*1
PER CURIAM. claims to have suffered an adverse tiff prior consequence action as 37.2103(i) (ii), defendants, with one (iii). environment, MCL We con- hostile work allege does not plaintiffs complaint clude under either to show sexual harassment sufficient therefore, a matter of law. and, fails as We pertaining decision the Court reverse claims and reinstate sexual harassment disposition for granting summary order trial court’s defendants.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY FACTS AND employed Smith were Joseph Plaintiff and defendant adult Education to work its the Detroit Board of Center. Golightly at Vocational program the education Plaintiff employed part-time counselor,1 was as a defendant her supervisor. During Smith was the course of their employment, plaintiff and Smith became ro- mantically involved a relationship that lasted three years. four The relationship ended when Smith dating started another employee, defendant Barbara alleges Finch. Plaintiff that after Smith and Finch involved, became repeatedly threat- ened plaintiff with adverse employment action if she said or did anything interfered with his relation- ship Finch.2 alleges Plaintiff also that Finch taunted, embarrassed, and humiliated her causing plaintiffs work station to be moved and by engaging in “catty” conversations with others that were about plaintiff and intended to be overheard her. According plaintiff, harassment culminated when discharged at the conclusion of the 1995-1996 year. school *3 suit,
Plaintiff filed claiming harassment, sexual of contract, breach and intentional infliction of emo- tional Regarding distress. the sexual claim, harassment plaintiff alleged that she was species two of harassment prohibited the Michigan Act: a hostile working environment, 37.2103(i)(iii), MCL 37.2103(i)(ii). quid pro quo harassment, 2.116(C)(8) (10), Pursuant to MCR the circuit court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, ruling plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief granted could be and that there no genuine issue material fact. simultaneously Plaintiff employment held full-time with the Detroit only Board of Education. The facts relevant to this case involve
part-time employment Golightly. at 2 Defendants Smith and Finch since have married. Ed Detroit Bd of Opinion of the Court and reversed part affirmed Appeals
The Court of grant court’s order reversed trial The part. panel harass regarding the sexual summary disposition ing persistent claims, reasoning alleged that the ment reasonably be considered could hostile communications defendants nature because a sexual communications of in the presence work “continued “disliked” plaintiffs Furthermore, paramour.”4 as Smith’s former place sufficient submitted Court determined pro quo evidence of “her actions as result
suffered adverse overtures.5 to Smith’s prior” ‘submission’ threats, reasoned that additionally panel es working conditions remarks, and adverse offensive of a hostile work environ sufficient evidence tablished to this Court. appeal leave to ment. Defendants seek II. OF REVIEW STANDARD the resolution of reviews de novo This Court motion.6 summary disposition 2.116(C)(8) legal MCR tests A motion “under the plead- on the sufficiency complaint basis “The of such motion is ings alone.”7 upon has a claim stated determine whether The motion should be granted. can which relief be justify development possibly if could granted no factual recovery.”8 summary disposition regarding breach The Court of affirmed App 246 Mich intentional infliction of emotional distress.
of contract and
appeal
rulings.
15, 25-26;
did not
those
III. ANALYSIS We initially turn to whether plaintiff alleges 2.116(0(10) sufficient under MCR to establish a claim of sexual harassment actionable under either pro quo theory or a hostile work environment theory, MCL (iii). 37.2103(i)(ii),
“Sexual harassment” is defined MCL as: advances, requests
[UJnwelcome sexual for sexual fa- vors, and physical other verbal or conduct or communica- tion of a sexual following nature under the conditions:
(ii)
rejection
Submission to or
of the conduct or commu-
nication
an individual is used
aas
factor in decisions
affecting the
employment, public
individual’s
accommoda-
public services,
tions
education,
housing.
or
or
(iii) The conduct or
communication has the
or
substantially
effect of
interfering with an individual’s
employment, public
public services,
accommodations or
education,
housing,
creating
intimidating, hostile,
Rozwood,
Maiden v
109,
119;
or offensive services, educational, housing environment. or matter, allege must Thus, plaintiff as a threshold subjected to “unwelcome that showing favors,” or “con- advances,” for sexual “requests before she of a sexual nature” duct or communication harassment under actionable sexual can establish pro quo a quid or hostile work environment 37.2103(i). theory. defendants made not contend that
Plaintiff does requests or for advances either unwelcome sexual of MCL turn to the third element sexual favors. We thus to “conduct if she was to determine “Sexual nature” of a sexual nature.” not in statute. a term is is not defined Where statute, ordinary will review its defined we defined, dictionary meaning guidance.11 “Sexual” “occurring to as “of or sex” or part, pertaining sexes: sexual relations”12 involving between characteri as a “native or inherent “Nature” defined defi Utilizing commonly two understood stic.”13 these nitions, that actionable sexual harassment we conclude inherently communication that requires conduct or to pertains sex.14 alleged by plaintiff and communication
The conduct that do this definition. Plaintiff contends not meet to warned not repeatedly and threat- relationship his with Finch interfere with 11 (2002). Managers, 1, 18; ofHosp 651 v Bd NW2d 356 Cox College Dictionary Random House Webster’s 13 Id. Police, 302, 312; Haynie Dep’t State 468 Mich 664 NW2d See Community College, Barrett v Kirtland (2003); see also (2001) (reiterating 306, 321; Act is 628 NW2d sex). any way all is in related so broad as bar conduct Mich op the Court her ened with consequences if she did. The Court of Appeals, viewing evidence in a light most favorable plaintiff, concluded that the threats could constitute unwelcome they communications stemmed from Smith’s past intimate relationship with plaintiff. disagree. 'We
After their intimate ended, their work- ing relationship difficult, became but defendant Smith’s alleged threats that he would fire if she inter- *6 fered with his new relationship inherently were not nature. Verbal or physical conduct or commu- nication that is not sexual in nature is not sexual harassment.15 For this reason, we conclude that plain- tiff cannot meet the requirement threshold to establish a quid pro either quo sexual harassment claim hostile work environment sexual harassment claim against defendant Smith.
Regarding Finch, plaintiff alleges that Finch contributed to a hostile work environment engaging in “catty” conversations about causing plaintiffs work station to be As relocated. above, discussed plaintiff must establish that the as- serted conduct or communication were of a sexual is, nature. That that Finch’s conduct or communication inherently pertained Here, to sex. the asserted commu- nication by Finch conveyed more nothing than Finch’s personal animosity plaintiff. towards does not forbid the communication of enmity between rivals, even if the predicate for the dislike is sexual competition, long as the as conduct or commu- nication not inherently sexual. In summary, what may have been sexual this case did not involve harassment, while what did involve harassment was It sexual. cannot any be said by understanding Haynie, supra at 310. Bd of Ed v Detroit Opinion by
Dissenting Cavanagh, J. subject of MCL 37.2103 language Thus, plain- we conclude to “sexual harassment.” to threshold requirement to meet tiff has failed this by Finch because sexual harassment establish conduct and and the between sex connection missing.16 IV CONCLUSION as matter of law because claim fails Plaintiffs conduct communica- evidence of has not established claim required support a “sexual nature” as tion of Therefore, reverse deci- harassment. we of sexual respect sion of the circuit claims and reinstate sexual harassment summary defen- disposition order court’s 2.116(0(10). under MCR dants Taylor, Young, Corrigan, Weaver, C.J., and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred. .
CAVANAGH, I respectfully J. dissent. (dissenting). fit dispose this majority While sees minutes after fifteen opinion per perfunctory curiam *7 I argument application, of oral on believe granted for leave should be application defendant’s only briefing be after full this case should decided this argument. Court of Appeals opinion Further, jurispruden- presented the issue published. than the tially closely and is more drawn significant believe. majority would have reader reached I unclear whether the result am Additionally, I am troubled majority is correct. plead failed sufficient facts under MCR Because has plaintiff’s 2.116(C)(10), legal sufficiency decide the we need not 2.116(C)(8). complaint under MCR 470 MICH 274 Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J. majority’s quick dictionary, any resort to the without principles underlying consideration of the Michigan’s any Act and without examina- tion the federal cases have considered this issue. respectfully Therefore, I must dissent because this parties, Court, and the be would better served application defendant’s for leave. KELLY, J., with CAVANAGH, concurred J.