Jerry William CORRELL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Tоdd G. Scher, Chief Assistant CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Miami, for Appellant.
*523 Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Jerry William Correll appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief and his motion to disqualify the trial judge. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
In 1986 Correll was tried and convicted of the first-degree murders of his ex-wife, Susan Correll, her sister, Marybeth Jones, their mother, Mary Lou Hines, and the Corrells' five-year-old daughter, Tuesday. The jury recommended the death penalty for each of the murders and the trial court imposed four death sentences. This Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences in Correll v. State,
In March of 1996 a hearing on Correll's postconviction motion was conducted before Judge Stroker who had been the judge who presided at Correll's trial. The trial judge summarily denied relief. Correll then filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge on the grounds that the judge had relied on personal knowledge in denying Correll's claims and that the judge was biased against Correll's counsel. This motion was also denied. Correll now appeals the denial of his rule 3.850 motion and the motion to disqualify.
In order for evidence to qualify as newly discovered, "the asserted facts `must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or his counsel could nоt have known them by the use of due diligence.'"Jones v. State,
In its order denying Correll's motion for postconviction relief the trial court stated:
The gravamen of the allegations contained in CORRELL'S motion is that Ms. Bunker has, subsequent to her testimony in the instant case, exaggerated her credentials, most notably holding herself out to be a high school graduate when she aрparently does not, in fact possess a high school diploma. Significantly, the thrust of CORRELL'S complaint appears to be the witness's qualification as an expert, as opposed to the substance, i.e. scientific validity or accuracy, of her tеstimony.
All of the "newly discovered evidence" contained in the Defendant's motion is purely collateral to Ms. Bunker's qualification as an expert witness by this Court. Ms. Bunker's qualification as an expert at trial was based almost entirely on her experience in the relatively new field of blood spatter analysis, and not on her education. Clearly, whatever education the witness did or did not possess was discoverable at the time, had the appropriate questions been asked. Because no reasonable probability exists that "newly discovered evidence" *524 presented in the Defendant's post-conviction motion would have affected the outcome of the trial, had it been known at the time, no evidentiary hearing was warranted. See Jones v. State,591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991).
We agree with the trial court that the evidence proffered by Correll does not qualify as newly discovered evidence because it was discoverable at the time of trial. However, even if the evidence was not discoverable at the time of trial, the discrepancies between the level of education, training, and еxperience Bunker testified to at trial and the asserted level of education, training, and experience she actually had were not so great as to make any difference in the outcome of the case. Moreover, Bunker's vita, which among other things, falsely set forth that Bunker had a high school diploma, was never seen by the jury. Thus, any misrepresentations contained in the vita are irrelevant to Correll's claim.
The only alleged misrepresentation of any import was Bunker's assertion that she hаd worked as an assistant and technical specialist for the medical examiner's office from 1970 through 1982, when in reality she was a secretary at the medical examiner's office from 1970 to 1974, an assistant to the medical examiner from 1974 to 1981, and a techniсal specialist for the last five months of her employment with the medical examiner's office. In view of the fact that it is undisputed that she worked on thousands of cases while in the employ of the medical examiner, even this discrepancy becomеs less serious.
However, assuming for the sake of argument that Bunker's testimony did contain serious discrepancies that could not have been discovered during trial, we are convinced that these discrepancies did not have any impact on the outсome of the case in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial in support of Correll's guilt.[1] Moreover, Bunker's testimony was not crucial to the State's case and merely corroborated the medical examiner's testimony. Correll's argument that Bunker's testimony greatly affected the outcome of the case because it was the only evidence presented in support of the State's "single-killer" theory is meritless because there was overwhelming evidence of Correll's guilt regardless of whether other perpetrators were involved in the murders.[2]
All of Correll's public records requests went to the issue of whether various agencies had consulted with Bunker as an expert witness. The requests were therefore directly related to his newly discovеred evidence claim. Because the trial court determined that Correll's newly discovered evidence claim was without merit, the trial court's summary denial of Correll's related public records claim was proper.
Regarding Correll's motion to disqualify Judge Stroker, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion because it did not state a legally sufficient basis for disqualification. A motion to disqualify will be dismissed as legally insufficient if it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that he will not receive a fair hearing. Quince v. State,
We affirm the denial of Correll's motion for postconviction relief and the denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, GRIMES, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
SHAW, Justice, concurring in result only.
The gist of Correll's "blood spatter" argument is that the State's expert, Judith Bunker, misstated her credentials and was unqualified to testify. This claim, in my opinion, misses the mark for two reasons. First, even if Bunker's credentials were in fact diminished,[4] the trial court still would have recognized her as an expert. The court stated in its order dеnying relief:
All of the "newly-discovered evidence" contained in the Defendant's motion is purely collateral to Ms. Bunker's qualification as an expert witness by this Court. Ms. Bunker's qualification as an expert at trial was based almost entirely on her experienсe in the relatively new field of blood spatter analysis, and not on her education. Clearly, whatever education the witness did or did not possess was discoverable at the time, had the appropriate questions been asked. Because no rеasonable probability exists that the "newly-discovered evidence" presented in the Defendant's post-conviction motion would have affected the outcome at trial, had it been known at that time, no evidentiary hearing in this cause is warranted.
This dеcision is within the sound discretion of the trial court.[5]See, e.g., Cheshire v. State,
Second, even accepting the alleged discrepancies as established, the record shows conclusively that Correll is entitled no relief in light of the other compelling evidence of guilt.[6]See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d) ("If the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no *526 relief, the motion shall be denied without a hearing."). I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Correll's post-conviction motion.
This situation, in my opinion, exposes a critical point concerning expert testimony. The State in a criminal trial assumes a heavy responsibility in vouching for an expert's credentials, for if the State is duped along with everyone else, the consequences can be dire. In the present case, if Bunker's testimony had played a more decisive role in the guilt phase, the State's failure to verify Bunker's credentials could well have resulted in an entire capital trial being thrown out years after the crime had grown stalе.
NOTES
Notes
[1] Correll had previously threatened to kill his ex-wife. In addition, several bloody fingerprints and palm prints found at the crime scene were matched to Correll's. Correll also had scratches, cuts, and bruises on his hands and forearms when he was questioned by the sheriff's department on the night of the murder.
[2] Bunker never expressed an opinion with respect to how many persons committed the crimes.
[3] Correll's argument is based on the trial judge's following statement:
With the same background and experience as I now know her to have, she would have been admitted as an expert in the emerging field of blood spatter analysis in 1986.
[4] Correll's main complaint is that Bunker represented that she had worked as an assistant and technical specialist to the medical examiner (ME) from 1970 through 1982, when in fact she had worked as a secretary for the ME for part of that time (from 1970 to 1974) and as an assistant and specialist for the remainder. Although Correll also claims that Bunker misstated her credentials on her curriculum vitae and on her job applicatiоn, neither her vitae nor her application was ever before the jury or trial court.
[5] Whether the alleged discrepancies could have been discovered earlier is questionable. According to Correll, Bunker lied about her qualifications whеn questioned by the prosecutor at trial. Had she been questioned further by defense counsel, she might well have continued to lie. In point of fact, Bunker allegedly lied on her curriculum vitae and on her job application to the ME's office, as noted аbove.
[6] See Correll v. State,