Cornelius v. OverstreetCornelius v. Overstreet
for the Court:
¶ 1. In Junе 1995, the Chancery Court of Lee County granted Robert T. Cornelius, Sr. and Helen G. Cornelius Overstreet a divorce on irreconcilable differences. Helen filed a motion to cite for contempt of court and termination of parental visitation alleging that Robert had violated certain provisions of their property settlement agreement. The chancellor found that Robert had failed to pay back ad valorem tаxes as provided in the agreement. Because Helen had already paid the taxes in an effort to avoid foreclosure proсeedings, the chancery court ordered Robert to pay to Helen the amount of the back ad valo-rem taxes plus interest. Aggrieved with this decision, Robert has appealed to this Court arguing the following assignments of error which we quote verbatim from his brief:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND WAS MANIFESTLY WRONG IN AWARDING AP-PELLEE BACK AD VALOREM TAXES IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,000.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND WAS MANIFESTLY WRONG OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AWARDING APPEL-LEE ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,923.19.
After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong, nor did-he abuse his discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the chancery court.
FACTS
¶ 2. Rоbert and Helen were married on May 22, 1981. In June 1995, the Lee County Chancery Court granted the parties a divorce on irreconcilable differences. A property settlement agreement signed by both parties was incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. Helen filed a motion to cite for contempt of court and termination of parental visitation, and among other allegations, she alleged that Robert failed to pay $3,000 of ad valorem taxes as provided in the property settlement agreement. Although the property settlement agreemеnt provided that Robert was to pay these taxes, Helen paid the taxes in an effort to prevent foreclosure of the former marital property in Grand Saline, Texas. Robert filed a cross-petition for citation of contempt of court in which he admitted that he agreed to pay approximately $3,000 of ad valorem taxes. However, in his petition, he maintained that because Helen had paid the taxеs, he was no longer required to pay the taxes. The chancellor found that Robert was responsible for $3,000 plus interest for back ad valorem taxes and ordered that Robert pay this amount to Helen. The chancellor further ordered that Robert was to pay Helen’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,923.19.
ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION OF LAW
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND WAS MANIFESTLY WRONG IN AWARDING AP-PELLEE BACK AD VALOREM TAXES IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,000.
¶ 4. This Court’s standard of review for all appeals involving domestic relations cases is well-established. “Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited by our familiar substantial evidеnce/manifest error rule.” Magee v. Magee,
¶ 5. In the case sub judice, the record contains substantial, credible evidence to support the chancellor’s findings. Robert admits and the propérty settlement agreement shows that Robert was to be responsible for the back ad valorem taxes on the former marital property located in Grand Saline, Texas. Even though Helen paid these taxes to avoid foreclosure proceedings, Robert is still responsible for the payment of the back ad valorem taxes as provided in the property settlement agreement. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that prоperty settlement agreements are contractual obligations from the date of the final judgment of divorce. Mount v. Mount,
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND WAS MANIFESTLY WRONG OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AWARDING APPEL-LEE ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,923.19.
¶ 6. Robert also argues on appeal that the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding Helen attorney’s fees because she was financially able to pay these fees. Helen maintains that because Robert failed to object to the award of attorney’s fees or any evidence concerning the attorney’s fees, hе has waived his right to assert on appeal that this award is error. This Court has held that, to preserve an issue on appeal, “a contemрoraneous objection on specific grounds must be made to the admission of evidence by the trial court.” Denson v. State,
¶ 7. Alternatively, this assignment of error is without merit. In domestic cases, the award of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the chancellor. Brooks v. Brooks,
¶ 8. By statute, appellants are required to be charged with 15% of the judgment if it is (1) a final judgment (2) of the type specified by thе statute (3) affirmed unconditionally (4) by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-3-23 (Rev.1991). Although not requésted in this case, Robert is required to be charged with 15% of the final judgment sinсe we are affirming the lower court. The statute directs the imposition of penalties based upon the judgment or decree affirmed if it is monеtary. Therefore, we impose a statutory penalty of 15% upon such sum. Legal interest is also due upon the judgment from the date of its entry.
¶ 9. In addition, this Court would like to comment to the bar and the trial bench about cases similar in nature which fall within the purview of Rule 81(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The initiation of such actions should be by filing “complaints” or “petitions,” and “counterclaims” or “cross-claims” (whichever might be appropriate), not “motions” and “cross-petitions” as was done in this case. See M.R.C.P. 13, 81(d)(l-3), 81(f), and comments to 81(d)(3) and 81(f).
¶ 10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. STATUTORY DAMAGES AND INTEREST ARE AWARDED TO THE APPELLEE. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.