CORAL RIDGE MINISTRIES MEDIA, INC., d.b.а. D. James Kennedy Ministries v. AMAZON.COM, INC., SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, INC., AMAZONSMILE FOUNDATION, AMAZONSMILE FOUNDATION, INC., et al.
No. 19-14125
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
July 28, 2021
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00566-MHT-SMD [PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
Before WILSON, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
Coral Ridge Ministries Media (Coral Ridge), a Christian ministry and media corporation, appeals the district court‘s dismissal of its defamation claim against the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and religious discrimination claim against Amazon.com and the AmazonSmile Foundation (collectively, Amazon). Because we find that the district court did not err in dismissing this suit, we affirm.
I.
Amazon.com is the largest internet-based retailer in the world. AmazonSmile Foundation (AmazonSmile) is a tax-exempt corporation affiliated with Amazon.com. The AmazonSmile website allows customers to buy products as if they were using Amazon.com, but with every purchase Amazon will donate 0.5% of the price to an eligible charity selected by the customer. To be an eligible charity for the AmazonSmile program, an organization must be registered and in good standing with the Internal Revenue Service as a nonprofit organization under
Coral Ridge filed suit in the Middle District of Alabama, claiming, inter alia, that (1) SPLC defamed Coral Ridge by listing it on the Hate Map, and (2) Amazon violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act (Title II),
In a thorough 141-page order, the district court dismissed the defamation claim on First Amendment grounds and dismissed the Title II claim primarily because it found that the AmazonSmile program was not covered by Title II in this instance. Alternatively, it held that Coral Ridge‘s interpretation of Title II created First Amendment problems. Finally, the district court found that Coral Ridge did not plausibly allege either intentional or disparate impact discrimination. It therefore dismissed Coral Ridge‘s suit in full.
II.
We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 2016). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We need not, however, accept as true a complaint‘s conclusory allegations or legal conclusions. Id.
III.
Under Alabama law, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie defamation claim when he or she demonstrates: “(1) that the defendant was at least negligent (2) in publishing (3) a false and defamatory statement to another (4) cоncerning the
When applying state defamation law to public figures, the First Amendment imposes additional limitations.5 First, the alleged defamatory statement must be “sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false.” Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990). Second, the statement must be actually false. Id. at 16. And third, a public-figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the alleged defamatory statement with “actual malice“—“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). This actual malice test is subjective; the public-figure plaintiff must show that the defendant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the statement. Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2020).
The district court dismissed Coral Ridge‘s defamation claim on the grounds that the term hate group has a “highly debatable and ambiguous meaning” and thus is not provable as false. Alternatively, the court found that Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead that SPLC acted with actual malice.6 Because we agree that Coral Ridge failed to adequately plead actual malice, we affirm the dismissal of Coral Ridge‘s defamation claim.7
Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that SPLC “actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity” of its hate group definition and that definition‘s application to Coral Ridge, or that SPLC was “highly aware” that the definition and its application was “probably false.” Michel, 816 F.3d at 702–03. For starters, we can disregard the portions of the complaint where Coral Ridge alleged in a purely conclusory manner that the defendants acted “with actual malice” in publishing the Hate Map. Allegations such as these amount to threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, which are insufficient to state a claim. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Setting those allegations aside, Coral Ridge makes two basic contentions regarding actual malice. First, it claims that SPLC‘s definition of hate group is so far removed from the commonly understood meaning of the term that its designation of Coral Ridge as a hate group is “intentionally false and deceptive.” This statement comes very close to being a conclusory assertion of the elements of the cause of action. Michel, 816 F.3d at 703. In any event, Coral Ridge does not plead any facts that would allow us to infer that SPLC doubted the veracity of its own definition
Second, Coral Ridge contends that SPLC acted “with reckless disregard for the truth” in designating Coral Ridge a hate group, even under SPLC‘s definition оf the term. But Coral Ridge pleaded no facts that would allow us to infer that SPLC seriously doubted the accuracy of designating Coral Ridge a hate group. The complaint states that Coral Ridge “has never attacked or maligned anyone on the basis of engaging in homosexual conduct” and that “SPLC‘s conduct, in and of itself, would have created a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of SPLC‘s declarаtion.”8 Although we must accept Coral Ridge‘s allegations as true at this stage, bare-bone allegations like these are insufficient to show that SPLC doubted the truth of its designation. Michel, 816 F.3d at 703. Accordingly, the district court was correct to dismiss Coral Ridge‘s defamation claim on the ground that Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead actual malice, and we affirm as to this issue.9
IV.
Next, we review whether the district court was correct in dismissing Coral Ridge‘s religious disсrimination claim. In relevant part, Title II states: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”
The district court assumed without deciding that websites, likе Amazon and AmazonSmile, qualify as places of public accommodation under Title II. It dismissed Coral Ridge‘s Title II claim primarily because it found that the AmazonSmile program did not qualify as a “service,” “privilege,” or “advantage” under the statute. It held in the alternative that Coral Ridge‘s claim failed on First Amendment grounds. And last, it found that the claim had to be dismissed because it did not adequately allege discrimination.
Coral Ridge challenges all of the district court‘s findings. It alleges that Amazon is liable under Title II because (1) Amazon is a “place of public accommodation,” (2) the
We hold that the district court was correct in finding that Coral Ridge‘s interpretation of Title II would violate the First Amendment by essentially forcing Amazon to donate tо organizations it does not support.
As an initial matter, we disagree with Coral Ridge‘s position that it is the customers rather than Amazon who donate under the program. It is Amazon that is forgoing a portion of its proceeds and donating to the charities. Coral Ridge acknowledges as much in their complaint when it quotes the AmazonSmile website, which states that the “AmazonSmile Foundation will donate 0.5% of the price of eligible рurchases to the charitable organizations selected by customers.” Coral Ridge argues that still it is the customers who get to choose where to donate. This is true in a sense, but ignores the fact that Amazon is the party actually paying the charities. Thus the donation is Amazon‘s—not the customers‘. With that in mind, we turn to Amazon‘s right to free speech under the First Amendment.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedоm of speech.”
The parties do not dispute that donating money qualifies as expressive conduct. Indeed, it is “bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support.” Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 656 (2014). The question is how the facts of this casе map onto that principle.
In setting out the criteria for the AmazonSmile program, Amazon expressly states that it relies on SPLC to determine which charitable organizations are eligible to participate. A reasonable person would interpret this as Amazon conveying ”some sort of message” about the organizations it wishes to support. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1240; see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to lеave unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide what not to say.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we have no problem finding that Amazon engages in expressive
Next, we must consider whether Coral Ridge‘s proposed application of Title II to the AmazonSmile program is permissible under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston is instructive here. 515 U.S. 557. In Hurley, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) sued the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (the Council), an association that organized a St. Patrick‘s Day parade in Boston, when the Council denied GLIB‘s application to have a unit in the parade. Id. at 561. GLIB sued in state court under a Massaсhusetts law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation “in the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation.” Id. at 572 (internal quotation mark omitted). The Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed with GLIB, finding that the Council violated the state law in denying its parade-unit application. Id. at 563–64. In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 581.
The Supreme Court statеd that GLIB‘s interpretation of the state public accommodation law was “peculiar” in that individual members of GLIB were not “claim[ing] to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march. Instead, the disagreement [went] to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.” Id. at 572. The Court explained that while the state statute was generally constitutional and acceptable, “the state courts’ application of the statute had the effect of declaring the [Council‘s] speech itself to be the public accommodation.” Id. at 573. That is, the Council‘s decision as to which organizations could have a unit in the parade was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id. The Court further reasoned that the lower court‘s application of the law did not advance the law‘s purpose of preventing discrimination in access to public accommodations. Id. at 578 (“When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own. But in the absenсe of some further, legitimate end, this object is merely to allow exactly what the general rule of speaker‘s autonomy forbids.“). Because there was no other legitimate reason to apply the state statute in this way, the Court reversed the Massachusetts Supreme Court‘s decision on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 579 (“The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and statemеnts acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.“).
Hurley is analogous to this case in that Coral Ridge‘s proposed interpretation of Title II would violate the First Amendment. In the same way that the Council‘s choice of parade units was expressive conduct, so too is Amazon‘s choice of what charities are eligible to receive donations through AmazonSmile. Applying Title II in the way Coral Ridge proposes would not further the statute‘s purpose of “secur[ing] for all citizens the full enjoyment of facilities described in the Act which are open to the general public.” United States v. DeRosier, 473 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1973).10 It would instead “modify the content of [Amazon‘s] expression“—and thus modify Amazon‘s “speech itself“—by forcing it to donate to an organization it does not wish to promote. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578, 573.11 This we cannot do. The law “is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.” Id. at 579.
Therefore, because Coral Ridge‘s proposed interpretation of Title II would infringe on Amazon‘s First Amendment right to engage in expressive conduct and would not further Title II‘s purpose, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of this claim.12
V.
In sum, we find that Coral Ridge has not adequately alleged a state law defamation claim and that its proposed interpretation of Title II would violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Coral Ridge‘s complaint.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2019).By way of comparison, assume that a closely held fast-food restaurant chain, whose owners are Christian and object to homosexuality based on their religious beliefs, initiates a “charity match” program. Under the program, consumers who purchase a certain number of sandwiches may donate up to $5.00 to the charity of their choice, subject to certain restrictions, and the corporation will match the donation. According to Coral Ridge‘s interpretation of Title II, the fast-food chain could be compelled—over their objection—to match donations to, for example, a church whose central mission is promoting the Christian acceptance of homosexuality; the Church of Satan; or any number of religious organizations whose purpose and activities run directly contrary to the business‘s deeply held convictions. Even though the consumer initiated the transaction that would ultimately lead to the business donating money, it is still the business‘s money being donated, and the business retains its say as to where it goes.