In this аction to set aside a finding of paternity and to modify child support, we granted discretionary appeal tо review the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Stanley Mehosky for his counsel’s contempt-hearing preparation after his ex-wife failed to comply with an order for DNA testing. As the statute relied upon by the trial court does not authorize an award of attorney fees in this case, we reverse.
The undisputed evidence shows that Mehosky and Victoria Cothran were divorced on July 15,1997. In the final decree, Mehosky acknowledged paternity of thе two minor children born during the marriage (a daughter and a son) and was ordered to pay child support. On November 30, 2005, he filed an action to set aside the finding of paternity and to modify the child support award, claiming that he was not thе legitimate biological father of the son. When Cothran contested these claims, Mehosky obtained an order from the trial court requiring Cothran to submit to DNApaternity testing. She refused to comply, and Mehosky moved for contempt. Prior to the court’s ruling at a December 5, 2006 contempt hearing, the parties entered into an agreement, in whiсh Cothran conceded Mehosky was not the biological father of the son, and in which Mehosky’s child support obligation was modified. The sole issue remaining before the trial court was Mehosky’s request for attorney fees.
Although it declined to award attorney fees for the entire cost of the action, the court awarded fees to Mehоsky, pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-2, for his counsel’s work performed in preparation for the contempt hearing. The court reаsoned that OCGA § 19-6-2 (a) authorized attorney fees in “alimony, divorce and alimony, or contempt proceedings,” аnd thus governed the December 5 contempt hearing. 1 The court rejected Mehosky’s claim of $6,071.50 worth of work by his *641 attorney performed for the contempt hearing, and awarded $3,705 as “reasonable compensation.”
Cothran appeals, contending that OCGA § 19-6-2 does not authorize attorney fees in these circumstances, and that therefore the trial court’s award was in error. We agree.
Where, as here, the issue is a question of law, we apрly the plain legal error standard of review and owe no deference to the trial court’s ruling. Suarez v. Halbert. 2
“As a general rule, Georgia law does not provide for the award of attorney fees even to a prevailing party unless аuthorized by statute or by contract.”
Suarez v. Halbert,
supra,
Where the action seeks solely to modify thе alimony or divorce decree, however, such as an action for modification of child support, child custody, or visitation, and does not contain any contempt allegations for failure to comply with the original alimony or divorce decree, it falls outside the parameters of OCGA § 19-6-2. See
Cotting v. Cotting,
supra,
Here, the aсtion was not for alimony or divorce, which had in fact been finalized between the parties approximatеly eight-and-one-half years earlier. Instead, the action to set aside the paternity finding as to the son and to decrease the child support obligation was an action for modification of the original divorce decree. See
Thornton v. Intveldt
10
(award of attorney fees reversed where action sought modification of custody and child suрport). The case involved no allegations of contempt for noncompliance with the original deсree. See
Cotting v. Cotting,
supra,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
The trial court rejected any other statutory basis for awarding attorney fees in the action. It reasoned that attorney fees were not authorized under OCGA § 19-7-54 (g), since the petition *641 for DNA testing had not heen denied. The court also concluded that attorney fees were not authorized under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), as the proceedings were not frivolous.
Suarez v.
Halbert,
Cason v. Cason,
Johnson v. Johnson,
Rieffel v. Rieffel,
Cotting v. Cotting,
Thedieck v. Thedieck,
Glaza v. Morgan,
McDonogh v. O’Connor,
Thornton v. Intveldt,