34 F. 692 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1888
On March 80, 1882, William A. Boies, Benjamin B. Fay, Lucius W. Conkey, and Julius K. Graves, formed a limited partnership under the firm name oí Boies, Fay & Conkey, to carry on the business of wholesale grocers for five years, at Chicago. Graves, a special partner only, was a resident of Dubuque, Iowa, where he remained; and, whether the business proved profitable or unprofitable, interest was to ho paid on his capital of $50,000, at the rate of 20 percent, per annum. Fay and Graves were brothers-in-law, and the former became financial and chief manager of the firm. In August, 1882, about five months after Graves became a limited partner, an inventory was taken of the assets, from which the book-keeper made a statement, showing the firm’s finaiioial condition. This statement embraced all the hills receivable, and although some of the debts due to the firm wore then uncollectible and worthless, no deduction was made on that account. If such deduction had been made it would have appeared that the liabilities exceeded the assets. If the partners did not then know that the firm was insolvent, they must have known it was seriously threatened with insolvency and bankruptcy. This statement has nor, been produced, and Fay testified that a copy of it which was furnished him by the book-keeper had been lost or destroyed.
The Illinois statute
“It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the partnership heretofore existing between William A. Boies, Benjamin B. Fay, and Lucius W. Conkey, under the firm name of Boies, Fay & Conkey, is this day dissolved by mutual consent. The said dissolution shall date from the 1st day of November, 1882, and legal notice thereof shall be published on or before the 10th day of November, 1882.”
This paper or notice was published for the first time in the Chicago Daily Evening Journal, on December 2d; and the paper bjr which it is claimed the limited partnership was dissolved two days before, was published on the same day in the Chicago Legal News, a legal publication read by few besides lawyers. On the 18th of October, the day after the alleged dissolution of the limited partnership, the bank, through Gage, made another demand loan of $10,000 to the limited partnership, receiving as security other warehouse receipts of the same character. At the time of the alleged dissolution of the limited partnership, and the sale by Boies of his interest to Fay & Conkey, a large amount of the limited partnership paper was about to mature, and the firm was still purchasing goods; and the testimony shows that the partners deemed it unwise to then give notice of the alleged withdrawal of Graves and Boies. The business was continued in the name of the limited partnership,
Why was it thought necessary to dissolve the limited partnership on the 17th of October, and keep the fact a secret from the public until the 2d of December? And if there was no intention on the part of Graves and his partners to take advantage of any portion of their creditors, and allow Graves to escape liability as a partner, why was the agreement of dissolution published in the Chicago Legal News, a legal publication read by few except lawyers, instead of in the Evening Journal, a paper of much wider general circulation? And why did the notice which appeared in the Evening Journal of the same day say nothing about the retirement of Graves? Wiiat occurred prior'and subsequent to October 17 fairly shows that the dissolution was a' pretended one, and that the
This, the Corbin suit, came to a final hearing on November 17,1885, when the court decreed that on the 20th of August, 1882, the limited partnership was insolvent, with the knowledge of each of the partners, ■and so continued until the termination of its business on the 22d of January, 1883, when Fay & Conkey, the pretended successors of Boies, Fay & Conkey, confessed the judgments already mentioned; that the acts of the partners, whereby they pretended to dissolve the limited partnership, were done with intent to defeat and evade the provisions of the statute of Illinois which prohibited preferences by such partnerships, and that all such acts were void; that the judgments were confessed by Fay & Conkey for the purpose of protecting Graves against loss as a member of the limited partnership, and as ail indorser for it; that the judgments in favor of the Commercial National Bank for $14,396.49, the Dubuque County Bank for $12,002.38, the Importers & Traders National Bank of New York for $15,126, were confessod at the special instance of Graves, and that they, as well as the Graves’judgment in this court,
At and before the hearing, Graves was represented by Flow'er, Remy & Gregory, and, not paying the decree within the time limited, an execution was issued against him, and returned nulla bona, after which an alias execution was issued, upon which the marshal indorsed a return that he had made a personal demand upon Graves for money or property to pay or satisfy the same, and he had refused to do either. An order was then entered on the application of the complainant, requiring Graves to personally appear before the court on October 30, 1886, and show cause why he should not be attached for contempt in failing to comply with the decree of the court. This he did not do, although personally served with a copy of the order. On November 1, 1886, it was adjudged that Graves had willfully disobeyed the orders of the court; that he was guilty of contempt of its authority; and that a writ be directed to the marshal of the Northern district of Illinois, commanding him to arrest Graves, and commit him to the jail of Cook county until he complied with the orders of the court, or was discharged by due process of law. Not finding Graves within his district, the marshal proceeded to Dubuque, where Graves resided, and there presented the writ to the district judge of the Northern district of Iowa, and requested that the proper process should be issued for his arrest and identification, in order that he might be removed to this district. This request was denied after argument of counsel. In re Graves, 29 Fed. Rep. 60.
The jurisdiction of this court, both as to subject-matter and the parties, including Graves, is not denied, and until the decree and orders are reversed they are binding upon him. When Graves refused to obey the orders and process of the court, and thus defied its authority, he was rightfully adjudged guilty of contempt. Section 725, Rev. St., declares that the courts of the United States shall have power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, persons guilty of contempt of their authority by disobedience to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
“It is not a crime, in one sense, but it partakes of the nature and character of a crime; and I do not see why, if a man is imprisoned for a contempt of a court of the Dnited States, and breaks jail and escapes into another state, he cannot be arrested and returned to his imprisonment under the authority of the United States.”
In New Orleans v. Steam-ship Co., 20 Wall 392, Justice Swayne says: “Contempt of court is a specific criminal offense.” On this subject see, also, hi re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157.
Graves should have paid into court the amount adjudged to be clue from him, if he was able to do so: and if he was insolvent, or unable to satisfy the decree, he could and should have exonerated himself by personally appearing and showing that fact. It cannot be that the law is so impotent as to allow a party to resist a suit stop by step, and, when a decree is entered against him, disobey it with impunity, by removing beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Graves having thus, for the time being, at least, successfully defied the authority of the court, the complainant now asks for a decree against the First National Bank of Chicago for §40,000, paid to it in satisfaction of the confessed judgment, and also for §10,000 of the firm assets, paid to it on January 20, with interest on these amounts. This relief is asked on the ground that the limited partnership became insolvent as already stated; and, knowing that fact, the bank, through Gage, co-operated with Graves in his scheme, which had for its object the latter’s protection against liability as special partner and as indorser. Graves needed the aid of the bank to accomplish his purpose, and it co-operated with him through Gage. The bank was apparently willing, if not desirous, that Graves should be protected against threatened loss, provided it did not suffer thereby. Gage testified that it was not until after the judgments had been confessed that he knew a limited partnership could not prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion of others. We have already seen that while Fay was absent buying goods, and Graves was occupying his place in the store, the latter told Gage ho would see that all checks drawn by the firm’s book-keeper were paid; that when Fay returned he promised Gage that if the firm got into trouble the bank should bo protected; and that two days before the judgments were confessed it was agreed between Graves and Gage and Fay & Conkey, in the office of Flower, Remy & Gregory, who acted as counsel for all the parties, that the bank’s judgment and execution should be a first lien and first paid, and that Graves’judgment should stand next in priority. After the proceeds of the sale had
A decree will be entered against the bank for the amount it has received in satisfaction of the judgment confessed in its favor, with interest.
(2 Starr & C. St. Ill. p. 1568, c. 84, § 22.)