144 Ga. 636 | Ga. | 1916
1. While the evidence in this case was somewhat vague, that introduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to withstand a motion for a nonsuit, and it was error to sustain such motion.
2. In an ejectment case, whether a witness can testify generally, subject to cross-examination, that at a certain time a named person was in possession of a tract of land, or whether such testimony involves the statement of a conclusion and is therefore objectionable, is a question, as to which the authorities outside of this State are in conflict. See Wright v. State, 136 Ala. 139, 140 (34 So. 233); Driver v. King, 145 Ala. 585, 595, 596 (40 So. 315). Contra: Arents v. Long Island R. Co., 156 N. Y. 1 (50 N. E. 422); Tetrault v. O’Connor, 8 N. D. 15 (76 N. W. 225, 226).
(а) In Sweeney v. Sweeney, 121 Ga. 293 (48 S. E. 984), it is ruled that “where it is material to an issue on trial, a witness may testify who was in actual possession of designated realty at a given time.”"' '
(б) Semble, that this did not deal with constructive possession, hut only with actual possession evidenced by visible facts; and that the admission of such evidence would be subject to cross-examination and motion to exclude the evidence, if it thus appeared to he improper.
Judgment reversed.
