On June 26,1979, Martha Thomas Carter, 79 years old, filed a complaint in the Wayne Superior Court against Richard Copeland in which she alleged that Copeland had recorded a deed conveying certain lands from herself to Copeland, and that Copeland had conspired with an unknown imposter to forge her signature to said deed. Carter prayed that the deed be set aside and that attorney’s fees and punitive damages be awarded.
Copeland did not file an answer. Instead, on November 30,1979, Copeland filed a motion to open the default which the trial court subsequently granted on the grounds that Copeland’s failure to timely file an answer had been the result of excusable neglect and that the other conditions of Code Ann. § 81A-155 (b) had bеen fulfilled. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict setting the deed aside and awarding Carter $3,000 for attorney fees.
Carter appeals the trial court’s grаnt of Copeland’s motion to open the default, and Copeland аppeals a series of allegedly erroneous rulings by the trial court during trial.
We affirm the trial court in all instances.
1. Carter enumerates three errors regarding the trial court’s grant of Coрeland’s motion to open the default: Copeland’s failure to pаy the costs prior to the hearing on the motion (Carter concedes that Copeland paid the costs prior to the trial court’s grant of the motion), аnd, the failure of the facts sworn to by Copeland in his verified motion to open the default to establish either a meritorious defense or excusаble neglect.
Assuming a movant’s compliance with the other conditions in Cоde Ann. § 81A-155 (b), a trial court is authorized to grant a motion to open a defаult so long as the movant has paid the costs prior to the grant of said mоtion. Cf.
Sweat v. Mohr & Sons,
By verified answer, Copeland swore to the following facts: On or about June 11, 1979, Copeland and Carter went before Notary Public Paul Scott and executed, in the presence of one other person, a warranty deed conveying certain lands from Carter to Copelаnd. These facts constitute a meritorious defense to Carter’s allegаtions that Copeland had conspired with an unknown imposter to forge hеr signature to the deed.
Regarding Carter’s complaint that the facts sworn to by Copeland in his verified motion to open the default failed to establish
*543
excusable neglect, and that the trial court therefore erred in оpening the default on that ground, we note first that Code Ann. § 81A-155 (b) states three grounds upon which a trial court may open a default: providential causе, excusable neglect, and a proper case. Accordingly, аlthough the trial court in the present case opened the default on the ground of excusable neglect, this court will affirm the trial court’s decision to open the default if the record sustains said decision under any of thе three noted grounds. See,
Collins v. McPhail,
. In the present case, the trial judge, found as a fact that Copelаnd’s failure to timely answer had not been the consequence of wilful or gross negligence and that Carter had not been prejudiced by Copeland’s delay. The record supports these findings of fact. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, under the “proper case” grоund, in granting Copeland’s motion to open the default.
Axelroad v. Preston,
2. Having reviewed the enumerations of error raised by Copeland, and the record relevant thereto, we affirm the trial court in every instance.
Judgment affirmed.