Corey v. Schuster, Hingston & Co.Corey v. Schuster, Hingston & Co.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Ragan
On the 25th day of November, 1892, Alfred G. Corey and Mary C. Corey brought this action in the district court *272of York county, making Schuster, Hingston & Co. and Plummer, Perry & Co. defendants thereto. The Coreys in their petition alleged that they were husband and wife, residents and citizens of the state of Nebraska, had a family of five children; that they were the owners in fee-simple of lot 23, in block 48, in the town of McCool Junction, in said York county ; that said real estate consisted of one lot and a dwelling house and out-buildings thereon, all of the value of not to exceed $800; that they had occupied said premises as their homestead since June, 1885, until within about four months of the time of filing the petition, during which four months they had been living temporarily in Clay county, Nebraska, where they were educating their children, the older children being in attendance upon a college in said Clay county; that neither of them had any other homestead than the above described real estate, and that neither of them had any other real estate whatever; that the parties made defendants to the action, in the year 1891, recovered certain judgments against the said Alfred G. Corey, which judgments are of record in the office of the clerk of the district court of said York county and are wholly unpaid; that said judgments were not based on debts secured by mechanics’, laborers’, or vendors’ liens, nor on debts secured by mortgage on said premises, but that they cast a cloud upon the title of plaintiffs to said premises and caused persons not learned in the law and not fully informed of the facts to question the title of said premises as against said judgments, to the annoyance, injury, and damage of the plaintiffs; that said premises were incumbered by a mortgage of $300; that plaintiffs had but little means and were desirous of selling said premises for the purpose of investing the proceeds in a cheaper homestead and one not incumbered. The prayer was that said judgments and each of them might be decreed to be not liens upon the premises; that the cloud cast thereby upon the title to said premises might be removed, and the parties *273made defendants perpetually enjoined from asserting . or. ■claiming a lien on said premises by virtue of said judgments.: The parties made defendants to the action appeared and answered the petition. The district court found all the issues in favor of Corey and wife and entered a decree as follows.: •“It is hereby ordered and adjudged by the court that such judgments be, and they hereby are, declared no liens on said real estate, and said defendants are hereby enjoined from setting up any claim to or claiming any lien on said premises by reason of their said judgments.” From- this •decree Schuster, Hingston & Co. and Plummer, Perry, & ■Co. have appealed.
In Lick v. Ray, 43 Cal., 83, it is said: “ If a title against which relief is prayed as a cloud be of such a character that, if asserted by action and put in evidence, it would drive the other party to the prod action of his own title in order *274to establish a defense, it constitutes a cloud which the latter has a right to call upon equity to remove.”
In Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 Ind., 44, it is said: “ When the claim set up by one to an interest in land appears to be valid on the face of the record, and the defect can only be made to appear by extrinsic evidence, particularly if that evidence depends upon oral testimony, it presents a ease invoking the aid of a court of equity to remove it as a cloud upon the title.” The court cites 1 Story, Equity; sec. 711, and Crooke v. Andrews, 40 N. Y., 547.
Under the jurisdiction and practice in equity, independently of statute, the object of a bill to remove a cloud upon title, and to quiet the possession of real estate, is to protect the owner of the legal title from being disturbed in his possession, or harassed by suits in regard to that title. (Mr. Justice Gray, in Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S., 552; Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S., 370; City of Hartford v. Chipman, 21 Conn., 488.)
In 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, it is said:
“Sec. 1398. The jurisdiction of courts of equity to remove clouds from title is well settled, the relief being granted on the principle quia timet; that is, that the deed or other instrument or proceeding constituting the cloud may be used to injuriously or vexatiously embarrass or affect a plaintiff’s title.
“Sec. 1399. Whether or not the jurisdiction will be exercised depends upon the fact that the estate or interest to be protected is equitable in its nature, or that the remedies at law are inadequate where the estate or interest is legal. * * * While a court of equity will set aside a deed,, agreement or proceeding affecting real estate, where extrinsic evidence is necessary to show its invalidity, because such in.-trument or proceeding may be used for annoying and injurious purposes at a time when the evidence to contest or resist it may not be as effectual as if used at once, still, if the defect appears upon its face and a resort *275to extrinsic evidence is unnecessary, the reason for equitable interference does not exist for it cannot be said that any cloud whatever is cast upon the title.”
Applying the doctrine of these- authorities to the facts of the case at bar we reach the conclusion that the judgments of the appellants are apparent liens upon the homestead of the Coreys, and as such constitute a cloud upon, the title to the homestead, which a court of equity has jurisdiction to remove at the suit of the homestead owner. If’ the appellants should cause executions to be issued and: levied upon this real estate it would require the production of extrinsic evidence on the part of the Coreys to show that such real estate was not in fact subject to the liens of such judgments. It is not an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of such an action as this that the judgment creditors should be threatening or about to cause executions-to be issued and levied upon the exempt homestead. It is-sufficient, to authorize the interposition of a court of equity, that the existence of the apparent liens of the judgments upon the premises may be used injuriously or vexatiously to harass the owner of the homestead and injure and depreciate his title to the property.
Judgment accordingly.