4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 296 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1966
The plaintiff sued to recover damages claimed to have resulted from the purchase of a secondhand 1959 Ford Calaxie automobile, which purchase, it is alleged, was induced by the fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendants to the effect that the car was in good condition and had been rebuilt and completely reconditioned. Believing such representations to be true, the plaintiff claims he bought the car, paying the defendant Esposito $1143.45. The plaintiff further alleged that the statements were false and known by Esposito or his agent Elbaum, the eodefendant, to have been false when they were made. The defendants denied these allegations and by way of special defense
The court found that the plaintiff purchased the car for his son, a minor, sometime around March 19, 1964. The plaintiff signed a contract but did not read the sales paper because of language difficulty in that he did not understand English completely. He did not drive the car and had no knowledge of the mechanics of automobiles. He asked Elbaum about the car and was told that it was all right. The plaintiff or his son was told by Elbaum that the car was “in good condition,” “a decent automobile,” “had been rebuilt and reconditioned,” and was “just like a new car.” Elbaum knew or should have known that the car was not in the condition he represented it to be. Elbaum had been convicted of felonies and had served time in state prison. The plaintiff relied on Elbaum’s representations and purchased the car. The sale was effected on the terms “Not guaranteed — Sold as is.” The following day when the car was driven, it jumped all over the road, the gearshift did not function, the transmission was noisy, and the ear overheated. A few days later the car was returned to Esposito, and although Esposito undertook some repairs, the car thereafter never functioned properly. Sometime later the points burned out, oil leaked from the gaskets, and the rear end went to pieces. Elbaum later told the plaintiff’s son, “Sucker, now you are stuck with it.” As a result, the car became valueless and was placed on blocks in the plaintiff’s yard. At this time it had a trade-in value of $150 to $200. The court concluded that the essential elements of fraud had been proven and rendered judgment for $1000 in damages to the plaintiff.
The defendants question the finding as it relates to several of the essential elements necessary to sustain the action. A fraudulent representation must be made as a statement of fact and be knowingly untrue or made without belief in its truth or recklessly made for the purpose of inducing action upon it. Sallies v. Johnson, supra, 82. The representations made by Elbaum immediately before the car was purchased, relating to the condition of the car, could hardly be said to be other than factual representations. Elbaum’s testimony that he had
One of the defendants’ assignments of error requires some consideration. The court found that the plaintiff signed a contract, “Retail Order for Motor Vehicle,” hut did not read the agreement because of language difficulty. The defendants unsuccessfully sought to strike this paragraph except as it related to the signing of the contract. The plaintiff testified that he read some English but “not too much. I do read a little bit, but I don’t understand a lot of it.” The document signed by the plaintiff contains a statement to the effect that the signer has read the terms and conditions on the back of the order and agrees to them and that the front and back of the order comprise the entire agreement. On the reverse side, printed in small letters, appear certain terms and conditions. One of the conditions provides that if the vehicle is a used one it is sold “as is” without warranty unless a used-car warranty appears on the front of the document under the word “Remarks.” After the word “Remarks” on the front of the document there appears a blank space. The defendants argue that this evidence relieves them of any liability in respect to any representations made in connection with the condition of the car. “The general rule is that where a person of mature years and who can read and write, signs or accepts a formal written contract affecting his pecuniary interests, it is his duty to read it and notice of its contents will be imputed to him if he negligently fails to do so; but this rule is subject to qualifications, including intervention of fraud or artifice, or mistake not due to negligence, and applies only if nothing has been said or done to mislead the person sought to be charged or to put a man of reasonable business prudence off
The remaining question relates to the proof of the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the fraudulent representations. The settled rule in this state makes the measure of such damages “the difference between the actual value of the property received and its value had it been as represented, with any consequential damages resulting directly from the fraud.” Morrell v. Wiley, 119 Conn. 578, 583; Clark v. Haggard, supra. The trial court found this difference to be $1000. This finding was based on the testimony of a witness called by the plaintiff as an expert on the value of such a car; his qualifications as such do not appear to be questioned. This witness gave as his opinion that the car at the time he examined it in the spring of 1964 was not worth much — “I guess $300 or $400.” The value of the car at the time of sale was represented by the cost price of $1143.45. The court could accept this figure as fixing the value the car would have had if it had been as. represented. Morrell v. Wiley, supra, 585. The court found that the actual value of the car was $150. The court was not bound by the expert’s opinion. Clark v. Haggard, supra, 674. The value of property in many instances is a matter of estimate. Ford v. H. W. Dubiskie & Co., supra, 580. In cases of this nature damages can
There is no error.
In this opinion Pruyn and Kosicki, Js., concurred.