In thе Matter of the Worker‘s Compensation Benefits Claimed by San Juana CORDOVA, Surviving Spouse of Felipe A. Cordova. San Juana CORDOVA, Petitioner (Claimant), v. HOLLY SUGAR CORPORATION, Respondent (Employer), and State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Worker‘s Compensation Division, Respondent (Objector).
No. 93-138
Supreme Court of Wyoming
Oct. 7, 1994
880 P.2d 880
Almost ten years ago, we stated that:
[W]orker‘s compensation statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their beneficent purpose. The purpose of such construction is to require the industry to bear the burden of industrial accidents, not the injured worker. But we cannot ignore clear statutory language and apply worker‘s compensation statutes to situations that do not reasonably fall within the intended ambit of such laws.
Matter of Abas, 701 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Wyo. 1985) (citations omitted).
This rule has been followed in Jaqua, 873 P.2d 1219; and Woodman v. Grace Bomac Drilling, 736 P.2d 313 (Wyo.1987).
This court has reaffirmed the burden of proof with respect to the existence of a causal connection between injury and course of employment. Bearden. We relied upon Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker‘s Compensation Div., 798 P.2d 323 (Wyo.1990). There is evidеnce from which an inference can be drawn that the December 7, 1991 injury at home was a separate event in a continuous history of back-related problems. While the contrary inference could be drawn, as the district court did, this is precisely the function that is foreclosed so far as the reviewing court is concеrned.2
The Order Awarding Benefits and Remanding Case entered in the district court is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for the entry of an order affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Lowell H. Fitch of Fitch Law Offices, Torrington, for petitioner San Juana Cordova.
Catherine W. Hansen of Hollard & Hart, Cheyenne and Jerry M. Smith of Sigler & Smith Law Offices, Torrington, for Respondent Holly Sugar Corp.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Kenneth E. Spurrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent Worker‘s Compensation Div.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY and TAYLOR, JJ.
CARDINE, Justice, Retired.
Felipe Cordova suffered a compensable hand injury but died of non-work related causes before he could file for permanent disability benefits. His surviving spouse, San Juana Cordova (Cоrdova), then applied for permanent disability benefits from the Wyoming Worker‘s Compensation Division (Division) on behalf of her deceased husband.
* Retired July 6, 1994.
We reverse.
Cordova presents two issues:
- Under the Wyoming Worker‘s Compensation Act and subject otherwise to its pertinent requirements, may Employee‘s widow seek payment for an actual and compensable permanent disability suffered by Employee when formal claim for a permanent disability award was not made before the time of Employee‘s death due to causes other than the work related injury?
- If so, should this court direct the District Court to vacate the Order made by the Office of Administrative Hearings granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment and dismissal of Petitioner‘s case therein?
FACTS
Felipe Cordova (Felipе) worked for the Holly Sugar Corporation (Holly Sugar) for nineteen years. From 1986 to February 28, 1992, Felipe, at a warehouse in Torrington, Wyoming, moved, weighed, sealed and stacked fifteen-pound, machine-filled containers of sugar packets for Holly Sugar. From September 1991, to February 1992, Felipe suffered from recurring cramps in both рalms and elbows while performing his duties at Holly Sugar. Felipe was laid off on February 28, 1992, and recalled to work on March 18, 1992. Felipe returned to work but was unable to perform his duties due to the pain in his palms and elbows. After visiting several physicians, Felipe was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
On April 9, 1992, Felipe filed an aсcident report with the clerk of the Goshen County District Court describing his injured hands. Holly Sugar disputed Felipe‘s claim. After a contested case hearing on July 9, 1992, a
On August 18, 1992, Felipe filed another claim for temporary total disability benefits for the month of August. On August 26, 1992, Holly Sugar petitioned the Division for review of Felipe‘s August claim and, ironically, Felipe died of heart failure unrelated to his hand injury. Holly Sugar dropped its appeal of Felipe‘s final temporary total disability claim, and the Division paid that final claim on August 31, 1992. Before his death, Felipe had not received a permanent partial or permanent total disability rating, and had not made a claim for permanent disability.
On December 2, 1992, Cordova, Felipe‘s wife, by a letter from her counsel, sought permanent disability benefits for Felipe‘s injury. Enclosed with that letter was a letter from Felipe‘s physician to Cordova‘s counsel, written after Felipe‘s death, which stated:
I think [Felipe]‘s hands had been rendered essentially totally useless, and in my medical opinion, both hands would have remained essentially totally functiоnless as a result of the inflammatory process.
On January 12, 1993, the Division denied Cordova‘s request for permanent disability benefits; and on February 4, 1993, Cordova requested a contested case hearing. Both Holly Sugar and the Division moved for summary judgment, and Cordova answered by filing a “Claimant‘s Memorandum of Law.” On May 14, 1993, a hearing officer awarded summary judgment to Holly Sugar and the Division and dismissed Cordova‘s claim. On June 9, 1993, Cordova petitioned the Goshen County District Court for judicial review and, on July 6, 1993, the district court certified Cordova‘s petition to this court because it presented a “novel question of state-wide importance.”
DISCUSSION
The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. The sоle question we must address is whether, based on the undisputed facts, the hearing officer correctly concluded that the Division and Holly Sugar were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm agency conclusions of law if they are in accordance with law.
The question we must answer is whеther a surviving spouse of an employee, who suffers a compensable injury but who dies from causes other than the compensable injury before he has made a formal claim for permanent disability benefits, may maintain a separate action for permanent disability benefits. The dispositive statute,
(a) In addition to payment of medical and hospital care and artificial replacement, an injured employee and his dependents may be entitled to one (1) or more awards for:
(i) Temporary total disability;
(ii) Permanent partial disability;
(iii) Permanent total disability; or
(iv) Death.
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(d) If an injured employee entitled to receive or receiving an award under paragraph (a)(ii) or (iii) of this section dies due to causes other than the work relatеd accident, the balance of the award shall be paid:
(i) To the surviving spouse[.]
(emphasis added). Under the statute, when an injured employee dies from causes other than the work related injury, the Division must pay the balance of a permanent disability award to a surviving spouse in two different situations. First, if the injured employee is an employee receiving an award of permanent disability and, second, if the injured employee is an employee entitled to receive a permanent disability award. We are concerned with the second situation. The hearing officer determined that Felipe was not “an injured employee entitled to receive” а permanent disability award because “no award for either permanent partial disability
Holly Sugar and the Division argue that the hearing officer‘s construction of the phrase “entitled to receive” is correct. They assert that the hearing officer‘s construction is supported by
Conversely, Cordova asserts that she should be allowed to prove that Felipe is entitled to receive a permanent disability award and that simply because he did not make a claim or receive the required certification does not mean he is not entitled to receive a permanent disability award. Cordova argues that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute does not require the filing of a claim or obtaining physician certification as a pre-condition to her ability to maintain this action.
We agree with Cordova. Nowhere in
When faced with the question of “whether a dependent of a deceased employe[e] may receive benefits to which that employe[e] may have been entitled when no claim was filed during the employe[e]‘s lifetime[,]” a Pennsylvania Court stated:
We must begin this discussion with the proposition that nothing in thе Act specifically prohibits recovery in this situation. Nowhere in the Act is there the requirement that a claim for benefits due and owing a deceased employe[e] be filed before that employe[e]‘s death. On the contrary, Section 410 can be fairly read to authorize a dependent‘s filing of such a claim. Werе we to refuse recovery here, we would hardly be giving the Act the broad, liberal construction which has traditionally been accorded it.
In addition, the construction urged by Holly Sugar and the Division would produce an absurd, illogical and unreasonable statute, which we must avoid when construing statutes. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1093 (Wyo.1989). If we read the statute as urged by Holly Sugar and the Division, then, no matter how obvious a permanently disabling injury, e.g., loss of limb, the failure to file a claim and obtain physician certification before an unrelated death will preclude a dependent from maintaining a claim for permanent disability benefits. On the other hand, if a claim is filed the day before death or if death rеsults from the work related injury, benefits are payable to survivors. That interpretation contended by appellees “would indeed elevate form over substance.” Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 849 (Wyo.1992). We do not think the legislature intended an unjust and unreasonable result.
As further support for adopting this construction, аn Indiana appellate court, when faced with precisely the same question, construed very similar statutory language in favor of the surviving spouse. Snyder Constr. Co. v. Thompson, 145 Ind.App. 103, 248 N.E.2d 560, 564 (1969). The employee/claimant in Snyder was injured, receiving temporary total disability and had not yet filed for
When an employee has been awarded or is entitled to an award of compensation for a definite period under this act * * * for an injury * * * and dies from any other cause than such injury, payment of the unpaid balance of such compensation * * * shall be made to his dependents * * *.
(emphasis added). Id., 248 N.E.2d at 561. That сourt construed the above statutory language as follows:
[A] dependent may institute an independent claim for workmen‘s compensation in the event the deceased employee died from causes unrelated to a compensable injury, if the employee is otherwise entitled to receive compеnsation under the act. Further, a dependent‘s right to compensation is not dependent upon the initiation of a claim for compensation by the injured employee prior to his death.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the hearing officer did not rule in accordance with law when he granted summary judgment to Holly Sugar and the Division. When an injured employee dies from causes unrelated to his or her compensable injury,
We reverse.
THOMAS, J., files a dissenting opinion.
THOMAS, Justice, dissenting.
I do not read the statute in the same way as the majority. I do not think the statute justifies the consideration of an award for permanent disability in this instance, and I would affirm the summary judgment of the hearing officer. Consequently, I dissent.
I am satisfied the statutory scheme in this instance encompasses something beyond a mere expectancy. The majority opinion points out Felipe Cordova had not made a claim for permanent disability benefits prior to his death from an unrelated cause. It also is clear he was not receiving an award for permanent disability аnd, as the majority correctly says, the focus must be upon whether he was entitled to receive a permanent disability award at the time of his death.
Even conceding the rule of liberal construction, we still must discern legislative intent with respect to this statutory enactment. As we said in State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div. v. Halstеad, 795 P.2d 760, 771 (Wyo.1990):
Legislative intent is the primary and foremost consideration in statutory construction. Such intent should be ascertained as nearly as possible from the language of the statute. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d 97 (Wyo.1985); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo.1983); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo.1982); Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681 (Wyo.1982). All portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must be given effect and considered so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, all with the purpose of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intent. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo.1988); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 (Wyo.1985); Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo.1982).
I would affirm the order of the hearing examiner in this instance, even recognizing that the worker‘s widow is entitled to concern and sympathy. I simply cannot justify the construction of the statute adopted by the majority.