Lead Opinion
On April 14, 1976, plaintiff, Margaret Cooper, filed a claim against her former employer, the University of Michigan, for unemployment benefits. On May 12, 1976, the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC) made a determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment benefits. On June 23, 1976, MESC made a redetermination pursuant to plaintiff’s request and affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits to the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an appeal from this redetermination. On January 17, 1977, a hearing was held before MESC Referee Raymond K. Sewell, Jr. Referee Sewell affirmed the MESC redetermination. Plaintiff again appealed. On June
The facts in the present case are undisputed. Plaintiff began work for the defendant on February 24, 1975. In August of 1975, the plaintiff began work in the accounting department as a clerical worker. Plaintiff’s duties required taking care of the incoming cash receipts, balancing and filing. In January of 1976, plaintiff told her immediate supervisor that she did not have enough work to do and that she had too much spare time in the afternoon. In March of 1976, plaintiff discussed her dissatisfaction with a woman in the personnel department, who advised her that she could attempt to transfer to another job. Plaintiff attempted to effect such transfer but was unsuccessful due to lack of seniority.
Plaintiff then told Elex Makarewich, the supervisor over her immediate supervisor, of her discontent with the lack of work. Plaintiff also tendered a resignation at this time. Makarewich told plaintiff that she could occasionally do some work for the accountants in the department clearing erroneous accounts. Plaintiff then withdrew her resignation in order to consider the supervisor’s proposal. After talking with an accountant, plaintiff learned that clearing the erroneous accounts would take only a few hours a month and that if she did this work, the accountants would not have enough to do. Plaintiff subsequently tendered her resignation on April 9, 1976.
On April 14, 1976, plaintiff filed her claim for
MCL 421.29(1); MSA 17.531(1) provides in part:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits in all cases in which he:
"(a) Has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit.”
Three issues related to the above statute are raised on appeal: (1) whether the burden of proof relevant to the above standard falls upon the claimant or employer, (2) whether an employee’s dissatisfaction with the amount of work assigned constitutes good cause, and (3) whether this determination as to the existence of good cause is a question of law or fact.
It is defendants’ position that the burden of proving eligibility for benefits rests with the claimant. Dwyer v Unemployment Compensation Comm,
While we are clearly presented with a disqualification question, we disagree with plaintiffs position that the employer bears the burden of proof in all cases involving an employee’s disqualification for unemployment benefits. Those cases on which plaintiff relies do not turn on the "good cause” conduct of the claimant; rather, they impose the burden of proof on the employer in the following instances. One: When the employee is to be disqualified for benefits due to the employer’s discharge for misconduct, Fresta, supra. See MCL 421.29(l)(b); MSA 17.531(l)(b). Two: When the employee is to be disqualified for failure to accept "suitable” work offered by the employer, Lasher, supra.
In each situation the conduct, knowledge, reasoning, and control of the employer is critical in order to determine whether disqualification is justified. However, potential disqualification, for benefits under MCL 421.29(l)(a); MSA 17.531(l)(a), as here, requires inquiry into whether plaintiff’s behavior in terminating employment was voluntary and plaintiff’s reasons for doing so, the answers to these questions being within the exclusive knowledge of the claimant. Plaintiff herein left work because she was dissatisfied with the amount of work assigned to her. In light of the undisputed facts attending the plaintiff’s cause, whether this
Cases decided in both Pennsylvania and New York, which have similar statutory schemes, provide some guidance as to whether voluntary termination of employment due to an employee’s determination of insufficient quantity of work should be considered within the purview of "good cause”.
In Sabloff v Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 194 Pa Super 63;
In Welker v Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 180 Pa Super 534;
In Albright v Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa Super 290;
The language of the Pennsylvania and Michigan statutes differs in that the former legislation pro
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the above cases and Eisenberg v Catherwood,
Plaintiff also directs our attention to a Wayne County Circuit Court decision, John Johnson Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, (Docket No. 231, 402, November 19, 1943), which not only lacks precedential value but is also factually distinguishable from the present case since the plaintiff in Johnson left a part-time job to seek full-time employment.
Finally, we summarily reject plaintiff’s argument that she was subjected to a disguised lay-off when, despite the unavailability of sufficient tasks to keep her totally occupied, defendant continued to employ her at full-time hours and pay.
We conclude that plaintiff voluntarily
Notes
The Court did not address the question of the claimant’s good cause in rejecting employment since that determination is subsequent to the decision regarding the employer’s offer of work that is "suitable”.
The voluntariness of plaintiffs conduct is not at issue here.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). I concur in the result arrived at by the majority in this case, but I arrive at that result by a slightly different route.
First, the Declaration of Policy section in the Employment Security Act of the State of Michigan, MCL 421.2; MSA 17.502, provides that the act was enacted "for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own”. Emphasis added.
The reason for not finding in favor of the plaintiff is succinctly stated by Judge Allen in Dueweke v Morang Drive Greenhouses, Inc,
"The issue raised is a question of law. Do such reasons constitute 'good cause’ for refusal to work as that term is used in the statute? That question is answered in Losada v Chrysler Corp,24 Mich App 656 , 660;180 NW2d 844 (1970), lv den383 Mich 827 (1970), which held that personal reasons were not good cause under the statute. That decision was followed in a split decision in Keith v Chrysler Corp,41 Mich App 708 ;200 NW2d 764 (1972), affirmed by an equally divided Court390 Mich 458 ;213 NW2d 147 (1973). While the split in the Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the vitality of the Losada ruling, we are bound by the decision until it is changed by the higher Court. See Lasher v Mueller Brass Co,62 Mich App 171 ;233 NW2d 513 (1975).” (Emphasis added.)
This decision was followed by another panel of this Court in Allied Building Service Co v Michigan Employment Security Comm,
It is recognized that the above cases refer to
Under current law "good personal reasons” do not equate with "good cause” under either section.
The plaintiff, Margaret Cooper, displayed an unusual determination and desire to utilize her best efforts in her employer’s interests and being thwarted in her efforts she resigned. This is commendable and it seems unjust that she should be denied unemployment benefits.
It is not proper, however, for the courts to amend or broaden the statute by reading in provisions not included by the Legislature. Alexander v Employment Security Comm,
Courts have no authority to pass upon the wisdom, policy or equity of the legislation. Wojewoda v Employment Security Comm,
In spite of the commendable industry of the plaintiff, neither the current statutes nor case law support her claim.