COPE v. THE STATE.
S18A0313
Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided June 18, 2018.
304 Ga. 1
BENHAM, Justice.
Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Freesemann. Steven L. Sparger, for appellant. Meg E. Heap, District Attorney, Emily C. Puhala, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The record construed in a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdicts of guilty shows as follows. The victim lived in a house with appellant’s two brothers and their nephew. Appellant’s brother James Cope testified that, on the night in question, he and the victim were sitting in his room watching television when appellant arrived. Appellant came into the
A next door neighbor of the Cope residence testified he heard the voices of appellant and the victim at about 3:00 a.m., coming from the lower level and rear of the Cope house. He also testified he heard a thump and then heard
Sometime between 8:00 a.m. and 8:15 a.m., the victim’s employer testified he arrived at the Cope house in his car to pick up the victim for work. He testified that the victim was usually on the porch waiting for him when he arrived, but that on this morning the victim was not outside waiting for him. The victim’s employer testified he saw appellant on the porch, so he asked appellant to go inside and wake the victim. The victim’s employer testified appellant had a swollen eye, and appellant told him he had been in a fight with the victim. Appellant went inside the house and came back outside and told the victim’s employer he could not rouse the victim. The victim’s employer also asked appellant’s nephew to go wake the victim, and he also came back saying he could not awaken the victim. The victim’s employer testified he went inside to wake the victim, who was lying on his cot in the back room of the house, and, upon discovering that the victim was not breathing and cold to the touch, called 911.
Paramedics dispatched to the Cope residence found the victim lying on his cot in a back room of the house. When they moved the victim from his cot to the stretcher, they noticed that the victim had a significant head wound and
1. The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it admitted two statements he made to police. The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements. The relevant facts from that hearing are as follows. Appellant made three statements to police about the victim’s death. The first statement, which was video-recorded, was made on December 7, 2013, the date on which the victim’s body was discovered. At
On appeal, appellant contends his first statement to Detective Herron was inadmissible because he did not receive Miranda warnings. ”Miranda establishes a prophylactic rule which applies only to an accused’s custodial statement which is made during interrogation.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Davison, 280 Ga. 84 (2) (623 SE2d 500) (2005). “The issue of whether a statement was the result of an interrogation or was instead volunteered is a determination of fact for the trial court, and it will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871 (8) (655 SE2d 806) (2008). Appellant was not being interrogated at the time he told Detective Herron he killed the victim in self-defense; rather Detective Herron had merely introduced himself and stated that he was there to talk about the victim. A voluntary and spontaneous outburst which is not made in response to custodial questioning is admissible at trial. See id. at 877-878. Neither the existence of
Appellant contends his second statement to Detective Herron, which was video-recorded and provided after a waiver of Miranda rights, was inadmissible because appellant was intoxicated and incoherent to the extent his statement was rendered involuntary. We disagree. During the video-recorded interview, Detective Herron asked appellant if he had consumed any alcohol and appellant responded in the affirmative, stating he had “gin and juice” earlier that day. At the pretrial hearing, however, Detective Herron testified that he could not smell any alcohol on appellant. Our review of the video4 does indicate that appellant often mumbled his responses and spoke quickly in a thick vernacular, making it difficult to understand everything he said.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
