829 S.W.2d 140 | Tenn. | 1992
OPINION
We have been asked to interpret our recent decision in Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn.1989), as it applies to the facts of this case, in order to determine whether Plaintiff’s injuries are compensable. To be compensable under our workers’ compensation statute, an injury must be one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(5) (1991). In Lollar we evaluated
THE FACTS
In 1970, the Plaintiff-employee, Cora L. Copeland, started working in the plant of the Defendant, Leaf, Inc. in Memphis, Tennessee. On June 13, 1988, Plaintiff clocked out of Defendant’s plant at 2:30 p.m., exited the designated employee door, and headed for her car in the parking area. Leaf, Inc.’s plant is located on Kansas Street and Plaintiff’s car was parked in a designated employee parking lot directly across Kansas Street from the main plant. Plaintiff testified that after crossing the street an individual got out of a car on Kansas Street to strike another individual with an iron pipe. The second individual, a Leaf employee, ran and knocked Plaintiff under one of Defendant’s trucks in the company owned parking lot across the street from the plant. It is unclear whether Plaintiff was initially struck while crossing Kansas Street or whether she had reached the sidewalk. However, whether it was the street or sidewalk matters little because both are public ways and not the premises of the Defendant Leaf, Inc.
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court found “that the Plaintiff had clocked out of her place of employment, left at the exit, and was on the public street or sidewalk which intervened between her place of employment and the parking lot provided for the employees such as Plaintiff, when she was suddenly knocked down by a temporary employee of Defendant who was fleeing for his own safety from a non-employee, who was chasing him because of a romantic disagreement.” Citing Lollar v. Wal-Mart, the Court specifically found “that while an employee on the employer’s premises, or the employee parking lot provided for its employees, who sustains an injury may claim compensation, it appears that one who is not on the employer’s premises after leaving work may not claim compensation, even though he or she may later be intending to enter upon another part of the employer’s premises.” The trial court’s holding is consistent with Lollar; however, we are asked by Plaintiff to extend Lollar in order to avoid the unfairness of the trial court’s decision. Plaintiff seeks to have the premises rule broadened to include that area necessary for access to that land actually owned or controlled by the employer.
OUR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Had this accident occurred on Defendant’s plant site or on Defendant’s parking lot, liability under Lollar would have been clear because Plaintiff would have been injured on the employer’s premises en route from work. In the case before us, the employer’s premises,
In Epler v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., supra, it was necessary for the employee to cross a public thoroughfare after leaving the work place to get to the employee parking lot. As Epler attempted to cross the road, he was struck and killed by an automobile. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion written by, now, Chief Justice Nix held:
We find no justification in logic or law which would support the conclusion that compensation should be denied, under the facts of the instant case, solely because the accident occurred while the claimant was crossing a public road.... To employ the distinction between accidents occurring on a public way and a*144 private way [citations omitted.] under the facts of this case would place undue significance upon a fact that should not here be controlling. The real question is whether the site of the accident was an integral part of employer’s premises.
393 A.2d at 1166. Justice Pomeroy, in a concurring opinion, stated:
The exception to the “premises rule” recognized by the Court today is that an injury in a public street or other off-premises place between plant and parking lots is in the course of employment because it occurs on a necessary route between two portions of the premises. This position represents the majority rule of other jurisdictions.... [footnote omitted.] The best explanation for today’s short extension of the “premises rule” is that the employer is responsible for creating the necessity of his employees’ encountering the particular hazards of the trip between a noncontiguous parking lot and the working plant itself.
Id. at 1167-68.
We agree with Justice Pomeroy that, here, it was the employer who created the necessity of the employee’s crossing a public street between a noncontiguous parking lot and the plant itself. To allow coverage from the plant to the public street, to disallow coverage while crossing the street, and to allow coverage while walking in the parking lot to her automobile would appear inconsistent and illogical. Cf. Mallette v. Mercury Outboard Sup. Co., supra (This Court allowed recovery when employee was injured on city steps, because the steps were the only reasonable means of getting from the place of employment to the parking lot.)
We realize that a strict interpretation of the Lollar premises liability rule would make the application of the rule easier to apply. However, we are concerned that such an interpretation would create arbitrary and illogical results. We fully realize an extension of Lollar will eventually engender even more difficult cases, yet we feel an extension is warranted. Therefore, we hold that employees who must cross a public way that bisects an employer’s premises and who are injured on that public way while traveling a direct route between an employer’s plant facility and parking lot, are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Because such travel was necessary by the Plaintiff here, her injury on the public way is compensable.
Having found Plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits compensable, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for an assessment of damages, if necessary.
. The term "premises” includes the entire area devoted by the employer to the industry with which the employee is associated. 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 15.41 (1990).
. A remand may be unnecessary for it appears to this Court that counsel for the Defendant has conceded that if Plaintiffs claim is compensa-ble, then Plaintiff is entitled to 100 percent disability. In response to a question by the trial court, counsel for the Defendant stated: "If the Court were to find that she’s compensable, then she’s 100 percent under the proof.”