Opinion
The issue before us on this appeal is whether the gift taxes paid by the donor-decedent prior to her death are includable in her gross estate for inheritance tax purpose. Surprising as it may seem, this issue has not been directly determined in this state.
The State of California, acting through Kenneth Cory as State Controller, appellant, and John P. Belton as tax referee, treated the total gift taxes of $127,389 paid by the decedent as a prepayment of death taxes and hence an asset of the estate. Objections were filed on behalf of decedent’s estate on the ground that the amount of prepaid taxes should not have been treated as a taxable asset. The trial court agreed and this appeal by the state followed.
Issue
Are gift taxes paid by the donor prior to death and credited against both federal and state death taxes on the transferred property assets of the decedent’s taxable estate?
Discussion
If decedent had died after 5 p.m. on September 26, 1977, respondent estate concedes that the amount of the paid gift taxes would have been included in decedent’s taxable estate. On that date, at that time, section
Case law on the subject prior to September 26, 1977, is not as clear and decisive as the parties would have us believe. We are satisfied, however, that what law there is favors appellant’s position.
Under our state law the gift tax credited against the inheritance tax is payment of state inheritance tax. (Estate of Kirshbaum (1968)
And, on page 108 of the same opinion, the court states: “The payment of an obligation for a state gift tax on an inter vivos transfer which nevertheless is subject to the inheritance tax upon the transferor’s death, is deemed to constitute merely a prepayment of the inheritance tax.”
Based upon the above reasoning appellant argues that the donor’s (decedent’s) gift tax liability through the allowance of the gift tax credit was converted into partial payment of the death taxes. This prepaid
We agree with appellant’s argument that a prepaid tax is an asset or property which has value to someone. Civil Code section 654, in defining ownership of a thing, states “. . . the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others...” A person who has the right to use a credit has ownership of this right which is therefore a property right. The word “property” may be properly used to signify any valuable right or interest protected by law. (Franklin v. Franklin (1945)
In Estate of Schmalenbach
Respondent, noting that this footnote is quite destructive of its position, contends that it is only dicta in a case that is dealing with a different issue. This is the usual argument in such a situation. However, dicta that is well-reasoned can help to anchor a rule of law when it is subsequently decided. Footnote 10 meets head on the issue here, analyzes it, and to a limited degree suggests the solution.
In Estate of Garin (1979)
We see no reason to believe that section 13648 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, effective on September 26, 1977, established new law in California, at least to the extent that it would prevent the Controller from including paid gift taxes in the taxable estate of the decedent. Estate of Schmalenbach,
We have reviewed the meager legislative history available on the statute and it neither affirms nor contradicts appellant’s reason for the 1977 enactment. One thing is certain, nothing therein supports respondent’s arguments. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above we conclude appellant was correct in including the paid gift taxes in decedent’s taxable estate.
Respondent makes one other argument that evolves as follows: Section 13641, footnote 1, supra, provides that only those transfers not constituting a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration or moneys worth can be subjected to inheritance tax. Oh the date of the gift a gift tax was due, therefore when decedent paid the gift taxes in 1975, she was discharging a statutory indebtedness which was in fact full consideration for the transfer. No cases support this somewhat novel argument. The cases cited by respondent are totally inapposite.
The order is reversed.
Stephens, Acting P. J., and Ashby, J., concurred.
Notes
Section 13644: “A transfer conforming to Section 13641 and under which the transferor expressly or impliedly reserves for his life an income or interest in the property transferred is a transfer subject to this part. Such a reservation shall be conclusively presumed where the transferor retains the possession or enjoyment of the income or interest in the property transferred until his death."
Section 13641: “If a transfer specified in this article was made during lifetime by a decedent, for a consideration in money or money’s worth, but the transfer was not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money, or money’s worth, the amount of the transfer subject to this part shall be the excess of
“(a) The value, at the date of the transferor’s death, of the property transferred, over “(b) An amount equal to the same proportion of the value, at the time of the transferor’s death, of the property transferred which the consideration received in money or money’s worth for the property transferred bears to the value, at the dale of transfer, of the property transferred.”
Unless otherwise stated all references arc to Revenue and Taxation Code.
Other jurisdictions agree with our conclusion that the gift taxes are includable in the decedent’s estate. In Estate of Moody (1980)
“As enacted in 1977, the law provided that all lifetime transfers, whenever made, subject to gift tax were to be aggregated with transfers subject to inheritance tax. In 1978 A.B. 2263 (Stats. 1977, Ch. 1388) provided that in the case of decedents with a date of death after 8:25 p.m., September 30, 1978, nonincludible gifts were to be aggregated with transfers subject to inheritance tax only if made after December 31, 1976. However, a problem arose because inter vivos transfers continued to be subject to inheritance tax regardless of when the transfer was made. Consequently gift tax credit provisions were added to the code again, so that includible transfers made before December 31, 1976, would not lose the benefit of the gift tax credit.”
The cases Dunlap v. Commercial Nat. Bank (1920)
