Corporate Telecom Services, Inc. v. Federal Communications CommissionCorporate Telecom Services, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Williams
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
In each market area for cellular radio systems, the Federal Communications Commission grants two licenses, one to a telephone (“wireline”) company and one to another (“nonwireline”) company. When there are competing applicants for a given license, the Commission chooses the licensee by lottery. See
CTSI now appeals, asserting that Trum-bower did not, under any reasonable interpretation of
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The facts are not in dispute. Among those who submitted an application for the Boone area nonwireline license were CTSI, a wholly owned subsidiary of SSE Telecom (“SSE”), *674 and First Cellular Limited Partnership (“First Cellular”). Both SSE and First Cellular are publicly traded companies.
When CTSI filed its application, Trumbower held a 4% interest in SSE (CTSI’s parent) as well as a 33% interest in First Cellular. Under the FCC’s ownership attribution rules for this licensing program, Trumbower’s interest in SSE gave him an equivalent (i.e., 4%) interest in CTSI. See
Complications arose after the applications were filed but before the lottery winner was selected, when SSE decided to raise additional capital through a private placement of stock. Among the potential investors in the issue was Trumbower, who expressed interest in purchasing stock in an amount that would increase his stake in SSE from 4% to approximately 16%. SSE was keen on selling stock to Trumbower, but there was an obvious hitch: If the transaction went through, CTSI’s application would be attributed to Trumbower to the extent of his projected 16% interest in SSE; this interest, combined with Trumbower’s continued 33% interest in First Cellular, would clearly violate
In an attempt to avoid this result, SSE placed all of its stock in CTSI in a stock trust, naming SSE’s then-current shareholders as the beneficiaries in proportion to their interests in SSE. As a then-4% shareholder of SSE, Trumbower became the owner of a 4% beneficial interest in the CTSI trust. Although his 4% interest was equitable not legal, no one doubts that it must be attributed to him under
Only after spinning off its interest in CTSI to SSE shareholders did SSE go through with the private placement of SSE stock. Trumbower then purchased an additional 12% interest in SSE, as planned, bringing his cumulative total in SSE to 16%. On its face the purchase appeared to bring him no additional interest in CTSI, since SSE itself now held no interest in CTSI and had never had any interest in the CTSI trust.
Nevertheless, the FCC’s Mobile Services Division rejected CTSI’s application as defective, the Common Carrier Bureau denied CTSI’s request for reconsideration of that decision, and the FCC denied CTSI’s petition for review. Corporate Telecom Services, Inc., 9 F.C.C.R. 1012 (1994) (“Corp. Tele-com”). The FCC explained that, despite the trust arrangement, Trumbower’s 16% interest in SSE gave him a 16% indirect “ownership interest” in CTSI’s application; the trust arrangement was inadequate to divorce SSE from CTSI because the trustee, Wilbur Pritchard, “was also SSE’s largest single shareholder (48 percent), its chief operating officer, and the chairman of its board of directors”. Id. at 1013 ¶ 10. As such, Pritchard did not “possess[] the independence demanded in these situations”. Id. Moreover, CTSI had shown no “good cause” for a waiver, because CTSI could easily have avoided the violation “by either selecting a disinterested third party as trustee or by Trumbower’s divesting himself of his interest in First Cellular.” Id. at ¶ 11.
In sum, the FCC’s position as we understand it is that Trumbower indirectly “owns” a 16% interest in CTSI’s Boone application simply because the trustee holding title to CTSI’s stock is a large shareholder and director of another company, SSE, in which Trumbower has a 16% interest.
CTSI urges us to reject this position as arbitrary and capricious, arguing in the first instance that the Commission’s expansive interpretation of the words “ownership interest, direct or indirect” in
We have no difficulty accepting the proposition that the term “ownership” may vary in meaning depending on the context in which it is used, and that, in some circumstances and for some purposes, the sort of control or influence that Trumbower might have enjoyed through influence over Pritchard might be enough to justify the Commission in disregarding the trust. See Smith v. Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., 277 F.Supp. 956, 957 (S.D.N.Y.1967) (noting that the term “ownership” has “ehameleonesque qualities”). This is not, then, the sort of case where the agency has gotten out “the Dictionary of Newspeak and pronounce[d] that for purposes of its regulation war is peace....” Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir.1987).
But the FCC may only give the words “ownership interest, direct or indirect” a meaning that serves the values the provision is supposed to embody. Otherwise, the interpretation cannot be regarded as “reasoned”. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“Reasoned decision promotes results in the public interest by requiring the agency to focus on the values served by its decision, and hence releasing the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice.”).
While there might be some purpose to the rule other than (or in addition to) preventing *676 excessive accumulation of chances at economic advantage, the FCC has given no indication what it might be. In the context of this case, the FCC’s only explanation for why the trustee must be independent is that “independence [is] demanded in these situations” and that its “strict” application of the rule “assure[s] administrative fairness to those who comply with our ... cross-ownership restrictions, the lack of economic gain notwithstanding.” Corp. Telecom, 9 F.C.C.R. at 1013 ¶ 10. If the allusion to “administrative fairness” is intended to argue the advantages of a bright-line rule, it does not help the Commission here. The Commission has not in fact drawn a bright line between when a trustee has enough independence and when not. And, even if it had, it would still have to state how the rule relates to a purpose other than brightness of line. See Athens Community Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 1176, 1180 (D.C.Cir.1994) (ease of administration alone cannot support a rule that serves no substantive goal).
The Commission’s contention that a long line of FCC precedent provides clear interpretive guidance supporting its decision is just not true. We do not see how
Chickasaw Telephone Company for the Benefit of CTC Scholarship Trust,
8 F.C.C.R. 600, 601 ¶ 7 (1993),
aff‘d,
24 F.3d 1464 (D.C.Cir.1994);
FTC Communications,
75 F.C.C.2d 15 (1979); or
Florida Cellular Mobil Communications Corp.,
6 F.C.C.R. 6910 (1991), reconsideration
denied,
7 F.C.C.R. 7856 (1992),
aff‘d,
28 F.3d 191 (D.C.Cir.1994), which the Commission invokes, see
Corp. Telecom,
9 F.C.C.R. at 1012 nn. 5 & 8, could possibly be construed as establishing principles relevant to the resolution of this case. In
Chickasaw Telephone Co.,
the FCC rejected a nonwire-line license application because it found that the real party in interest was not a trust (as claimed) but the trust’s settlor, a telephone company that was ineligible for a nonwireline license under
FTC Communications
appears equally off point. In that case, the FCC authorized a French-owned U.S. corporation to acquire additional U.S. gateways, based on the corporation’s plan to transfer control over its operations to an independent U.S. trustee; the proposed transfer, the FCC found, alleviated concerns that the authorizations violated the FCC’s mandate to ensure reciprocity between foreign countries and the United States in the treatment of communications companies. A secondary problem in the case involved whether the trust agreement would ensure compliance with the alien ownership restrictions of
The only rules and orders to which the FCC points that seem even superficially relevant here deal with the prohibitions on multiple ownership of broadcast stations, see
These differences in purpose are reflected in obvious differences between the rules’ language. Both
We note finally that these differences in purpose and in language have unsurprisingly resulted in divergent FCC decisions. Thus, from 1976 until 1992 the Commission indulged a presumption under
Because the Commission may have some theory under which its rejection of CTSI’s application, and the idea of ownership implicit in that rejection, might fit within the purposes of
So ordered.
Notes
. Paragraph 5 of the agreement permits the trustee to reconvey the CTSI stock to SSE if “(a) the FCC shall have released an order, not subject to further administrative or judicial review, determining that Trustee may make such reconveyance and redelivery without causing the disal-lowance or loss of any cellular license that may have been awarded; or (b) the Trustee shall have received an opinion of legal counsel ..., concluding that the FCC shall have amended, clarified, or interpreted its rules ... to remove any impediment to such reconveyance and redelivery, or that the existing FCC rules permit such reconveyance and redelivety.” In denying CTSI’s motion for reconsideration, the Common Carrier Bureau conceded “the fact that the provisions of the trust instrument forbid the reconveyance of CTSI stock to SSE‘s new shareholders, absent prior Commission approval”, though it believed the Mobile Services Division had properly found that Pritchard had “a predisposition not to comply with the insulation provisions of the trust“, 6 F.C.C.R. at 5815 If 10, a ground neither adopted by the Commission nor pressed before us.
. Broadcast Services: Television and Radio Broadcasting, 60 Fed.Reg. 6483 ¶ 1 (to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 73) (proposed Feb. 2, 1995) (describing purpose of