Vivian COSE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TOWNER COUNTY, a Public Corporation, and Roy Peterson, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 7795.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Dec. 10, 1959.
On Rehearing May 2, 1960.
102 N.W.2d 538
Duffy & Haugland, Devils Lake, for respondent.
This is an action for wrongful death. Plaintiff‘s decedent met his death in a collision between a car driven by him and a caterpillar propelled road maintainer operated by the defendant, Roy Peterson, as an employee of the defendant, Towner County. At the trial of the case, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict against both defendants and judgment was entered on the verdict. After judgment, the defendants joined in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. This motion was denied in both its phases and the defendants have appealed both from the order of denial and from the judgment.
On the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict it was urged, that the evidence established contributory negligence upon the part of plaintiff‘s decedent as a matter of law, and that since the defendants were engaged in performing a governmental function at the time of the collision, they are shielded from suit by governmental immunity.
The collision occurred at about 5:30 p. m. on November 26, 1956. The day was clear and the visibility was good. The time was approximately one half hour after sunset or in the middle twilight. The defendant, Peterson, testified that it was possible to see 300 to 400 feet without lights and the witness, Mrs. Ahrentz, testified that she could see 250 to 300 feet. Immediately prior to the collision the road maintainer was proceeding southward spreading a windrow of gravel from the east edge of the highway. It was moving in the east lane of the highway or that which is ordinarily reserved for north bound traffic. The patrol was equipped with two operating lights located, one on each side of the top of the cab, nine and a half feet above the ground. The lights had been turned on about 5:00 o‘clock p. m. They were focused at a point on the ground about fifteen feet ahead of the front end of the patrol. The patrol was not equipped with warning flags or colored lights of any kind.
The decedent was a farmer who resided about eleven miles north of Egeland. On the day before the collision he had driven home from Minneapolis, arriving some time after midnight or in the very early morning of the day of the accident. Between 8:00 and 9:00 o‘clock of that morning he was in Cando. He left Cando some time in the afternoon and he left Egeland for his farm at about 5:30 p. m. The road north from Egeland is slightly undulating. It has shallow dips and low crests with long and moderate grades between. The dips are of sufficient depth, in some instances, to prevent the driver of a car at the low point of one dip from seeing a car at the bottom of a succeeding dip. About a half mile north of Egeland decedent passed a truck which was being driven by the witness, Hanson, in the same direction at a speed of about 40 miles an hour. Three miles north of Egeland decedent crashed head on into the county road maintainer. Just prior to the crash Peterson, the operator of the maintainer, had stopped it and taken it out of gear. As a result of the crash the whole front end of decedent‘s car was telescoped as far back as the rear of the front seat and the maintainer which weighed 15 tons was moved about three feet.
Upon this record defendants assert that plaintiff‘s decedent was negligent as a matter of law and that his negligence contributed proximately to cause his injury and death. Questions of negligence and contributory negligence are questions of fact for the jury unless the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but one conclusion therefrom. Rettler v. Ebreck, N.D., 71 N.W.2d 759; McCullagh v. Fortune, 76 N.D. 669, 38 N.W.2d 771; Olson v. Kem Temple, 78 N.D. 263, 49 N.W.2d 99. Is there any reasonable hypothesis, consistent with the proof, which will explain the collision without the necessity of imputing contributory negligence to the decedent? If there is, the question was one for the jury.
As a possible reasonable inference from the testimony the plaintiff suggests that decedent‘s view of the lights of the road patrol, before he topped the crest of the hill, would be confusing; that it would be reasonable for him to assume that they were the lights of a car approaching in its proper lane from a considerable distance and that in the circumstances, he could be excused for not seeing the patrol until he was too close to avoid the collision. The fallacy in this view of the testimony lies in the fact that not only the lights of the grader, but the grader itself and the bright spot on the road in front of the grader, upon which its lights were focused, were all within the range of decedent‘s vision for a distance of 400 to 500 feet before he reached the point of collision. The highway was perfectly straight and there was a clear way of passage 18 feet wide to the west of the patrol. In these circumstances it is inconceivable that the decedent, had he been alert, maintaining a watchful lookout, and driving at a reasonable speed, as it was his duty to do, would not have seen and recognized an obstacle in his path of travel when he was 400 feet away or 300 feet away or even 200 feet away from the patrol and have taken some positive action either by stopping or by passing to the west of the patrol to avoid or at least minimize the effect of the collision.
We consider it established that decedent drove his car into the county road patrol which was within the range of his vision for 400 to 500 feet before the collision without making any attempt to slow down or turn aside, that had he been maintaining a watchful lookout, he would have recognized that the patrol was an obstacle in his line of travel at a distance of at least 200 feet and that had he been traveling at a reasonable speed and maintaining a lookout he could have avoided the accident either by stopping or by passing in the open traffic lane to the west of the patrol. The facts of this case are similar to those in Billingsley v. McCormick Transfer Co., 58 N.D. 913, 228 N.W. 424. In that case the plaintiff had collided with a truck which had stopped in his lane of traffic. There was a dispute in the testimony as to whether there was a white light showing on the truck. There this court said: (58 N.D. 920, 228 N.W. 427)
“Stormy nights, dusty roads, passing vehicles, distracting circumstances, sudden emergencies, are all nonexistent. His lights were good, the car could be controlled, the road was wide and in excellent condition. The physical facts are such that no conclusion can be reached but that of carelessness, heedlessness, and negligence of the driver of plaintiff‘s car; that this was the real cause of the accident, or so contributed to it that without it no collision could have occurred.”
Also similar is the case of Bagan v. Bitterman, 65 N.D. 423, 259 N.W. 266. In that case this court said: (65 N.D. 427, 259 N.W. 267)
“* * * plaintiff cannot recover because of contributory negligence. He stated his lights were in good shape, and lighted the road for a distance of 200 feet. He was traveling at a rate not to exceed 25 miles per hour. He was keeping a lookout and yet he did not see the truck until he was upon it. Others testified they saw the truck for about 100 feet ahead. Either he was driving at an excessive rate of speed or was not driving carefully or his lights were poor or he was not keeping a lookout. There was no object to obscure his vision.”
See also Schaller v. Bjornstad, 77 N.D. 51, 40 N.W.2d 59; Doll v. Treiber, N.D., 76 N.W.2d 910.
While we are of the view that the undisputed evidence establishes that decedent had sufficient time and distance within which to avoid the accident after he
The record in this case is such that we can conceive of no reasonable explanation of the collision between decedent‘s car and the county patrol from which negligence of the decedent as a substantial contributing factor can be eliminated. Since the judgment in this case cannot stand because of the contributory negligence of plaintiff‘s decedent, it is unnecessary for us to consider any of the other questions raised on this appeal. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendants.
SATHRE, C. J., and MORRIS, J., concur.
On Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
A rehearing was granted in this case. After a re-argument and a reconsideration of all of the issues, we adhere to the opinion heretofore filed in this case.
SATHRE, C. J., and BURKE, MORRIS, STRUTZ and TEIGEN, JJ., concur.
