*1 Act and stated intent. wrote the by the Joyce authorized
patronage dividends are Kathleen COPELAND and Patrick Legislature very Act which Copeland, Appellants, same marketing cooperatives agricultural deemed (d). is “nonprofit.” 2 O.S.1991 361Í Pursuant need to construe the statutes. ADMIRAL PEST CONTROL Marketing Cooperative
to the Association CO., Defendant/Appellee, Act, organized Act are under the associations exempt taxes. nonprofit and from franchise of Arkansas’ law similar State Lodging Enterprises, corpo a Kansas “agricultural cooperatives ours ration; Country Inn and Green of Mer (although eleemosynary) deemed rian, partnership, a limited Defendants. existing non-profit, purpose for making profit for the members their No. 87629. capacities producers.” individual Jeffer Gin, Department Cooperative Inc. v. son Administration the State Finance & Oklahoma, Appeals Court of Arkansas, 932, 255 Ark. 500 S.W.2d Division 1.No. (1973). statutory By express language, our Oct. 1996. Legislature Coop, Clinton removed cooperatives, profit” categori like from a “for Rehearing Denied Nov. 1996. They subject levy zation.1 are not Certiorari Denied Jan. franchise tax. As Court of stated, objec principal “the South Carolina
tive, therefore, cooperative of a to increase producers agri returns to its members as cooperative, as a cultural commodities. The legal entity, legal not in a make a does sense profit produce on marketed for its mem Dairy Cooperative,
bers.” Coble Products Livingston, Inc. 239 S.C. 123 S.E.2d (1961). 301, 303 reasons, find the For these we Oklahoma grant Tax Commission erred when failed to Coop’s protest. Clinton We reverse its order and remand this matter to the Commission opinion. an order with this enter consistent AND REVERSED REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. J.,
HANSEN, concurs. J., ADAMS, dissents. patronage "not-for-profit” supported by account divi- a reserve 1. The label is owned, orga- Cooperatives dends can be disbursed until after account facts. are member products. cooperative buy Because must have nized and sell the members satisfied. stock, instance, agriculture de- and because still Interest is limited to reserve account pends on 8% variables, cooperative keeps per year, must a device nonmembers natural which investing. required Cooperatives are strive above-cost revenue. *2 Frasier, Frasier, Frasier James & Hick- man, Tulsa, Appellants. Rhodes, Warzynski, Edward
Richard Hier- Jones, Gable, onymus, Tulsa, Tucker & Appellee.
OPINION
BUETTNER, Judge: Plaintiff, Joyce Copeland, and her husband brought alleging negligence this action Inc., Enterprises, Lodging Days owner of a Appellee, in Muskogee, Inn Motel Admi- (“Admiral”). ral Copeland Pest Control injuries claims she sustained severe and in- expenses medical curred from bite brown recluse spending while she was night sought the motel. actual She punitive damages. alleged She Admiral itself, fee, took it for a exterminate motel, premises she rented at the and to things spiders it free from such or dangerous other insects. summary filed a judg- motion for alleging Copeland
ment that it owe did not pests to eliminate from the motel or to danger pests. warn of the It those premised upon argument Admiral’s Copeland was person not a foreseeable whom owed a it because was not the owner/occupier premises of the and had no personal or other business rela- Copeland.' tionship with The trial court agreed and sustained Admiral’s motion. Copeland lodges appeal this conformance 1.203, Appellate with Rule Rules of Proce- Cases, 15, App. dure in Civil Ch. O.S.1991 2.1 summary judgment,
In motion
Ad-
miral admitted it had an oral contract with
pests,
the motel owner to treat the motel for
insects,
including
performed
and that it
those
every
about
It
services
four weeks.
submit-
reflecting
ted
statements
treatments
during
charge
month
1992 at a
$65.00
pursu-
pending
appears
The trial
court certified
order as final
the motel owner remain
and it
finding
they
ant to
Country
was not
Inn
O.S.1991
there
dismissed Green
from the law-
just
delay.
against
appeal.
party
reason for
Plaintiffs' claims
suit. Neither is a
to this
summary judg-
injury,
properly
a failure to
exercise
Admiral’s motion for
month.
(3) injuries
on its
perform
on a
relied
lack
ment
response
Copeland’s
did
part
plaintiff proximately caused
defendant’s
to Plaintiff.
any of
evidence or
not controvert
McKel
failure
exercise his
care.
Hospital,
statement
facts.
lips v. St. Francis
*3
(Okla.1987).
Duty
clearly
470
the
BENEFICIARY
THIRD-PARTY
question
any negligence
in
action.
threshold
Co.,
Haas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
563
poten-
response
Copeland’s
did raise
The
(Okla.1976).
P.2d
or not a
625
Whether
beneficiary
the
third-party
of
tial
a
status
relationship
duty
depends
the
exists
be
contract,
presented
but
no evi-
pest control
Duty
question
parties.
the
of care is a
tween
of such status.
dence
a
law. The court
defen
of
decides whether
provides:
29
Title 15 O.S.1991
plain
relationship
in
to a
dant stands
such a
contract,
expressly
made
for the ben-
“A
obligation
an
tiff that the defendant owes
of
by
may
person
a
be enforced
efit of
third
persons
conduct to
who are fore-
reasonable
any
parties thereto
at
the
him
time before
seeably endangered by his conduct with re
it.”
rescind
to
which
the
unrea
spect
risks
make
conduct
presented no
Copeland has
evidence
sonably dangerous,
v. Eastern
Wofford
ex
pest control contract was made
that the
(Okla.1990).
Hospital,
Under the facts
to
is to be measured
Admiral,
court,
that
scope
there is no evidence
of
contractual under
the contractor’s
motel,
Corp.,
benefit
specifically
Qualls
intended to
v.
taking.
Elevator
863
U.S.
(Okla.1993).2
guests
guests
that motel
motel
to the extent
is no evi
P.2d
in court. See
could enforce the contract
the contract or
dence that
breached
Amick,
Ins.
v.
680 P.2d
Allstate
Co.
negligently. Admiral
performed the contract
(Okla.1984)
injured by
in
(third-persons
to
stranger
to a
greater
owed
liability
strangers
are
to a
insurance
sured
Cope
to the motel.
contract than
owed
contract).
guaranteed
shown that Admiral
land
not
a
the motel would be
ás
insect-free
NEGLIGENCE
treatments,
a
of
or that such
con
result
in a
of
provision would result
cause
tractual
not
do
find
Even
we
a
guests.
recognize
in
To
tort
action
favor
third-party beneficiary of the
Copeland was a
make
cause of action under these facts would
contract,
injuries
pest
liability for
control
work,
his
provider an
the service
insurer
The
persons may
imposed
tort.
contrary
to the terms of his contract
negligence
elements of
are
essential
existing
protect plaintiff
law.
owed
defendant
(Okla. 1988),
Company,
Company,
the court
Sapulpa
3. Because there is no 4. The of an with to brown spraying, distinguish pesti- there is little to spiders general recluse is not before us. For a manufacturer, sprayer pesticide cide from the Rodgers Quinta discussion of such see v. La sprayer’s agreement than spray other ev- Inn, Motor 316 S.W.2d Ark. 873 551 ery Certainly four weeks. the dissent would not Signore, Cal.App.3d and Brunelle v. pesticide find the of a manufacturer had a (1989). Cal.Rptr. 415 pest-free places products all in which are used. Doeng- plaintiff stranger JOPLIN, J., was concurs. es, he in- was would be foreseeable HANSEN, P.J., separate with dissents jured by negligence Doenges. any opinion. necessary in a tort privity court held no dissenting: HANSEN, Presiding Judge, negligence. based on The Court ob- action summary judgment Diggs, Court in Truitt v. motion for served (Okla.1980), part “the Stated tradi- a lack of a on on relied privity action for rule law was that other element tional at common Plaintiff. No required trial a cause of ac- presented to the court. contract was before negligence was alone, basis, and this basis tion in tort arose from breach It was on this contract, summary judgment now this restriction granted but trial court created injury to involving physical case should in The decision this cases Admiral. theory many any such as eliminat- other instances been not be based case, present In warranty, where Ad- it is or a contract ed or modified.” breach might charged breach if it that Plaintiff could be with its likewise foreseeable miral injured performed in a extinguish single bug if its duties promised have not been place. negligent These issues manner. the trial court. briefed heard Delbrel, Stuckey Court in further cited in a Duty clearly question a threshold *5 Co., P.2d 726 Young Exploration Haas v. Firestone Tire & negligence action. (Okla.1978). a That held a decision (Okla.1976). Co., P.2d 620 Rubber of chattels to exercise reasonable repairer on the depends a exists Whether not quite any obligation in aside from care was The relationship parties. court between repairs negligently contract that one who and a a stands such decides whether defendant request of the owner liable vehicle relationship plaintiff that the defendant injured by his persons might who obligation of conduct for reasonable owes negligence. plaintiff. impor most the benefit of certainly may to third Such establishing tant consideration perform here to ex- equated foreseeability. v. Eastern State Wofford reasonable care termination services with (Okla.1990). P.2d 516 Hospital, 795 non-negligent workmanlike relationship majority no such stresses I hold an exterminator who manner. would Plaintiff existed between Admiral and ever an inn to eliminate contracts with or hotel largely because of the lack of patrons of bugs owes a disagree. I Even between them. perform bug extermina- establishment relationship with Admiral had no contractual and in a workman- with reasonable care tion Plaintiff, beneficiary clearly is a Plaintiff not the exter- manner. This does mean like Why the motel. insect extermination every bug will be promises that minator proprietor feel the need would a else destroyed! provide such services? distinguish majority attempts to Admiral breached Whether dealing inju- with Supreme Court decision a breach caused Plaintiff’s recent whether such liability to a not fore this Court as was issue a defendant’s before ries no contractual rela motion sum- plaintiff argued who had at trial Admiral’s seeable In judgment. questions Del fact tionship alleged mary with the tortfeasor. These Ford, Inc., 913 P.2d be resolved remand. brel would (Okla.1996), pushing plaintiff roadway he public vehicle off a when disabled from behind another
was struck vehicle. passenger in the plaintiff was by Doenges previously repaired been had in the road ear died Ford. The held even way. The Court