248 Pa. 109 | Pa. | 1915
Opinion by
This case was so carefully and exhaustively considered by the learned president judge of the court below sitting as a chancellor, that very little if anything of value can be added by this court in disposing of the questions raised upon the present record. Keeping in mind the material findings of fact, which are not challenged, we must regard the defenses relied on here as purely technical and without substantial merit. No one can read the testimony in this case without concluding that the 65 shares of stock in controversy represented by two certificates belonged to the plaintiff, that her name signed to the power of attorney on the back of each certificate was a forgery, and that within a very few days after discovering her stock had been thus pledged as collateral for another’s debt, she caused notice to be served upon appellants by making demand for a return of the shares of stock. At the hearing before the chancellor two.credible witnesses, familiar with her handwriting, testified that the signatures purporting to be those of plaintiff were forgeries. In addition to this testimony the chancellor had before him the certificates upon the back of which were written the forged signatures, and thus had the opportunity of inspecting the signatures and of making comparisons with the genuine handwriting of plaintiff before determining whether forged or not. Appellants did not attempt to prove'that the signatures were genuine, and no testimony was offered to contradict the witnesses who testified that they were forgeries. Upon the record thus presented the
■ On this branch of the case it remains to be determined whether the averment in the answer that plaintiff had authorized someone to sign her name to the powers of attorney was responsive in the sense of casting the burden of proof upon the plaintiff as required by the equity
We cannot agree that there was any question of laches in the present case and the finding of the court below is a complete answer to the position of appellants in this regard.
Nor can we agree that the learned court below erred in entering a money decree under the facts developed at the hearing. When the bill was filed appellants still held the shares of stock, and they had personal notice that these shares of stock were claimed as the property of plaintiff. They took the chances of selling the stock and converting the shares into money.- The decree simply requires them to account to the plaintiff for the money actually received by them as proceeds of the sale, together with such dividends and interest as accrued in the meantime. These facts bring the case within the rule of Blood v. Erie Dime Savings and Loan Co., 164 Pa. 95.
The contention that the decree should be reversed because the learned court below did not undertake to determine in this proceeding the liability between appellants and The Philadelphia Company cannot be sustained. There is nothing in the record, or in the pleadings, which required the court below to determine the ultimate liability of these respective parties. No cross-bill was filed and the court took the position that as the-record stood no such question was presented for determination. This was clearly the right view to take. If appellants desired affirmative relief, they should have filed a cross-bill: Freeland v. South Penn Oil Company, 189 Pa. 54; McCune v. Lytle, 197 Pa. 404.
Decree affirmed at cost of appellants.