116 Ga. 685 | Ga. | 1902
Mrs. Copeland brought an equitable petition against Mrs. Cheney and Jim Murkerson. The petition alleged, in substance, as follows: Plaintiff had borrowed from Mrs. Cheney the sum of $130, had given her three notes at sixty dollars each, with interest at six per cent, per annum, and, to secure the payment of the same, had executed and delivered a deed to a described parcel of land. Suit had been- brought upon the three notes, and judgment had been rendered for the full amount of the principal, interest, and costs. Executions had been issued and levied upon the land, and the same had been sold by the sheriff, and Mrs. Cheney had become'the purchaser for the sum of $180. Between the time the land was advertised and the date of the sale the plaintiff had entered into an agreement to sell the land to Murkerson fox" the sum of $500, to be paid in annual installments of $100 each, with interest at 8 fo, Murkerson, as additional-security for the purchase-money, to give a mortgage upon other land owned by him and on certain personal property. This agreement between the plaintiff and Murkei-son was communicated to Mrs. Cheney, and it was agreed between plaintiff and Mrs. Cheney that the land should xxot be sold at the time and place advertised and that the extension of the time of payment of the executions would be given and the sale to Murkerson consummated. The notes and mortgage given by Murker
Even if the contract between the plaintiff and Mrs. Cheney was infected with usury, it was too late, after judgment had been rendered-on the notes, to attempt to take advantage of this as a defense to the judgment. The judgment precludes the defendant therein from ever setting up any defect of this character in the transaction which was the foundation of the judgment. See Hendrix v. Webb, 113 Ga. 1028, 1030, and cases cited. A general demurrer to an equitable petition, that it sets forth no cause of action, requires a decision only as to whether the plaintiff, under the allegations of the petition, is entitled to the relief asked for therein. See Steed v. Savage, 115 Ga. 97. The plaintiff in an equitable petition must not only allege facts which will show that he is entitled to relief, but by his prayers must indicate the nature of that relief. The plaintiff in an equitable petition will never be granted any relief unless there is a prayer asking for the specific relief sought, or unless there is a prayer for general relief and the nature of the case is such that under the prayer for general relief some character of relief may be granted which is consistent with the case made by the petition and with the specific prayers therein. Such being the rule, the plaintiff is confined to his prayers for relief; and in order to determine whether an equitable petition sets forth a cause of action, it is only necessary to determine whether the allegations of the petition are such as to authorize the particular relief which is the subject-matter of the prayers. Applying these principles to the petition in the present case, we can not do otherwise than hold that
Judgment affirmed.