Cope v. Let's Eat Out, Inc.Cope v. Let's Eat Out, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Bough
ORDER
STEPHEN R. BOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEBefore the Court is Plaintiff Olivia Cope’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 143). *549For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
I. Background
This Motion for Class Certification, filed pursuant to
A. History of Proceedings
On February 10,2016, Plaintiff Olivia Cope (“Plaintiff Cope”) filed the instant action against Defendants Let’s Eat Out, Inc., d/b/a/ Buffalo Wild Wings, later amended to include Defendant Bruno and other co-defendants (collectively, the “Defendants”), for (1) violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
Plaintiff Cope was employed at a Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant in Springfield, Missouri, between approximately March 2013 and January 2016, For approximately the first six to seven months of her employment, Plaintiff Cope worked as a cashier, and then as a server. For the last five to six months of her employment, Plaintiff Cope also worked as a bartender. The Complaint alleges that Defendants violated the FLSA by: (1) paying tipped employees sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay, while failing to inform them of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA; (2) requiring them to perform improper types and excessive amounts of non-tipped work; and (3) requiring them to reimburse the restaurants from their tips when customer walkouts or cash register shortages occurred. Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Missouri state minimum wage laws and Missouri common law by enforcing the “Guest Payment Policy,” which— at least, according to the terms of the policy—required employees to reimburse the restaurants for tips for losses resulting from customer walkouts or cash register shortages.
On April 1, 2016, Plaintiff Cope filed a motion for conditional certification of a class of “all current and tipped employees of Defendants’ Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants who were paid sub-minimum wages in the last three years” for her FLSA claim pursuant to
*550Unlike the present
B. The Instant Motion
The Court has been asked to certify the following two classes under Plaintiffs Missouri state law claims for employees who worked at Defendants’ four locations in Missouri—the “MMWL Class” and “Missouri Common Law Class”—pursuant to the considerably more stringent requirements of
1. All current and former servers and bartenders working at any of Defendants’ Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Missouri who, at any time from February 10, 2014 until May 31,2015, were paid sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay.
2. All current and former servers and bartenders working at any of Defendants’ Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants who, at any time from February 10, 2011 until May 31, 2015, were paid sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay.
In connection with the requested class certification, Plaintiff Cope asks the Court to: (1) appoint Plaintiff Cope as Class Representative; (2) designate Plaintiffs counsel of record as Class Counsel; (3) order Defendants to provide a third-party notice administrator a “Class List” containing the names and information of prospective class members; and (4) approve the proposed class action notice.
II. Legal Standard
Class certification is governed by
Before analyzing whether the requirements set forth in
“
However, there are limits to a court’s analysis of the merits of a matter at the class certification stage. A court’s inquiry on a motion for class certification is “tentative,” “preliminary,” and “limited.” In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011). “
III. Discussion
A.
1. Ascertainability of Proposed Classes2
The Eighth Circuit has held that a proposed class “must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” Sandusky, supra, 821 F.3d at 996 (discussing the heightened standard of ascertainability applied to class definitions by the Third Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the same). The Court’s ascertainability inquiry is intertwined *552with its analysis of standing, which requires a plaintiff to “establis[h] [an] injury in fact .., that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and likely [to] be redressed by a favorable decision.” Zurn, 644 F.3d at 616 (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants aver that the Guest Payment Policy was enforced on a manager-by-manager basis, that not all servers or bartenders employed at the applicable time periods were actually required to reimburse their restaurants for a guest walkout, and that the percentage and amount of the reimbursements required varied significantly. (See generally, Doc. # 147), Defendants also dispute the existence of a policy or practice requiring servers or bartenders to reimburse their restaurants for cash shortages. Id. at p. 1. Moreover, Defendants claim that Let’s Eat Out, Inc. and Bruno Enterprises, Inc. revised the policy in approximately late 2013, and that employees were only subject to disciplinary actions thereafter, Id. at pp. 1-3. On these grounds, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that all potential class members have suffered the same injury, thereby failing to establish the standing and implicitly, the ascertainability of the proposed classes.
Defendants do not dispute, however, that servers and bartenders working at the four Missouri restaurant locations were subject to a franchise-wide policy from “prior to 2012” or at least “[f]rom early 2012” to approximately late 2013, which required them to reimburse their restaurant for guest walkouts. (Doc. # 167-1, pp. 5, 7; Doc. # 147-1, ¶ 4; Doc. # 169, p.l). Plaintiff Cope has established the existence of the policy by a preponderance of the evidence, producing written copies of Guest Payment Policies signed by employees as late as August 27, 2015, as well as affidavits from servers, bartenders, and restaurant managers attesting to the enforcement of the same. (Doc. ## 144-2 and 144-3, Exhibits B-V, X (declarations from employees and managers regarding non-tipped work, customer walkouts, and cash drawer shortages); Doc. # 144-4, Exhibit Y (copy of Wild Wings Franchise Wide Store Policies, including subject policy); Doe. # 153-2, Exhibit 1 (copies of Guest Payment Policies signed between January 8, 2014 and August 27, 2015)). The evidence submitted so far indicates that the policy may have been in effect for longer than Defendants have acknowledged. (Doe. # 153— 2, pp. 1-56, Group Exhibit 1 (consisting of 61 original Guest Payment Policies signed by FLSA Class plaintiffs after 2013)).
The Guest Payment Policy is a single policy that purportedly violates Missouri law and similarly situates Plaintiff Cope and the putative plaintiffs. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2014), aff‘d — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 194 L.Ed.2d 124 (2016) (single time coding policy governing meat-processing employees “similarly situate[s]” plaintiff and other class members). Using the “objective criteria” of where an employee worked, the period of employment, and type of position held, Plaintiff may clearly ascertain employees who were subject to the Guest Payment Policy during the applicable time periods in Defendants’ Missouri restaurant locations, and thus readily identify potential class members from Defendants’ payroll records. Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 995 (discussing the heightened requirements of ascertainability adopted by the Third Circuit in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2016)). Based on the foregoing, the proposed classes have been adequately defined and are clearly ascertainable,
2. Standing of Proposed Classes
The fact that some class members may not have been required to reimburse a restaurant will not defeat a finding of standing. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1050, 194 L.Ed.2d 124 (2016) (declining to decide whether uninjured class members may recover, but concluding that the fact some class members suffered no injury will not defeat class certification); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 593 Fed.Appx. 578, 585 (8th Cir. 2014) (“federal courts do not require that each member of a class submit evidence of personal standing,” so long as each member may allege injury) (quoting Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th *553Cir. 2013)); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 757-58 (7th Cir. 2014) (class definition is too broad if it includes those “who could not have been harmed,” but is acceptable if it includes those “who were not harmed[.]”). The Court is mindful that, at the class certification stage, the parties are engaging in ongoing discovery regarding their underlying claims and defenses of the case, and the proposed class members have not been conclusively identified. As the Seventh Circuit has observed:
[A] class will often include persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct; indeed this is almost inevitable because at the outset of the case many of the members of the class may be unknown, or if they are known still the facts bearing on their claims may be unknown. Such a possibility or indeed inevitability does not preclude class certification.
Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, the fact that not all tipped employees were required to reimburse their restaurant after a guest walkout will not prevent a finding of standing and certification. “Fortuitous non-injury” to subset of class members will not necessarily defeat certification of an entire class, since a common policy or practice would expose the class as a whole to damages. Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). Certification of the proposed classes will not rule out the possibility of winnowing out of non-injured members at the damages phase of the litigation, the later refining of a class definition, and the use of discovery to eliminate class members who did not suffer an injury in fact. Id. At this stage of the litigation, by alleging that class members were subject to sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay as a result of the Guest Payment Policy, Plaintiff has sufficiently established an injury that that is fairly traceable to a common, purportedly unlawful policy and conduct of Defendants that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court. Zurn, supra, 644 F.3d at 616.
Additionally, the Court need not find that all class members suffered the same injury as Plaintiff Cope. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992) (it is not necessary that all class members suffer the same injury as the named plaintiff); DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (
The Court recognizes that the parties have provided conflicting evidence as to each restaurant’s enforcement and date of termination of the Guest Payment Policy. (E.g. Doc. # 147-1, ¶¶ 4, 6, 7 (“in around late 2013, this policy was changed”); contra Doc. # 153-2, (copies of written policies signed after 2013)). This is symptomatic, however, of Defendants’ failure to maintain records of employee reimbursements for customer walkouts.3 The Court will not deny relief *554based on the absence or inadequacy of records of the extent/amount of each class member’s damages. Where an “employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate,” the solution is “not to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery.. .[which] would place a premium on an employer’s failure to keep proper records in conformity with his statutory duty,” but to allow the employee to provide “sufficient evidence to show amount of work for which [the] employee was not properly compensated as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946), superseded by statute on other grounds. By providing declarations from a number of servers and bartenders who were required to reimburse the restaurant for guest walkouts and cash shortages, Plaintiff Cope has provided copies of the Guest Payment Policy and other evidence from which a just and reasonable inference that she and other class members were improperly compensated can be drawn. Id. at 687-688, 66 S.Ct. 1187. In view of the foregoing, Plaintiff Cope has properly established standing as the named plaintiff to sue on the claims that are the basis of this action.
i. Numerosity
Given that Missouri common law prescribes a longer limitations period of five years,
Plaintiffs presumption that the MMWL Class will be larger than 144 members warrants closer examination. The MMWL Class, as proposed, consists of tipped employees who worked at Defendants’ Missouri restaurants during a 15-month period from February 10, 2014, to May 31, 2015. This is a smaller sub-section of the 144 Opt-in Plaintiffs who worked at Defendants’ Missouri restaurants for the last three years. However, in replying to Defendants’ opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiffs counsel stated that 99 “opt-in” members of the FLSA Class who worked at Missouri locations between February 10, 2014, and May 31, 2015, had been identified following a review of Defendants’ payroll data. (Doc. # 153-6, ¶ 3). Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated that the MMWL Class consists of at least 99 employees. The Court also recognizes that the proposed classes, for which
Finding that the Missouri Common Law Class will likely consist of more than 144 members, and that the MMWL Class will include at least 99 members, the proposed classes are larger than other classes that *555have been approved for certification within this circuit. Ark. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. Of Educ., 446 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1971) (20 class members sufficient); Paxton v. Union Nat. Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982) (impracticable to join some portion of the 74 black employees of defendant bank who received lesser promotions than their white counterparts). Because the anticipated class sizes of at least 99 and 144 members would render joinder impractical, the numerosity requirement of
ii. Commonality
As noted above, however, it is not necessary that all class members suffer from the same injury as the class representatives or one another, Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018, and a certified class may even include individuals who have not been injured at all by Defendant’s conduct. Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677; Tyson, 136 S.Ct. at 1050; Torres, 835 F.3d at 1137. Here, factual and legal issues relating to when the Guest Payment Policy was enforced, whether a cash shortage policy ever existed, company-wide instructions to managers and assistant managers regarding enforcement of the policy, and the policy’s legality under the Missouri minimum wage laws are common to the proposed classes and suitable for classwide adjudication. By establishing the existence of the Guest Payment Policy by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiff Cope has set forth a common contention that will generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Thus, the commonality element of 23(a)(2) is satisfied.
iii. Typicality
In mid-to-late 2014, Plaintiff Cope states that she was required to reimburse the restaurant from her tips to cover an unpaid tab resulting from a customer walkout. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff Cope cites other occasions in which she was required to pay tips to cover another unpaid bill, and to reimburse the restaurant as a bartender when the “cash register was short” at the end of the night. (Id.). These grievances are the same or similar to the facts stated by other members of the proposed classes who have submitted declarations that are attached to this motion. (Doc. ## 144-1 to 144-3, Exhibits B-V (employee declarations)). Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1977) (
iv. Adequacy
B.
In addition to showing that the requirements of
(b) [...] A class action may be maintained ifRule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
[...]
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A)the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
1. Questions of Law or Common Facts Predominate
2. Class Action Is The Superior Method Of Adjudication
This factor requires the Court to determine whether the class action is manageable, taking into consideration choice of law determinations, notice to class members, etc. In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209 (D. Minn. 2003) (involving varying state laws governing products liability) (citing Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996)). Because this matter involves common questions of fact and law relating to the same Missouri minimum wage laws and common laws, and potential class members can be ascertained by examining Defendants’ payroll data, maintenance of this class would be manageable. Additionally, as noted above, individual adjudication of the more than 99 potential claims resulting from the proposed MMWL and Missouri Common Law Classes which involve common issues relating to the Guest Payment Policy presented by all members would be unrealistic and unnecessarily repetitive. Thus, the Court finds that class action would be the superior method of adjudication, and the superiority requirement of
C. Compliance of Class Notice with
In class actions based on
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Olivia Cope’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 143) is granted. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff Olivia Cope’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 143) is GRANTED;
(2) Pursuant to
a. All current and former servers and bartenders working at any of Defendants’ Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Missouri who, at any time from February 10, 2014 until May 31, 2015, were paid sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay.
b. All current and former servers and bartenders working at any of Defendants’ Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants who, at any time from February 10, 2011 until May 31, 2015, were paid sub-minimum, tip-credit rates of pay.
(3) Olivia Cope is designated as the Class Representative;
(4) Douglas M. Werman, Zachary C. Flowerree, Rowdy B. Meeks, and Steven P. Schneck will serve as Class Counsel;
(5) Defendants are directed to provide to a third-party administrator, a list all poten*558tial class members under the certified MMWL Class and the Missouri Common Law Class, including their names, last known mailing address, location(s) of employment, position(s) held, and dates of employment within thirty (30) calendar days of the entry of this Order; and
(6) The parties are directed to meet and confer within thirty (30) calendar days of the filing of this Order to agree on the proposed notice to potential class members pursuant to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. “Side” work is work where the employee does not have an opportunity to interact with customers for the purpose of earning tips.
. The parties’ primary dispute concerns the extent to which the Guest Payment Policy was actually enforced in Defendants’ Missouri restaurants. From this factual dispute flows the closely related questions of whether the proposed classes are fatally overbroad, whether the classes are clearly ascertainable, whether the named plaintiff and putative class members have standing, and other issues that have been alternately framed by the parties as issues of ascertainablity, standing, class manageability and judicial economy. Such factors are not expressly stated in
. At the May 2, 2017 hearing on this motion, Defendants acknowledged that they did not keep records of employee reimbursement for walkouts. Additionally, without according much substantive weight to the self-authenticating Department of Labor (“DOL”) report attached to Plaintiff’s motion to submit supplemental evidence, which the Court orally granted in the absence of Defendant‘s objection at the May 2, 2017, hearing on this motion, the Court also notes that the DOL previously found that Defendants did not maintain” records of the payments made by the employees as they are made in cash,” and that “[i]n order to pay for the mistakes/ walk outs[sic]/shortages, the employee would have to record it in the register as cash payment which is not any different as if a cus*554tomer was paying in cash.” (Doc. #167-1, p. 4).