delivered the opinion of the court.
The Troy Iron and Nail Factory filed their bill in the court below, claiming to be assignees of a patent granted to Henry Burden, for a “ new and useful improvement in the machinery for manufacturing wrought nails or spikes.” The bill charges, that the appellants, Corning & Company, have infringed their patent, and prays for an injunction and an account of -profits, &c. The answer of the respondents below took defence on two grounds — first, that Burden was not the first and original inventor of the machine patented; and, secondly, that the respondents used their machine under a license from the patentee. The court below sustained the defence on the latter ground, and entered the following deсree : “ Therefore, it is. ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said bill of complaint is hereby dismissed, with costs to be taxed, and that the defendant have execution therefor.”
The case is now before us on a motion to dismiss the 'appeal. Looking at the case as exhibited to us by the record, it appears to be an appeal by respondents from a decree dismissing the complainant’s bill with costs. It often happens that a court may decree in favor of a complainant, but nоt to the extent prayed for in his bill, and he may have just cause of appeal on that account. But the prayer of the respondent’s answer is, that “he be hencе dismissed, with his reasonable costs and charges, on this behalf most wrongfully sustained.” And, having such a decree on the present case, he cannot have a more favorаble one.
It is true that the petition for the appeal in this case prays • only, “ that so much of such parts of said decree, as declares, orders, adjudges, and. decrees as follows, to wit, “ And it appear *465 ing to the said court that the said Henry Burden was the first inventor of the improvement, &c., may be reversed, and that the appellants may be restored to all things which they have lost by reason thereof.”
But the matter complained of forms no part of the decree of the court below.
It shows only, that the judge, in reciting the inducement of reasons for entering a decree in favor of the respondents below, was of opinion that they were entitled to such decree, because they had- succeeded in establishing one only of the two defences alleged in their answer. It is the opinion of the court, on a question of fact invоlved in the case, but not affecting the decree. If the decree be correct, the party in whose'favor, it is given, has no right to complain; yet his appeal prays that it “may be reversed, and the appellants restored to all things which they have lost by reason thereof;” and the record shows they have lost nothing.
If the decree be reversed, according to the prayer of the appellants, the court must necessarily enter a decree for the complainants below. This would, probably, not meet the views of the appellants. They have put themselves in the anomalous position either of asking for the affirmance of the decree from which they have appealed, or of requesting this court to reverse a decree in their favor, and send back the record to the court below, with directions to еnter the very same decree, but to assign other reasons for it. The court were not bound to give any reasons for their decree. The law gives the party aggrieved аn appeal from a final decree of an inferior court. But it does not-give the party who is not aggrieved an appeal from a decree in his favor because the judge has given no reasons, or recited insufficient ones for a judgment admitted by the appellant to be correct.
There is a part of the history of this cаse which does not appear on the record; but, being known to the court, and assumed by counsel on both sides to* make part of the case, it will be necessary to notice the case under that aspect.
The decree in favor of the appellants, which is now appealed from, has already been before this сourt on an appeal by the complainant below. The parties were then fully heard, the decree of the Circuit Court reversed, and the case remanded fоr further proceedings. It is reportedin
It is plain, therefore, that, under the guise of an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court, this is an appeal, in fact, from the decision of this court. For there is no other decree existing in the case except the decree of this court. There must be an end of litigation some time. To allow a second appeal to a court of last resort, on the same questions which were open to dispute on the first, would lead to endless litigation. It is said' by this court, in Martin
v.
Hunter, (
A second appeal lies оnly when the court below, in carrying out the mandate of this court, is alleged to have committed an error. But, on an appeal from the mandate, it is well settled, that nothing is before the court but the proceedings subsequent to the mandate. Whatever was formerly before the court, and was disposed of by its decree, is considered as finally- disposed of. See Himely
v.
Rose,
*467
• Moreover, as it is admitted that the court below have not yet acted upon the mandate of this court, and entered a final decree in pursuance thereof, there is no final decree, from which only an appeal can. be. taken. See the Palmyra,
There are, therefore, three conclusive reasons for dismissing the present appeal:
1. The appellants have already been heard in this court on a former appeal.
2. There is no such dеcree as that from which the appeal purports to be taken.
3. There is no final decree in the case, from which an appeal can be taken.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Order.
This сause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, with costs.