16 P.2d 740 | Cal. | 1932
Appeal on judgment-roll alone from judgment for defendant in an action brought to determine whether the personal representative of a deceased life tenant had exclusive right to the proceeds of a $2,000 fire insurance policy taken out by the life tenant and the insurance thereafter paid to him and deposited in bank with his other funds. The appellant remainderman opposed the claim of the personal representative, and brings this appeal.
The deceased was the life tenant of a small piece of property and improvements. The appellant remainderman is the owner of the fee, subject and subordinate to the life estate of the deceased. The deceased insured the dwelling and improvements and paid the premiums. The insured property was destroyed by fire, and the amount of the policy was paid to the deceased and deposited by him in a bank. The identity of the insurance money was not lost, and, as so *774 identified, passed into his estate. The appellant remainderman demanded of the personal representative the payment of all moneys paid to the deceased by the insurance company, contending that the insurance fund was substituted for the destroyed property, and, after the death of the life tenant, was payable to the remainderman, inasmuch as the status of the two estates had not been changed by the conversion, and that the life tenant was a trustee for the remainderman.
[1] While the exact question presented is novel in California, respondent's position that the life tenant had the exclusive right to the benefit of insurance taken out by him, and that there had been no transmutation of the destroyed buildings into money as a substitute, must be sustained. There are facts inThompson v. Gearheart,
A similar holding is found in Addis v. Addis, 60 Hun, 581 [14 N.Y. Supp. 657], where the court held that under like circumstances the life tenant "is in no sense a trustee for the remainderman". In Bennett v. Featherstone,
The language of this court in Anderson v. Quick,
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from these authorities is that the plaintiff Corder, as a stranger to the contract between the deceased and the fire insurance company, had no interest in the proceeds paid to him by reason of that policy. The duty of a life tenant to insure must precede the right of the remainderman to participate in such proceeds. No such obligation is imposed upon a life tenant of California lands. His duty is as prescribed in sections
The judgment is affirmed.
Preston, J., Langdon, J., Shenk, J., Seawell, J., Curtis, J., and Tyler, J., pro tem., concurred. *776