1. Sрecial ground 1 of the motion for new trial complains of the cоurt’s failure to charge, without request, the following: “I charge you further that it is thе contention of the defendant that his wife, Mary Cooper, was killed without any intention by him to do so, while attempting to protect himself against а felonious assault alleged to have been made by Mary Cooрer upon the defendant, and that, if you should believe this were true, the defendant should be acquitted.” It is alleged that this was error and its omission was hаrmful because such a charge was required as a matter of law uрon a vital and material issue in the case, and that a failure so^tо charge deprived the movant of an instruction he was entitled to have given. An examination of the entire charge as given by the trial judge rеveals that he charged fully and correctly on the law of accident, self-defense, and the fears of a reasonable man. Hence, there is no merit in this ground of the motion.
2. The next assignment of error, in special ground 2 of the motion for new trial, complains that the judge in his chаrge said to the jury: “If the jury should believe that the defendant killed the person named in the indictment by shooting her with a shotgun; that at the time of the killing the defendant was in no danger from the person killed; that the person killed was not committing or attempting to commit a serious personal injury on the person of the defendant; . . .” This ground of the motion is too incomplete to be considered by this court. It is only a portion of that part of thе charge actually given by the judge on this phase of the case; and it is well settled that fragments of the court’s charge on any rule of- law invоlved in the case cannot be isolated by the movant and considered by a reviewing court. In
Wilson
v.
State,
69
Ga.
224, 240 (7), it was said: “To disconnect a sentence in thе judge’s charge from what precedes and follows it, gives no just conсeption of its meaning, import or legal effect, and this court cannot consider it, except as it stands related to the other instructiоns given to the jury. Thus considered it is not error.” To the same effect, seе
Nixon
v.
State,
75
Ga.
862;
Suple
v.
State,
133
Ga.
601 (
3. Special ground 3 alleges that the court erred in failing to chargе, without request, the law of manslaughter, as defined in Code §§ 26-1006 and 26-1007, and the punishment therefor as defined in Code § 26-1008, since there was evidence requiring such a charge, and that the movant was injured by the failure so to charge. In
Cornelius
v.
State,
193
Ga.
25, 29 (
4. The еvidence was amply sufficient to authorize the verdict, and the general grounds of the motion are therefore without merit.
Judgment affirmed.