Corwin v. New-York and Erie Railroad Co.Corwin v. New-York and Erie Railroad Co.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Marvin, Denio, Gardiner, Johnson, Dean, Hand, Crippen
It seems that a railroad corporation, which omits to comply with the statute as to erecting and maintaining fences and cattle guards, is liable to the owner of cattle which stray upon the track from an adjoining close, or the highway crossing it, and are there injured by the engines of the company, although they were not lawfully in such close or highway.
In such a case, the mere negligence of the owner, in permitting his cattle to stray upon the land of another adjoining the railroad, or to run at large in the highway which crosses it, is not a defence to the corporation. Per MARVIN and DENIO, JJ.
The duty imposed by the statute upon railroad corporations is not limited to the maintenance of fences and cattle guards, as against the animals of adjoining occupants, or those lawfully in the highway. Per MARVIN and DENIO, JJ.
THE action was commenced in 1852, in the supreme court, to recover damages for injuries done by the defendant to a pair of oxen owned by the plaintiff. The place of trial was the county of Broome. After issue was joined, the cause was referred to and tried before Robert Morrell, Esq., as sole referee. The pleadings admitted that the defendant was a corporation, created by the Laws of the State of New-York, to construct and operate a railroad; that it had constructed a portion of its road through the county of Broome; and that, at the time of the injuries complained of, it was accustomed by its agents to run engines and cars over that portion of the road. The finding of facts by the referee contained in the case was as follows:
It appeared from the case that Gregory occupied his land situate each side of the railroad, at the place where the oxen were injured. It did not appear where the plaintiff resided or where the oxen were usually kept.
As matter of law, the referee decided that the defendant was liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff which he assessed at $119.62; and he ordered judgment for this sum with costs, which was entered; and the counsel for the defendant excepted. On appeal, the supreme court sitting in the 6th district, reversed this judgment and gave judgment against the plaintiff for the costs of the action. The plaintiff appealed to this court.
D. S. Dickinson, for the appellant.
N. Hill, Jr., for the respondent.
MARVIN, J. In May, 1851, the plaintiff‘s oxen were upon the defendant‘s road at a place called the “.Summit,” in the town of Sandford, Broome county, and one of them was hit and injured by a passing train. In October of the same year, the same oxen were again upon the track of the road, and the locomotive and train of cars run over one of them and killed it, and struck and greatly injured the other. The road where the injury occurred, and for some distance each way, passed through land belonging to one Gregory; that is, Gregory owned the land on each side of the railroad, and had conveyed to the defendant the land for the road, and covenanted in the deed to make, and forever maintain all necessary fences on both sides of the road. The railroad crossed a highway some twenty-five to thirty rods from the place where the injury in May happened, and some seventy or eighty rods from the place where the injury in October occurred. The highway was on or through the land
The question is of much practical importance and calls for the construction of § 44 of the general railroad act of 1850 (
By the common law, the owner was bound to take care that his cattle did not leave his own lands and trespass upon those of his neighbor (Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Wm‘s Saund., 321); if they did, he was himself liable for damages in an action of trespass. It has long been settled in this state, that there can be no recovery in an action on the case for negligence, where the negligence or misconduct of the plaintiff contributed to the injury; hence it was repeatedly decided, prior to the general railroad act of ¿848, that one whose cattle were trespassing upon the railroad at the time they received the injury, could not recover damages of the railroad company. It will only be necessary to refer to The Tonawanda Railroad Company v. Munger (5 Den., 255), where the whole question is ably considered. (S. C. on Appeal, 4 Comst., 349.) It is clear, from the case just cited and from the well established principles of the common law, that, aside from the statute, the plaintiff in this case could not recover. We are then to consider whether the statute has made any change in the law, and if so, what, and whether it embraces the plaintiff‘s case and entitles him to recover. It should be here remarked that we have long had statutes in this state touching division fences; and there have been many decisions respecting the rights and remedies of adjoining proprietors where cattle have trespassed through defective fences. It has been decided that the land proprietor is not bound to fence against any cattle which are not lawfully in the adjoining close of his neighbor. In other words, if the cattle trespassing upon him, come as trespassers from the adjoining close of his neighbor, their owner could not defend upon the ground that the fence of the plaintiff was defective, or that there was no fence.
It has been suggested that a literal reading of the statute would render the corporation liable, in the absence of fences, for an injury to cattle, when the owner had driven them and left them upon the road. The statute, like others, must receive a reasonable construction. We must ascertain the object and intent of the legislature; and in our endeavors to ascertain such intent, and the object and scope of the provision, we are permitted to consider the state of things at the time the law was enacted. We know that cattle often strayed from the close of the owner; that they often trespassed upon the lands of a neighbor, where such neighbor‘s land adjoins the railroad. The owner of the cattle will be liable in damages to his neighbor for the trespass; but it by no means follows, since the statute,
It has been noticed that Gregory, who conveyed the land for the road through his farm, was bound, by his covenant with the defendant, to erect and maintain the fences. The plaintiff is a stranger to this covenant, and cannot be bound by it. Had Gregory‘s cattle entered upon the road from his land, by reason of there being no fence, and been injured, his covenant would have been a good answer to the action. It must be borne in mind that the statute imposes the duty generally upon the railroad company, to erect and maintain the fence; and the public and individuals have a right to hold the company responsible for the performance of this duty. If Gregory had erected and maintained the fence, this would have satisfied the statute, as the railroad com-
Several cases have arisen since the statute, and been decided by the supreme court. In Suydam v. Moore (8 Barb., 358), the railroad company had not erected fences: a cow came on to the track and was killed. The action was against the engineer and fireman, and it was held that the company or its agents were liable to the owner of the cow, without any proof of negligence. In Waldron v. Rensselaer and Saratoga R. R. Co. (8 Barb., 390), the company had not erected any fence. A horse was killed by the train in the night, and found a few feet from the place where the railroad crossed the highway. There was no cattle guard; it was held, the corporation not having erected fences or constructed cattle guards, that it was chargeable with negligence, and responsible for the injury. These cases were decided in the 4th judicial district. In Brooks v. The N. Y. and E. R. R. Co. (13 Barb., 594), the cows entered from the highway on to the railroad, through a gate erected across a passage or way leading from the highway across the railroad to a brick yard. The gate had been left open, and the cattle entered and strayed along the railroad where it was not fenced. There was no cattle guard where the way to the brick yard crossed the railroad. It was held that the company was not bound to construct a cattle guard at this crossing; also, that the company were not liable. Justice Shankland expressed the opinion, that cattle of a stranger, on the premises of an adjoining proprietor without right, are not within the protection of the statute. This opinion was not necessary to the decision of the case. He very properly says, that the only real point necessary to be decided in the case is, that when the cattle of a stranger are on the lands of a proprietor adjoining a railroad, and from those lands pass on to the railroad through a gate left open by the proprietor of the said lands, and are
DENIO, J. I am of opinion that the statute which we are called upon to construe is not to be regarded as merely a regulation, respecting division fences, between the land of the railroad corporations and those of adjoining property; but that it is rather to be considered as providing a safeguard for the protection of the lives of persons traveling by railroad, and of the property in animals, which citizens in the vicinity of those roads may own. If the land comprised within a railroad tract might be entered upon with no more hazard than an adjoining farm, it might be reasonable to construe the act as simply a modification of the law regarding division fences. But when we consider that these tracks are incessantly traversed by engines, driven at a great speed, and with a force practically irresistible, and that an intrusion thereon is very likely to result in the destruction of the intruder, and in loss of life to those who are traveling upon the road, we cannot but see that the legislature had something further in view than the pecuniary burthen of maintaining fences between adjoining proprietors of land. The injunction upon the railroad corporations, to construct and maintain the fences and cattle guards, is positive and unqualified, and it is obvious that the whole community has a deep interest in its observance. If the part which relates to fences, were to be taken to be only a portion of the law respecting division fences, it might be dispensed with by agreement between the corporation and the adjoining proprietors, and no other person would have a right to complain; and yet it cannot be doubted but that most of the public objects of the law would in this way be defeated.
I am of opinion that the statute imposes a public duty upon the railroad corporations, for a violation of which they are subject to indictment, whether individual interests are
The court of queen‘s bench has taken a similar view of a provision in an English railroad act of the same general
I am also in favor of reversing the judgment of the supreme court.
GARDINER, C. J., JOHNSON and DEAN, JJ., were also in favor of reversing the judgment of the supreme court at general term, and affirming that rendered by the referee.
HAND, J., dissented. CRIPPEN, J., took no part in the decision.
Judgment accordingly