65 Iowa 328 | Iowa | 1884
It is shown by the pleadings and evidence' in the case that the parties entered into partnership in the practice of law in 1872, and that this partnership was continued until February 1, 1878, when it was dissolved by the mutual consent of the partners. At the time of dissolution a notice was prepared for publication, which recited the fact of the dissolution; also that the notes and accounts belonging to the firm remained in plaintiff’s hands for settlement and collection. This notice was signed by each of the parties, and they at the same time signed the following stipulation, which was written on a paper containing a copy of said notice, and immediately below said copy: “It is further agreed by said parties that, if said sum of $1,182 can be made and collected from said accounts and notes by reasonable diligence, same is to be so applied in payment of the said sum, and the balance of said accounts and notes to remain the property of Corning and Grohe; the said Grohe to be liable for any balance of said sum remaining unpaid; the said sum being due said N. Corning upon settlement this day made.” The original of this stipulation was retained by defendant, and plaintiff retained a paper marked “ copy',” which contains a copy of the notice of dissolution, also of the stipulation; but at the time it was introduced in evidence it contained a provision, which was interlined, that the amount which was due plaintiff should bear ten per cent interest.
Plaintiff’s claim is that defendant’s interest in the notes and accounts of the firm was one-third thereof, and that the real agreement between the parties was that this proportion of the amount which should be collected on said notes and accounts
It must be presumed that the advantage of having the exclusive control of these notes and accounts, and of their settlement and collection, was a matter of importance to plaintiff, and that it operated as an' inducement to him to enter into the contract, and for that reason it could not be said that his agreement to apply the whole amount of the collections upon the debt until it should be satisfied, (if that is the stipulation,) was not supported by a consideration. The agreement, then, wMeh defendant contends is expressed by the writing, would be a valid and enforceable contract; and, considering the language of the contract and all of its provisions, as well as the object which the parties had in view when they made it, it seems to us that it is not fairly capable of the construction placed upon it by the circuit court. The language of the provision in question is as follows: “It is agreed * * * that if said sum of $1,182 can be made and collected from said accounts and notes, * * * same is to be applied in payment of said sum.”
III. The finding of the circuit court that the provision for interest was not part of the contract is sustained by the evidence. The amount collected by the plaintiff on the notes and accounts, as shown by the evidence,' is less than' the amount of the indebtedness. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the difference, which we find to be $154.56. At his election, this judgment will be entered here, or the cause will be remanded, with directions to enter it in the circuit court.
Beversed.