Plаintiffs appeal from denial of their motion for new trial after judgment upon jury verdict for defendant in this motor vehicle personal injury case. They claim trial court error in refusal to submit to the jury two specifications of defendant’s negligence. We find one of them should have been submitted, and reverse and remand.
The accident happened about 7:40 a. m. March 15, 1967, on east-west County Line Road whiсh runs along the boundary between Polk and Warren counties. Plaintiff Coppola resided on the south side of the ordinary two-lane gravel road, about one quarter mile west of its intersection with an extension of Fleur Drive. Her driveway was variously estimated as 120 to about 150 feet east of the crest of a hill.
Mrs. Coppola worked in Des Moines with plaintiff Hines who had agreed to drive her to work on the morning invоlved. The sun was shining and road surface was clear. Mrs. Hines drove into the Coppola driveway where Mrs. Coppola was waiting. After Mrs. Coppola got in the car, she backed out onto the roadway at a northwesterly angle to head east. Mrs. Hines said she looked west to the crest of the hill just before she started forward and saw nothing coming. Plaintiffs testified her car was traveling slowly forward and had passed the driveway at the time it was struck by defendant’s car.
Defendant lived in the area and traveled east on County Line Road each work day to get to Des Moines. He testified he was driving 50 miles per hour аpproaching the crest of the hill, beyond which he knew was the Coppola home and driveway. He did not reduce his speed until at .or over the crest of the hill when he saw the Hines car 100 to 120 feеt east of him. It had already backed out of the driveway. He thought the car was stopped two or three feet over the center of the road. There was no traffic heading west. He said he “whiрped” his car to the left, lost control, locked the brakes and skidded down the road with the front angling north. The right front corner of his vehicle struck the left rear of the Hines car, knocking it into the south ditch a сouple car lengths past the driveway.
*879 The trial court submitted specifications of defendant’s negligence based upon common law lookout and control and the Code § 321.28S requirement of reasonable and proper speed. The court refused to submit pleaded negligence specifications of speed greater than would permit defendant to bring his vehicle to a stoр within the assured clear distance under Code § 321.285 and requirements as to control and speed of his vehicle when approaching a steep descent in a public highway under Code § 321.288. Various cоntributory negligence specifications were submitted against plaintiffs. The sole appeal issues are whether the evidence supported submission of the two unsubmitted specifications of defеndant’s negligence.
I.
Should the assured clear distance specification have been submitted?
In determining whether a jury question is engendered the evidence is viewed in its light most favorable to the party having the burden of proof, and if reasonable minds can differ on the issue, it is for the jury. West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Company,
Defendant claims the assured clear distance statute is inapplicable in this case because the crest of the hill shortened his assured clear distance, depriving him of an opportunity to adjust his speed to avoid the collision. This argument ignores the language, purpose and meaning of the statute. Code § 321.285 relevantly provides, “[N]o person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having the right to assume, however, that all persons using said highway will observe the law.” The words “assured clear distance ahead” signify that a driver shall at all times be able to stop his car within the distance that discernible objеcts may be seen ahead of it. Demers v. Currie,
We have recognized that assured clear distance constantly changes as a motorist proceeds “and is measured at any moment by the distance betwеen the motorist’s vehicle and the limit of his vision ahead, or by the distance between the motorist’s vehicle and any intermediate discernible static or forward-moving object in the highway ahead constituting obstruction in the motorist’s path or lane of travel.” 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 188 at 739, quoted with approval in Demers v. Currie,
supra,
*880
Cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable. They fall within the exception where an established assured clear distance is suddenly and unexpectedly shortened and obstructed by some not reasonably anticipated intrusion by another rapidly approaching or converging vehicle into the driver’s path. In such circumstances the statute is inapplicable. See Plummer v. Loonan,
We agree with the Ohio court that a jury question on the issue exists where there is substantial evidence:
“(1) That the object with which the operator collided was located ahead of him in his lane of travel;
(2) That such object was reasonably discernible; and
(3) That the object was (a) static or stationary, (b) moving ahead of him in the same direction as such operator, or (c) came into his lane of travel within the assured clear distance ahead at a point sufficiently distant ahead of him to have made it possible tо bring his vehicle to a stop and avoid a collision.” Cerny v. Domer,13 Ohio St.2d 117 , 123-124,235 N.E.2d 132 , 137 (1968).
In this case the Hines vehicle was a discernible object constituting an obstruction in defendant’s lane of travel. It was either static or forward moving. Defendant was obliged to have his speed regulated so he could stop in the distance established by the range of visibility. This duty existed when the crest of the hill was the limit of his assured clear distance as well as when he passed the crest and saw the vehicle in his path. The statute required that he anticipate an object might lawfully be in his path just beyond the range of his vision and be traveling at such speеd that when he saw it he could stop his car to avoid hitting it. See 2 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice (3d ed.) § 105.39 at 411 (“A motorist cannot assume that his course of travel is free of danger or obstruction in the absence of the ability to see clearly ahead.”).
There was sufficient evidence to support jury submission of the assured clear distance specification. Contrary to defendant’s further argumеnt, a plaintiff is entitled to have submitted to the jury all properly pleaded negligence specifications which are supported by the evidence so long as they present distinct issues. Karr v. Samuеlson, Inc.,
II.
Should the steep descent specification have been submitted?
Without evidence of a “steep descent” in the area of highway involved, the duty imposed by Code § 321.288 as to control and proper speed when “approaching and traversing * * * a steep descent” is inapplicable. The term “steep descent” is not defined in the statutе or in our cases. The dictionary meaning of “steep” includes “making a large angle with the plane of the horizon: having a side or slope approaching the perpendicular; preсipitous.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966). The testimony in this case characterized the grade of the hill involved as “slight” between the crest of the hill and accident scene. Photographic еxhibits confirm it was a small hill. Its grade was far from precipitous. Cf. Falt v. Krug,
*881 III. Since we find reversible error in the trial court’s failure to submit the assured clear distance negligence specification, the case will be remanded for new trial. Ordinarily all appeal costs would be taxed to defendant. However, plaintiffs unnecessarily included in the reсord and their brief on appeal 61 printed pages relating to evidence on damages, although no damages issue was involved here. Therefore, plaintiffs are taxed $76.25 in appeal сosts.
We have adopted new rules of appellate procedure effective January 1, 1973. We encourage the bar to study them carefully. They are designed to simplify and shorten apрeal papers. We expect implementation of Rule 344.1 to result in inclusion in the appendix to briefs of only those limited portions of the record clearly authorized by the rule, so that prolixity and expense such as involved here will be avoided.
Reversed and remanded.