon-keeper. He had known plaintiff about two years and saw him the night he was hurt, in his saloon, and he seemed to be drinking, but was able to get where he pleased; about ten o’clock that night he saw plaintiff drink a couple of bottles of beer. The witness sold him a pint of whisky a little after ten o’clock. While plaintiff was drinking some he was going where he pleased and came into the saloon with another man and took a couple of bottles of beer.
J. W. Poster testified that he lived at Steele and did one thing and another and railroaded some this summer and was night watch in November, 1904. He had known plaintiff about two years and remembers the night he was hurt, but had not seen him that night before he was injured. He heard the train come in about half past eleven and it blew a couple of whistles for the crossing but he did not hear the bell ring. Witness was inside of the cotton gin of the
Underhill, the engineer, testified that he was on' the locomotive when the plaintiff was injured. The train reached Steele at 11:55 that night and ran ber' tween Big Creek and Hayti. And in coming to Steele he blew one long whistle at every railroad crossing and stopped and blew two more. The fireman rang the bell all the way from the crossing up to the time he stopped and he stopped the train four or five cars north of the platform; he stopped because he got a signal from the brakeman to slack ahead until they got the car where they wanted it to stop. After passing the crossing they were running- about three miles
Gilpin testified that he was a brakeman for defendant on the train that night and his duty was to do the switching; they got to Steele between 11 and 11:55 that night, were six or seven hours late. Witness is now a brakeman on the M., K. & T. railroad.
T. J. Odom was the fireman on the train that night. He testified the headlight was burning when plaintiff was hurt. As the «train approached Steele the first signal was one long whistle for the station, then two long whistles for the stop at the railroad crossing, and then they pulled up town, and he began ringing the bell before they crossed the crossing and rang it up into the station, but does not know how far north of the depot the engine stopped. They
J.' F. Halterman was a brakeman on the train also that night. He corroborated Odom as to the headlight being lighted and as to the giving of the signals for the station and at the crossings. Conld not remember whether the bell was rung or not. He assisted in taking plaintiff from under the train, he tried to question him to find out who he was, but he did not answer. Did not hear him make any statement before he was moved, was not positive he was lying with his face down, but thinks he was.
In rebuttal the plaintiff offered a number of witnesses who testified that the train did not have a headlight lighted on the front part of the engine, and to the fact that the whistle was not sounded, one witness saying that he heard the whistle, but thought it sounded like the cotton gin whistle.
This was substantially all the evidence in the case.
I. The first error assigned by the defendant is that the court erred in permitting the plaintiff to amend his petition after the jury had been impaneled, and before the evidence was heard, by striking out the prayer for three thousand dollars special damages, and by making his prayer for general damages eighteen thousand dollars instead of fifteen thousand dollars. It will be noted that the only change made was to charge the whole amount of damages that had been inserted in the original petition under the head of prayer for general damages, and strike out the prayer for special damages. The facts stated in the two petitions were identical, and it was perfectly competent for the court to permit the amendment. The same evidence would have necessarily supported either petition. It was an amendment and not a change of the
II. The circuit court in its instruction number one for the plaintiff directed the jury that, if they found and believed from the evidence that at the point where plaintiff was struck, run over and injured, if you find from the evidence that he was struck, run over and injured, said track was clear and unobstructed, and sufficiently straight to permit a view along the track from an approaching train; and if the jury further believe that, at the point where plaintiff was struck by the engine and cars, the roadbed of defendant, both northeast and southwest of said point, was, at the time, used and had for a long period of time prior thereto been used with the knowledge of the defendant, its servants, agents and employees, by pedestrians as a footpath leading to and from the village of Steele, then it was the duty of the defendant’s employees in charge of and operating its engine and train of cars, when approaching said portion of defendant’s roadbed, as was used as aforesaid as a passway, to keep a lookout for persons and to ascertain that said track was clear, and if they found from the evidence that at the time the engine and cars reached said portion of track that was used as aforesaid as a passway, that it was in the nighttime, and that the night was- a dark one, then it was the duty of the defendant’s employees in charge of said engine and cars to use ordinary care to provide a means to see and observe whether or not said track was clear, and if the jury found that the defendant’s employees in charge of said engine and cars recklessly, negligently and carelessly failed to perform their duties in this respect, and by reason thereof plaintiff
The jury were further instructed that although they might believe from the evidence that plaintiff was a trespasser upon defendant’s track at the time he was struck and injured, if they' further find and believe from the evidence that the engineer or fireman in charge of said engine which struck and injured plaintiff, by the use of ordinary care could have seen plaintiff and the perilous position in which he was placed, and that plaintiff was unaware of his peril, and was proceeding along the track unconscious of the approaching train, then it was the duty of the engineer to use ordinary care with the means at hand to have avoided the injury to plaintiff. But if they find the defendant, by its said servants, failed to use such ordinary care and plaintiff was injured, they would find for the plaintiff.
The court defined ordinary care to be such care as an ordinary, careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
The court also instructed the jury that if they believe from the evidence that plaintiff immediately before the accident came upon the railroad track of the defendant at the point on said track, which had been prior to and was at the time of the accident, used by the public with the knowledge and tacit consent of the defendant, as a footpath, and that before stepping upon the said track, he listened and looked south for an approaching engine, and could not and did not see the approach of the train; that it was in the nighttime, and the night was dark, and the headlight on the engine was not burning or lighted, and by the reason of the negligence of the defendant
For the defendant the court instructed the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff while on the track of the defendant railroad to look and listen both ways for the approach of the train, and if at any time, before he was injured, while he was on the defendant’s track, he could either by looking or by listening have seen oí known of the approach of the train in time to have avoided the accident complained of, then he could not recover. And although they might find from the evidence that persons were in the habit of walking on the railroad track from time to time where the plaintiff was injured, and that defendant knew it, yet, unless they further find that its track at this place was habitually so used, and that it knew it, or by the exercise of ordinary care might have known it, then the defendant’s servants in charge of the train owed no duty to keep a lookout at that place for persons on the track, and it was not liable in that case for the injuries received by the plaintiff, unless its servants in charge of the engine and train which injured him saw or knew that he was in a dangerous position, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known his dangerous position on the track in time to have stopped the train and avoided injuring him and failed to do so.
It is. insisted by the defendant that the evidence did not justify the submission of the ease to the jury, for that, the plaintiff went upon the. defendant’s railroad track about midnight upon a dark night, after having heard the train before he did so, and at a time of night when the defendant and employees under the facts in the case were not required to antici
As to the other proposition included in this contention, to-wit, that the employees of the defendant in charge of its engine and train that night were not required to anticipate the presence of any one on the track at the point of the injury, the court took
In Fearons v. Railroad, 180 Mo. l. c. 223, this court, speaking through Fox, J., said: “But, again, if it is at a point where there is reasonable ground for expecting or anticipating the presence of persons, the presumption of a clear track is destroyed, and even though the persons be trespassers, it does not relieve those in charge of the moving cars from keeping a careful lookout for the persons so expected to be present at that point. There was sufficient testimony in this cause, at least, tending to show a state of facts, in respect to the use of this tunnel as a foot passageway from one section of the city to another, as would authorize the submission of the case to the jury.” All
In'this case the first essential inquiry must be to ascertain and determine what were the duties of the defendant’s engineer and fireman in charge of the engine and train that night and at the place where plaintiff was struck, and how, if at all, they failed to discharge those duties, for unless the law cast upon them a duty to plaintiff there could be no negligence. In this and all similar cases, the defendant insists it owed no duty whatever to plaintiff save that of not wantonly and recklessly injuring him after the engineer or fireman actually saw the peril to which plaintiff was exposed and as they did not see him until after he was struck, there was no liability. As a necessary corollary of this presumption defendant insists that it was under no obligation to ring its bell or blow the whistle on its said engine, and that its failure to have a. headlight lighted and burning on the engine was not an omission of duty of which the plaintiff can complain in the circumstances.
Conceding that a railroad track upon which engines and trains are run is necessarily and obviously a place of danger for pedestrians, and that ordinarily he is a trespasser and guilty of negligence per se in walking upon the track, yet a long line of decisions by this court has determined that cases may and do arise where, though the company is entitled to a clear track, it cannot fairly be presumed that the track is clear, and the duty then arises to look out, and the liability is not limited to want of care after discovery of the danger. [Williams v. Railroad, 96 Mo. l. c. 281.]
in. As to the refusal of the instruction numbered six, to the effect that the defendant was guilty of no negligence in running its engine and train at the rate of speed shown by the testimony, or at any rate of speed, it is sufficient to say that no right of recovery whatever was based upon the charge that the train was being run too rapidly. While the instruction might have been well enough in a proper case, we think it had no place in this case. The court did not err in refusing it.
IY. Defendant complains of the modification by the court of its instruction number nine. As modified it was in these words, and numbered seven by the court: “The court further instructs you, that if you find from the evidence that plaintiff was injured while on the track of defendant’s railroad, as alleged in the petition, and when he was so injured, he was intoxicated in any degree, and his intoxication was unknown to the defendant’s servants in charge of the train, then his intoxication will not excuse the omission, on his part, of that same care and prudence which would have been required of a sober man, under the same circumstances and situation, to have exercised to protect
V. The court committed no error in modifying instruction number eight as requested by the defendant and giving in lieu thereof instruction number five. The modification was required by the law defining the duty of the defendant’s engineer and fireman as already herein announced. And for the same reason the court committed no error in refusing instructions 1, 2, 3 and 4, as they were all based upon the proposition that defendant’s servants, under the facts of this case, were not required to exercise ordinary care to discover the plaintiff on the track at the place where he was injured.
VI. There was no error in permitting the plaintiff to prove over the objections of the defendant by the witnesses J. R. Jenkins, Roscoe Wall, W. T. Wall and his wife, that the locomotive had no headlight lighted and burning that night. The objection was that these witnesses did not see the locomotive immediately before it struck and injured the- plaintiff, but
We have carefully gone through the evidence in the case, and there was unquestionably plain and direct conflict in the testimony. On the part of the plaintiff the evidence tended to show that there was no headlight burning and no bell rung on the locomotive at the time the train ran over the plaintiff, whereas on the part of the defendant the testimony of the train crew and the engineer and the fireman was to the effect that the headlight was burning brightly. Under these circumstances, it clearly was the province of the jury to determine which evidence they believed, and it was their province to reconcile the evidence if they could.
There is this to be said in regard to the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff: if, as the testimony of the engineer and fireman indicates, the heádlight would have thrown a light for at least one hundred feet in front of the engine, and the train was only running three miles an hour and could have been stopped in from six to twenty feet, it seems almost incredible that neither the fireman nor the engineer saw the plaintiff on the track as he clearly and evidently was at the time, whereas, if the plaintiff’s testimony is true and the headlight was not burning, and there was no light there, then we can readily understand why the engineer and fireman did not see the plaintiff on the track, and this is by far the most charitable view to take of the evidence; but as we have said, the jury found that there was no headlight on the engine, and that the bell was not. rung, and that the plaintiff was walking on a track which was habitually used by people of that