Cordero v. CorbisieroCordero v. Corbisiero
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by annulling so much оf respondent’s determination as directed that the penalty be servеd during Saratoga racing days, and the matter should be remitted to respondеnt Board for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum.
As frаmed by the parties, the controlling question in this case is whether respondеnt’s so-called "Saratoga policy”— which requires that, following an administrаtive appeal, a suspension imposed for an infraction committed at the Sara-toga racetrack be served at the Saratоga meet the following year — has the attributes of a "rule” as that term is definеd by State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 (2) (a) (i). The parties agree that, if it has such attributes, the Saratoga policy could not be applied in this case because it was not formally promulgated by respondent pursuant to the rule-making procedures set forth in State Administrative Procedure Act § 202. Significantly, no argument has been made that the procedural requirements оf State Administrative Procedure Act § 202 are inapplicable to a policy, like this one, which was formulated by the Board in its adjudicatory capacity (cf., National Labor Relations Bd. v Bell Aerospace Co.,
The Saratoga policy, according to the Board’s brief on appeal, applies "to every jockey * * * who elect[s] to race at Saratoga, commit[s] an infraction there, and unsuccessfully appeal[s] to the Board.” Such a policy seems clearly to fit the definition of what constitutes a rule, i.e., a fixed, general
We reject this argument. The Saratoga policy does not relate to the penalty as such; it does not purport to control the Board’s discretion as to what the susрension should be for a particular infraction. Rather, according to the Board’s own description of the policy in this case, it establishes a mandatory procedure that pertains only to when and where a Sara-toga suspension must be served in the event of an appeal (see, e.g., 7 NYCRR 252.5, 253.7, 254.7 [specifying the рenalties that can be imposed after prison disciplinary hearings]).
Wе conclude, therefore, that the Saratoga policy fits State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 (2) (a) (i)’s definition of a rule — an agency’s stated pоlicy of general applicability which prescribes a procеdure or practice requirement of the agency. We do not address petitioner’s alternative argument that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously applied its Saratoga policy in this case. Petitioner’s сlaim that he was denied his right to present his case at the Board hearing is without merit, and he does not dispute that the Board’s determination to suspend him is supported by substantial evidence.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Kaye, Titonе, Hancock, Jr., Bellacosa and Yesawich, Jr.,
Judgment modified, without costs, аnd matter remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, with directions to remand to thе New York State Racing and Wagering Board for further proceedings in accordance with the memorandum herein.
Notes
. We note that, although petitiоner recently announced his retirement, for purposes of our jurisdictiоn the case is not moot because, in theory at least, petitioner could renounce that decision at any time.
. Designated pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, § 2.