2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 34 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1963
The plaintiff entered into a written lease with the defendant for the letting of certain premises in Hartford owned by the plaintiff. The lease was for one year from August 1, 1959, reserving an annual rental of $2100 payable in monthly payments of $175. Among the usual printed clauses were the following special provisions: “The Lessee shall have the privilege and option to extend this lease for a period of one year from the date of the expiration of the term hereof, as originally limited. The exercise of said option shall act as and be an extension of this lease on the same terms and conditions as those recited herein, except that the rental to be paid shall be increased to $200.00 per month. . . . It is further understood and agreed that the Lessee shall pay as security for the faithful performance of the terms and conditions of this lease, and any extension thereof, the sum of $175.00, which shall be applied to the last month of the term of this lease, or any extension thereof, provided the Lessee shall not have defaulted in any of the terms hereof.”
Upon these facts, the court concluded that the mere holding over by the defendant did not constitute an exercise of its option to extend the lease for an additional year; that the term of the lease had expired and, through the operation of General Statutes § 47-22, there was no agreement for a further lease; that the tender of rental of $175 monthly
At common law, holding over after termination of a lease for one year created a new term for one year. Bacon v. Brown, 9 Conn. 334, 338. This rule has been nullified by statute, and now there is no implied contract for one year after the expiration of a term for one or more years. General Statutes § 47-22. This statutory rule, however, in a situation such as the one here, applies only where there is a fixed tenancy of a year with no provision in the lease for a further contract by renewal or extension. See, for instance, Shulman v. Hartford Public Library, 119 Conn. 428, 432. Upon termination of any fixed term, a new contract is necessary to create a tenancy other than one for one month only, and lacking such a contract, the tenancy is one at sufferance.
The statute has usually been applied in situations where the term of the lease was for one or more years. It is equally applicable to leases for shorter terms and provides (1) that no holding over shall be evidence of any agreement for a further lease (thus making the tenant one at sufferance; Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 608; and liable for the reasonable value of the occupancy; DiCostanzo v.
A lease for a definite term, as in the ease before us, may provide for continuation of the term initially reserved upon exercise of an option by the lessee. This may be done by express agreement for renewal of the lease or for its extension, upon the same or other terms, and with or without notice. Ordinarily, a provision for renewal calls for the execution of a new lease, whereas an extension does not require a new document if, in the existing lease, at least three of the limitations for a valid lease are certain: the commencement, the continuance, and
Where notice for renewal or extension is required by the lease, it is a condition precedent for continuation of contractual occupancy, unless the notice had been waived by agreement or conduct of the parties. If no notice is required of the lessee, the general rule, here and elsewhere, is that mere continuation of occupancy, at the end of the original term, constitutes a sufficient exercise of the lessee’s option for an extension. Johnson v. Mary Oliver Candy Shops, Inc., supra; Blanck v. Kimland Realty Co., 122 Conn. 317, 320.
In concluding that the defendant had not exercised its option to extend the lease, the court was in error. Section 47-22 has no application in this case. There was no expiration of a term, with no further agreement, but the end of the original term and continued occupancy under the extension provided for in the lease. No notice was necessary, and the plaintiff, in the absence of anything to the con
In its special defense, the defendant pleaded that acceptance by the plaintiff of the checks, for monthly rentals of $175 each, for the period August 1 to December 31, 1960, created either a month-to-month tenancy or a tenancy at sufferance; and the court has found that the tenancy so established was one at sufferance. There was no plea or claim that these payments constituted an accord and satisfaction; we therefore do not need to consider what effect the acceptance of these checks might otherwise have had on the plaintiff’s demand for additional payment.
There could be no dispute in this case as to the rental to be paid, as there was in Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603. The only contract between the parties provided that continued occupancy was to be at the increased rental. Any other construction would place the defendant in a position to profit by its breach. The defendant contended, in effect, that acceptance by the plaintiff of the monthly checks of $175 each was evidence of a tenancy from month to month and an abandonment of the right of renewal. Such tenancy could arise only in the absence of an express contract for an extension or by an agreement of the parties on such a tenancy. There is no evidence of any agreement except that
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff to recover such damages as he may prove on a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
In this opinion Pbityx and Dearietgton, Js., concurred.