119 Ind. 313 | Ind. | 1889
The appellant alleges in his complaint that he delivered to the appellee for collection a check given by the pension agent of the United States, at Indianapolis ; that the appellee undertook to collect it and return the proceeds to the appellant; that he did collect the amount of the check, but, instead of returning the amount collected to the appellant, deposited it in Fletcher & Sharpe’s bank, at Indianapolis, in his own name and to his own credit, and
The answers are sufficient. They confess and avoid the-cause of action stated in the complaint. The counsel for appellant is in error in asserting that, to be good, an answer in confession and avoidance must confess the cause of action precisely as it is alleged, for even under the strict rules of
The answers avoid, as well as confess, for they show that the appellant received the certificate of deposit with knowledge of all the facts, in full satisfaction of the appellee’s obligation. This fact alone relieves the appellee from liability. It would be manifestly unjust to compel the defendant to pay a claim where the plaintiff has accepted and retained a certificate of deposit issued and received under such circumstances as those stated in the answer.
The second paragraph of the reply is addressed to the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the answer. It admits the receipt of the certificate of deposit from the appellee, but avers that when it was delivered the appellant was informed by the appellee that he had collected and deposited the money ; that on the evening after the delivery of the certificate, the appellee informed the appellant that the bank had suspended and requested him to keep the certificate; that in compliance with the direction of the appellee, he did retain the certificate until the 4th day of September, 1884, when he delivered it to the appellee and has not seen it since; that on the 5th day of that month, he received from the appellee a paper signed by the receiver of the bank, and subsequently, by direction of the appellee, received dividends thereon. It is obvious that this reply is bad. It does not avoid the material averments of any one of the paragraphs of the answer, much less of all, as it professes to do. The averment that the certificate was received in satisfaction of the obligation imposed upon the appellee by his gratuitous act is confessed, but not avoided, and this, of itself, is enough to condemn the pleading. But there are other material allegations-in the answers which make them good and the reply bad,.
Evidence of the business and solvency of Fletcher & Sharpe’s bank was competent.
It was proper to permit the appellee to prove that at the time he deposited the proceeds of the appellant’s check, he deposited money of his own, and it wasproper to allow him to prove that he made the deposits separately.
A clause is taken from the second instruction given by the court and assailed as erroneous, but an assault upon detached clauses is seldom, successful, fp.r,ah..instruction is not to be judged in detached clauses, but as an entirety. Where a clause makes the entire instruction erroneous, then such an attack as this will prevail, but it can not prevail here, for taking the instruction as a whole it is quite as favorable to the appellant as he had a right to ask.
We can not disturb the verdict on the evidence.
Judgment affirmed.