*1 termination, since a prior the claimant provided entitled to seek reinstatement as CORRELL, Cheryl Appellant, 413(a). Hebden; Pieper
Section
See
v. Ame
Division,
tek-Thermox Instruments
25, 584 A.2d
the claimant
Should
Pennsylvania,
DE-
COMMONWEALTH
during
proceedings pres
the reinstatement
TRANSPORTATION,
OF
PARTMENT
only
substantially
ent
medical evidence
DRIVER
BUREAU OF
LICENSING.
previously rejected,
same as that
then the
judicata may
doctrine of
reinstate
res
bar
Commonwealth Court of
(discussing
ment. See Hahnemann
Faust v.
7,Oct.
Argued
Compensation Appeal
Workmen’s
Board
(Sears
(Pa.
Co.),
and
Roebuck
Co.), 125 Pa.Cmwlth. (1989)). case, however,
In this Claimant was denied
any opportunity present in the evidence proceedings.
reinstatement Claimant stated petition
in her that she suffered a recurrence disability since the termination. The
petition suggests further that the recurrence change based on a in her condition because
Claimant was treated for a herniated disc in
1993, whereas she had no herniated disc compensation
when her was terminated.
Moreover, performed Pontiac General a sur-
gical procedure on Claimant different from unnecessary one in the termination fbjjhd
proceedings. petition Because Claimant’s filed, timely
reinstatement was she is entitled opportunity prove
-to'an that her condition changed she has suffered a disability.
recurrence of her work-related vacated,
Accordingly, the Board’s order is
and the case is remanded to the Board with
instructions to remand to the for evi- WCJ
dentiary hearings on the merits of Claimant’s petition.
reinstatement
ORDER
AND day February, this 16th NOW Compensa- order Workers’ vacated, Appeal hereby
tion Board and this hearings
case is for evidentiary remanded petition for reinstatement discussed in
the foregoing opinion. relinquished.
Jurisdiction *2 McGlaughlin, Philadelphia,
David M. appellant. Werlinsky, Harrisburg, appel-
Marc A. lee. COLINS, Judge,
Before President DOYLE, J., SMITH, J., FRIEDMAN, J., KELLEY, J., J., FLAHERTY, LEADBETTER, J.
LEADBETTER, Judge.
Cheryl appeals order the Court of Common Pleas of Chester Division, January County, Civil dated which her and reinstated denied year operating privi- a one pursuant leges imposed Section 1581 (“Inter- Pa.C.S, Code, the Vehicle Compact” simply “Compact”). or Cor- challenges constitutionality of the rell grounds that it violates the Compact on jeopardy, process, equal pro- double tection clauses of the United States and no Constitutions. We find therefore, and, challenge merit in Correll’s judgment of the trial court. affirm the driver, Correll, licensed was cited in the state of New for and obtain apply privilege it is “[t]he of alcohol the influence driving while under (DUI) convict- to use July Correll was as well as license to use 25,1997. contract, September highway that offense on ... but not ed of vehicle on a compliance right.” with the Interstate right or civil property re- Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles New court concludes Accordingly, Pennsylva- *3 the ported conviction to Correll’s merit. argument is without that first Correll’s Transportation, Bureau of Department nia of Second, (Bureau).1 Bureau, that the sus by Correll claims Licensing The Driver 1997, license 17, Pennsylvania driver’s pension noti- October official notice mailed in New penalties be sus- of following imposition that her license would the fied Correll 21, year, clauses jeopardy one effective November pended violates the double 1997, Jersey convic- Pennsylvania a result of her New Con as and of the United States equivalent to a violation of tion for an offense jeopardy clause of the The stitutions. double 3731(a) Pennsylvania’s Section of Vehicle prohibits multi United States Constitution4 3731(a).2 Code, § Pa.C.S. See 75 the same offense. Witte ple punishments for 1532(b)(3)(twelve-month for vi- suspension 389, States, United 3731). a Con-ell filed statu- olation of section (1995). 1, 2199, 132 Article L.Ed.2d 351 the tory appeal on November 1997 and Pennsylvania the Constitution affords At January matter was heard on jeopardy protection. Common same double introduced hearing, the Commonwealth Quinlan, Pa.Super. wealth v. Jersey DUI of Correll’s New documentation dismissed, (1994), 1235, 1240 n. 4 A.2d suspen- notice of conviction and Bureau’s (1996). This court 544 Pa. 675 A.2d testimony presented sion to Correll. No was that license previously held to the trial court. impose in nature and proceedings are civil protecting at remedial sanctions aimed arguments four Correll raises Krall, drivers. 682 A.2d public from unsafe First, appeal.3 she contends that this Court suspension of Correll’s driver’s at 66. The recognize driving qualified right. should as consequence of her a collateral civil license is argu this Even were we inclined consider and, therefore, does not con DUI conviction ment, legisla clear mandates from both our meaning punishment within the of stitute preclude Supreme ture and our Court would Plowman, clause. 535 Pa. jeopardy double accepting principle our it. The is well estab 320-21, at 127-28. See also at 635 A.2d driving in law that is a lished Transp., Bureau Omdojfv. Department right. and See Plowman v. of of (Pa.Cmwlth. Licensing, Department Transp., Bureau 654 A.2d Driver Driver of of 314, 318, 1994). Licensing, A.2d 535 Pa. (1993). Transp., Bu Department See also of Third, argues that the In Scott, Licensing reau Driver 546 Pa. of is unconstitutional under Compact terstate 241, 250, 684 A.2d Krall v. as a denial state constitutions the federal and Department Transp., Bureau Driver of of process (Pa.Cmwlth. procedural” of “fundamental Licensing, 64-65 682 A.2d 1996) (en banc). for conduct oc addition, imposes sanctions statutory in that it In territorial borders of curring outside the privilege” states that “operating definition of law, questions of these claims raise 3. As all of enactment of sec- 1. On December Code, Pennsylvania plenary. Department of be- tion 1581 the Vehicle court’s review this party Compact. to the Driver’s License Licensing Clayton, came Transp., Bureau of Compact, (1996). New 342, 347, Pursuant to Article III of 546 Pa. state, notify Jersey, required to was as member Pursu- the Bureau of Correll’s DUI conviction. applica- jeopardy -clause was made double 4. The ant to IV of the Article process through clause the due ble to the states required DUI conviction as if to treat Correll's Mary- amendment. Benton of the fourteenth land, Pennsylvania. the conduct occurred in S.Ct. 23 L.Ed.2d 3731(a) driving defines the offense 2. Section controlled sub- of alcohol or under the influence stance. Kline, support allegation, of this Curtis v. our principle Supreme she relies the criminal law Court discussed “[njormally principle equal protection as follows: punished a crime can be only within the state where it is commit- principle The essence the constitutional ted,”5 articulating exceptions and cases equal protection law under the is that Since, above, that rule.6 license noted persons like circumstances will like proceedings revocation are remedial and civil However, similarly. treated it does not punishments, argu- in nature and not require persons that all under all circum- ment also lacks merit.7 enjoy protection stances identical under fourth, final, argument
Correll’s
right
law. The
absolutely
violates the United States and
prohibit
under
law does not
classifying
Constitutions as a denial of
the Commonwealth from
indi-
*4
equal protection.
postulates
She
that she is
receiving
for
purpose
viduals
differ-
treatment,
a member of a
drivers
ent
require equal
and does not
class—
in other
convicted
states —who are treated
people having
treatment of
different needs.
harshly than
more
those convicted inside the
(citations
255,
Id. at
The
clause
level of
to which it is
since
purported
tects an individual from state action that Correll has
to
failed
show that the
First,
discriminatory
selects him out for
treatment
classification has been made at all.
by
concedes,
subjecting
provision
facially
him to a
in the
Correll
law
the statute is
non-
imposed
discriminatory.
others of the same class. In
to the
Pursuant
Shook,
ing
deny
Pa.Super.
5.
211
to
Commonwealth v.
the fact of the conviction. See Witsch
(1967)
added).
Case,
(emphasis
236
561
Operator's
A.2d
Vehicle
Motor
License
Pa.Su-
(1961).
per.
proce-
6. Correll does not further articulate her
process
beyond question
dural due
claim.
It is
Although asserting
7.
was
that she
denied "funda-
suspended
to be
that licenses are not
without the
argue
process,
mentar’ due
Correll does not
procedural
process required by
due
the four-
legitimate
the
interest,
to
a
fails
serve
teenth
to the
States
amendment
United
Constitu-
appropriate
by
standard
which to
Burson,
535, 539,
tion. Bell v.
91 S.Ct.
judge
pro-
due
claimed denial of substantive
(1971).
held,
L.Ed.2d
This court has
events,
argument
cess.
all
At
such an
would
however,
hearing provided
that the de novo
recently
unpersuasive.
Supreme
Our
Court has
1550(a)
by
is sufficient. Croissant
that,
compel-
stated
“the
has a
Commonwealth
Commonwealth,
v.
492,
114 Pa.Cmwlth.
539 A.2d
578,
ling
protecting
interest in
its citizens from the
denied,
520 Pa.
dangers
by
posed
drunk drivers.” Occhibone v.
(1988). Specifically,
Pennsyl-
A.2d 138
where a
Commonwealth,
operating privilege
vania licensee’s
sus-
been
pended because of an out-of-state DUI convic-
tion, procedural
process
is accorded when
appear
given
opportunity
at a
she is
hear-
Pa.C.S.
Lane,
suspen-
Department
imposes
Knepp
F.Supp.
1221-22
same
(E.D.Pa.),
denied,
F.Supp.
reh.
sion
the licenses of all
(E.D.Pa.1994).
offense,
drivers convicted of the same
no
oc-
matter where
offense and conviction
Plainly, Correll
ei
cannot meet
curs.
prong
ther
of this test. She does not even
(nor
Department
suggest
legisla
that the
Nor can
maintain a claim
dis-
Compact)
joining
ture in
was “motivated
criminatory
neutral
facially
enforcement of a
discriminatory
by
purpose.”
As to discrim
recently
statute.
law in
The
this area was
effect,
inatory
all that can be said is that
by the
District
summarized
United States
state, county
county
state to
Pennsylva-
Court
the Eastern
District of
judge
criminal
judge,
charged
defendants
nia:
with the same conduct are sometimes treated
life;
differently.
simply
This is
a fact of
plea
Traditional
re
standards
offenses,
downgrading
bargains,
diversion
quire
showing
system
of en
programs
sentencing
are
alternatives
had a “discriminatory
forcement
effect”
necessarily subject
vagaries
to the
of individ
discriminatory
and was “motivated
ual
If
discretion.
this were a
violation
States,
purpose.” Wayte v. United
equal protection, all those receiving treat
598, 609,
average
ment
than some
harsher
statistical
(1985) (citing
L.Ed.2d 547
Personnel
*5
could mount successful constitutional chal
Adm’rs [Administrator] Massachusetts
of
lenges
absurdity
to their convictions. The
of
Feeney,
v.
442 U.S.
99 S.Ct.
60
self-evident,
such a
pre
notion is
but this is
(1979);
Heights
Arlington
L.Ed.2d
v.
cisely
argument
making.
the
Correll is
In
Metropolitan Housing
Corp.,
Dev.
it,
spite of
in which
the context
she raises
her
U.S.
97 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
complaint
Compact
lies with neither the
nor
Davis,
Washington v.
Pennsylvania’s administration of it but with
(1976)).
jority relies on proposition driving *6 recognized aas See, a right. e.g., Depart v. Plowman Transportation,
ment Bureau Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. Boardman,
Maurer v.
nom.,
Hamilton,
sub
Maurer
aff'd
these were for busi-
ness, while trips less than 25% of these were travel to and from work. Id. Of the miles day,
traveled in a 92.1% were traveled in a