45 S.E.2d 197 | Ga. | 1947
1. A petition alleging that the defendant has wilfully, falsely, and maliciously stated to a prospective purchaser from the owner of land that he owns it, has deeds to it, and will sell it states a cause of action for whatever special damages are sustained by the owner as a consequence thereof.
2. The petition states but a single cause of action, and that ground of the demurrer which attacks it for misjoinder of causes of action is without merit.
3. In an action for slander of title under the Code, § 105-1411, only such special damages as result directly therefrom may be recovered, and the pleader must allege them plainly, fully, and distinctly and with that particularity necessary to put the defendant on notice of their character.
2. We have held in the preceding division that the allegations of the petition were sufficient to state a cause of action for any special damages flowing to the plaintiff for a tort alleged to have been committed by the defendant, namely, falsely and maliciously impugning his title to certain lands. As we view and construe the petition and its prayers, it states no other cause of action. This being true, and we hold that it is, there is no merit, of course, in that ground of the demurrer which attacks the petition for a misjoinder of causes of action.
3. Paragraph 13 of the petition alleges that the plaintiff, because of the alleged wrongful acts of the defendant, lost a sale of his property and in consequence thereof was damaged $3000. Paragraph 17 alleges that the plaintiff expended $100 investigating *20
the defendant's claim; $500 for counsel fees as a necessary item of expense to prevent a continued slander of his title; and the balance of the $3000 was compensation for the loss of his time and for damage sustained because of a failure to close a sale of his property. These paragraphs were specially demurred to upon the grounds that the allegations were mere conclusions of the pleader without a statement of facts sufficient to support them, and that they were not sufficient to put the defendant on notice how or in what way the plaintiff had been damaged. We think that these objections to the petition were good, and that the court should have sustained special grounds 7 and 9 of the demurrer. The plaintiff could recover only such special damages as he actually sustained as a consequence of the alleged wrongful acts, and he was required to plead them plainly, fully, and distinctly. Code, § 81-101; City Council of Augusta v. Marks,
4. We have carefully examined the remaining grounds of special demurrer and hold that they were without merit.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All theJustices concur, except Wyatt, J., who took no part in theconsideration or decision of this case.