73 Ky. 288 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1874
delivered the opinion oe the court.
The right of the authorities of a city, with legislative warrant, to permit the construction and operation through its streets of railroads upon which trains of cars are propelled by steam is not now an open question in this state. (Lex. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Wolfe v. Cov. & Lex. R. R. Co., 15 B. Mon. 409; Lou. & Frank. R. R. Co. v. Brown, 17 B. Mon. 763; Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Foote, &c., 9 Bush, 264.)
It results therefore that the construction and operation of a railroad through the streets of a city or town is not per se an encroachment upon the property rights of persons owning lots fronting on the streets so occupied and used. If it was, it is plain that neither the municipal authorities nor the legislature, nor both, could confer upon a railroad corporation any such right. . It would be the taking of private property for public use without compensation, and therefore the grant would be violative of the constitution.
Those who purchase lots bordering on a street take their title subject to the appropriation of the street to such public uses, promotive of commerce and business, as the general good of the city or town may require. This public right is limited only to the extent that the appropriation must not be incompatible with the ends for which the street was established. It must not deprive the persons living on the street of its reasonable use as a passway for foot-passengers, horsemen,
In this case Ave do not decide whether the Common Council of the city of Owensboro had or not the necessary legislative authority to graut to the Oivensboro & Russellville Railroad Company the right to lay doAvn its track and operate its road through LeAvis Street, nor do Ave decide whether the railroad company had or not legislative authority to extend its road north of the southern boundary of the city of Owensboro. It is not necessary that we shall determine either of these questions; and as the city is not a party to this action, we expressly waive an expression of opinion upon either question. The city may or may not be bound by the grant of the right of way to the railroad company, and its rights are in no wise to be affected by this decision.
If it be conceded that the railroad company occupies and uses LeAvis Street without right, and that such use and occupation is a public nuisance, still the appellants can not have relief at the hands of the chancellor unless they are directly affected by it.
Private individuals seeking relief against a public nuisance must show that they suffer an injury distinct from that suffered by the general public, and that said injury is one that the public, in the promotion of the general interest, has not the right to inflict upon them without compensation.
As the government has the right to authorize the construction and operation of a railroad through the streets of 4a city, the inquiry in this case is as to the character of the injuries or inconveniences of which appellants complain.
Appellants claim that as owners of lots fronting on Lewis Street they own the fee in the land, the public having merely the use, and that the construction and operation of the railroad is in effect the appropriation without, their consent of then-private property.
The public having the use, was entitled to the possession. The entry by the railroad company was an entry upon the possession of the public. The right of action, if there be one, is in the municipal authorities representing the local public immediately interested in Lewis Street. If the'public shall at any time abandon the use to which the land constituting the street was dedicated, then the right of possession will revert to the lot-owners; and then they may complain that the railroad company is encroaching upon-their private rights. But so long as they are not entitled to the possession, and so long as none of their property rights are directly and immediately injured by the acts of the railroad company, they can have no
Upon the whole case we are of opinion that the appellants failed to make out a ease authorizing the interposition of the chancellor.
The judgment dismissing their petition is therefore affirmed.