41 W. Va. 493 | W. Va. | 1895
At the December rules of the Circuit Court of Harrison county, for the year 1886, Charlotte Cornell tiled her bill in equity against Elijah 0. Hartley, as administrator of the estate of Azariah Cornell, for the purpose of compelling the settlement of the account of said Hartley as such administrator, in which she alleged that said Azariah Cornell departed this life on the 4th day of April, 1883, leaving no children or other issue of his body; that complainant was his wife, and took by survivorship the entire personal estate of said Azariah. That said Azariah left personal es
The defendant Hartley tiled an answer to said bill, in which he claimed that he paid oft two of said one hundred dollar notes to said Azariah Cornell in his lifetime, and there remained unpaid at the death of said Azariah only the last of the three notes for one hundred dollars, each payable to the said Salome Cornell—that is to say, the note due and payable on the 25th day of December, 1894; that said note so remaining unpaid never came into his hands; that plaintiff, as the widow of said Cornell; had the control and custody of the papers of said decedent until and up to the day the appraisement was had of said estate, but said note was not among said papers, and never has come into his handstand he denied that any lien was reserved in said deed to secure the notes given by respondent as aforesaid; that his account as such administrator has been in the hands of a commissioner for nearly two years; that said Azariah Cornell was the committee of seveial parties in his lifetime, and the accounts of said committee were also before said commissioner, and were complicated; that under the advice of the commissioner he tried to compromise some of those accounts, but failed, and the delay in settlement is not owing to his negligence; and that he has been urging said commissioner to proceed and close the matter up as speedily as possible.
Quite a number of depositions were taken in the cause, and on the 23d day of January, 1891, said cause was dismissed from the docket under the four-year rule.
On the first Monday in July, 1894, said Charlotte Cornell filed another bill in equity in the said circuit court for the purpose of surcharging and falsifying the account of said Elijah 0. Hartley as administrator of the estate of Azariah Cornell, and made said Elijah 0. Hartley and Joseph I. Vincent, the surety in his administration bond, defendants, in which second bill she states: That her husband, Azariah Cornell, departed this life in 1883, intestate, leaving the plaintiff, his widow, as his only distributee of his personal estate, and states that her said husband, at the time of his death, was the owner and possesser of a large
The defendant E. 0. Hartley answered said bill and claimed that the complainant ought not to have and maintain her action in this cause because all the matters in controversy were fully litigated and disposed of in a similar and identical suit brought by the complainant in said circuit Court, on the chancery side thereof, to December rules, 1886, which suit was entitled “Charlotte Cornell v. E. 0. Hartley, Administrator of the Estate of Azariah Cornell, Deceased,” and that the facts and allegations set up in the bill filed in said suit were substantially the same as are set up in this cause, and that the object of said suit was the same, viz, the settlement of respondent’s accounts as administrator aforesaid; that he then employed couusel and made a perfect defense to the allegations thereof, and evidence was taken by both parties to said cause, and that said cause was finally dropped from the docket of said court, and the complainant is now without remedy except under the provision of section 8 of chapter 127 of the Code of West Virginia, which cause is referred to, to be read in connection with his answer. Respondent admits that he qualified as administrator of the estate of said Azariah Cornell, and took upon himself the duties of said office, and also admits that he had a sale of said personal estate, but avers that the sale was made of the entire personal estate as far as he was able to ascertain the same. Respondent further admits that complainant took, of the personal property of the said Azariah Cornell, the amount of one hundred and ninety eight dollars and ninety eight cents, but he denies that, in the settlement made by him before A. Werninger, a commissioner of accounts of said county, said sum of one hundred and ninety eight dollars and ninety eight cents, claimed, as alleged, by complainant as widow' of said Azariah stands charged to said estate; but on the contrary he avers that it will appear from said settlement, which is filed with complainant’s bill, that said estate is credited with the same, and respondent is charged therewith. He denies that he should not have credit for his commission
The cause was referred to a commissioner, and the defendant E. O. Hartley appeared and filed a demurrer, and also his answer to plaintiff’s bill. Said commissioner took depositions and returned his report, which was excepted to by defendant (1) because the report show’s bias and prejudice on his part; (2) because said commissioner acted as counsel in the case referred to in defendant’s answer filed in this cause, involving same matters in controversy in this cause, as will appear by the deposition of Abraham Rinehart, taken in said similar cause; (8) because the order of reference was improvidently, illegally, and improperly allowed.
On the 18th day of September, 1894, the cause was heard, and the court overruled the demurrer and the exceptions taken to the commissioner’s report, and confirmed
The first error assigned is as to the action of the court in overruling the defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s bill. The grounds relied on in said demurrer were:
First. Because the plaintiff has no right to bring suit, the complainant having assigned all her interest in the estate of the said Azariah Cornell to Samantha A. Janes for a consideration which, from all that can be learned from the hill, exhibits, and evidence in the cause, was fully paid, and it is not now in the power of the heirs of said Samantha A. Janes to convey or assign the interest of said Samantha A. Janes in said estate to said Cornell. Now, as to the questions raised by this demurrer, our conclusion is that the said Charlotte Cornell, by virtue of the reassignment to her of said personal estate, took it as distributee, subject to the indebtedness of the estate of said Samantha A. Janes, and this would entitle her to call on the administrator of Azariah Cornell for a settlement of his accounts and maintain a suit for that purpose; but before there could be a distribution of the assets of said Azariah Cornell, it was necessary that the administrator ofthc estate of Samantha A. Janes should be brought before the court. This was necessary for the protection of said E. 0. Hart-ley as administrator of the estate of Azariah Cornell. Otherwise, he might have to pay the balance found against him on settlement to the administrator of said Samantha A. Janes. We therefore think this point of the demurrer was well taken, and the demurrer should have been sustained, and the cause remanded, with leave tu the plaintift
As to the second ground of demurrer it may be well to express our opinion, as the cause is to be remanded. The second ground of demurrer relied on was: Because all the matters in controversy in said cause have been fully litigated in the cause of Charlotte Cornell v. E. 0. Hartley, Administrator of Azariah Cornell, Deceased, late pending in this Court, in which the defendant E. O. Hartley made full defense, and 'which cause was finally dropped from the docket pursuant to section 8 of chapter 127 of the Code, and the plaintiff is without remedy except under section 11 of said chapter, and said cause was referred to, to be read in connection with said demurrer. Now, when we look at that record we find that while the case was pending for some years on the docket and considerable testimony was taken therein, nothing was determined thereby, the casis was never heard upon the merits, and it was dismissed under the four-year rule. Upon this point Barton, in his Chancery Practice (volume 1, p. 358) states the law thus: “It is undoubtedly the rule that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a question directly involved in one suit, constitutes a bar to any other suit between the same parties or their privies for the same points of controversy; but to constitute such a bar it must appear either upon the face of the record or be shown by extrinsic evidence that the previous question was raised and determined in the former suit, and that the said former suit was determined on its merits.” So that we think this clause of the demurrer was properly overruled.
Having arrived at the conclusion above stated, in is unnecessary to discuss the exception to the commissioner’s report. The decree complained of is reversed, and the cause remanded, with leave to the plaintiff to amend her bill and make new parties, with costs.