delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pаtricia L. Cooper (Cooper) appeals a Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, jury verdict award of damages for injuries she sustained in a pedestrian/automobile accident in Butte, Montana. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
This case involves an accident that occurred on Saturday, November 19, 1983, in the parking lot of the War Bоnnett Inn, a motel in Butte, Montana. At approximately 11:00 p.m. that evening, a 1974 one-ton Chevrolet four-door pickup truck ran over Cooper. The driver of the pickup truck was Karl F. Rosston (Rosston) who was sixteen years old at the time.
Earlier that evening, Rosston picked-up six juvenile acquaintances to attend a game at a state girls basketball tоurnament in Butte. Prior to attending the game, the seven boys purchased three six packs of beer at a local grocery store. The boys drank some of the *188 beer with food at around 7:00 p.m. and then went to a basketball game at the Butte Civic Center. They left the Civic Center at around 10:00 p.m. and drove around for about an hour.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Rosstоn drove his father’s pickup truck onto the entry ramp of the War Bonnett Inn. Twenty-seven year old Patricia Cooper and some of her girl friends were leaving the War Bonnett Inn at the time Rosston and the other boys arrived. Cooper and her friends were also in Butte to attend the basketball games. Prior to leaving the War Bonnett Inn, Cooper and her friends had been drinking alcoholic beverages in the motel lounge.
As the women exited the motel, Rosston’s passengers exited the pickup truck and began to tease Cooper and her friends. Rosston did not participate in the teasing but stood next to his pickup truck and watched for the three or four minutes of the conversation. One of Rosston’s passengers, Chris Albrecht, attempted to take a beer cooler from the back of Cooper’s pickup truck. One of the women demanded that Albrecht return the cooler and he complied with the demand. The boys then left the immediate vicinity in Rosston’s pickup truck.
Instead of exiting the parking lot, Rosston circled around and parked within thirty or forty feet of the women. Some of the boys testified at trial that they went back specifically to attempt to take the beer cooler. Rosston’s passengers once again exited his vehicle and one of the boys took Cooper’s beer cooler. Rosston remained standing at the door of his vehicle until the boys started running back to the truck with the beer cooler. Rosston got into his vehicle and began to drive away with the back doors open as his acquaintances jumped in with the cooler. Meanwhile, Cooper and her friends chased down Rosston’s vehicle and one woman, Kellie Reed, grabbed on to the driver’s side mirror. Rosston felt a bump and thought that he had run over a speed bump. Kellie Reed then yelled that Rosston had run over Cooper. Cooper had attempted to jump on to Rosston’s moving vehicle and had fallen underneath the rear tires. Rosston stopped his vehicle, got out, and ran back to find Cooper on the ground with extensive injuries.
The authorities were called and Cooper was taken to the hospital. By the time the pоlice arrived, Rosston’s passengers had all left the scene. When questioned by the police as to what happened, Cooper’s friends failed to identify Rosston as the driver of the pickup truck. In a verbal statement at the scene, and an hour later in a written *189 statement, Rosston told the police that one of the other boys drove the piсkup truck at the time Cooper was injured. Rosston also failed to immediately identify two of the boys involved in the incident and did not inform the authorities that he had consumed some alcohol earlier in the evening. Later that evening, Rosston’s acquaintances contacted the police about their involvement in the accident. Approximately ninеty minutes after his first statement, Rosston changed his story and informed the police that he was the driver of the vehicle that ran over Cooper. Rosston has not since denied his involvement.
On January 9, 1984, Cooper filed a complaint and demand for jury trial with allegations of negligent, willful and reckless conduct. Cooper asked for general and punitive damagеs. Prior to trial, Ross-ton sought by a motion in limine to exclude any evidence pertaining to Rosston’s original story that someone else drove the pickup truck, his failure to identify all of the boys involved at the time of the accident, and his failure to inform authorities that he had consumed alcoholic beverages that evening. The District Court granted the motion аnd excluded the evidence. During trial the District Court also struck Cooper’s claim for punitive damages on the grounds that there was no evidence of willful or reckless misconduct.
The jury found both Rosston and Cooper fifty percent negligent and found Cooper’s total damages to be $30,000. Cooper’s total recovery after the reduction for her percentage of the negligence was $15,000 plus $775.95 in costs. Notably, Cooper’s actual medical expenses and lost wages totaled just under $15,000. Plaintiff Cooper appeals from the judgment and we identify the following four issues:
1. Did the District Court err in prohibiting the introduction of evidence regarding Rosston’s misrepresentations and omissions made to law enforcemеnt officials immediately after the accident?
2. Did the District Court err in instructing the jury that a juvenile is held to a lesser standard of care than an adult under the circumstances of this case?
3. Did the District Court err in refusing to instruct the jury as to the elements of theft, reckless driving, and willful and wanton misconduct?
4. Did the District Court err in striking Cooper’s claim for punitive damages?
In her first issue, Cooper claims that the District Court should have allowed the introduction of evidence regarding Rosston’s misdeeds immediately after the accident. We begin our analysis of evi
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dentiary rulings with the recognition that issues concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the district court.
Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons’ Co.
(1982),
“1. Statements made by Karl Rosston immediately following the accident, wherein he denied being the driver of the vehicle involved in this accident;
“2. Inconsistencies in the statements given by Karl Rosston following this accident to investigating offiсers, wherein he did not identify certain boys who where at or near the scene of the accident;
“3. Any and all other inconsistencies in the statements provided by Karl Rosston subsequent to this accident, including but not limited to, whether he had consumed alcoholic beverages; . .
The above misrepresentations and omissions, Cooper contends, were relevant to impeach Rosston’s credibility at trial and were relevant on the issue of punitive damages. Rosston counters by arguing that this evidence constitutes impeachment on collateral matters and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs any probative value.
At trial, Rosston identified the other juveniles in his pickup truck, admittеd that he was the driver of the vehicle that ran over Cooper, and admitted that he had been drinking prior to the accident. Ross-ton contends that, because these facts were not at issue in the trial, the excluded evidence constitutes impeachment on collateral matters. We agree that the evidence in question was collatеral to all issues in this case except two — the issue of Rosston’s credibility as a witness and the issue of punitive damages as will be discussed later in this opinion.
Section 26-1-302, MCA, provides as follows:
“A witness is presumed to speak the truth. The jury or the court in absence of the jury is the exclusive judge of his credibility. This presumption may be controverted and overcome by any matter that has a tendency to disprove the truthfulness of a witness’ testimony; such matters include but are not limited to:
“(7) inconsistent statements of the witness;
*191 “(8) an admission of untruthfulness by the witness;
“(9) Other evidence contradicting the witness’ testimony.”
Rule 401 of the Montana Rules of Evidence provides that “[r]elevant evidence may include evidence bearing upon the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant.” Credibility evidence, though relevant, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfаir prejudice . . .” Rule 403 M.R.Evid. Evidence of Rosston’s misrepresentations and omissions is relevant to the issue of his credibility as a witness and we are not convinced that the admission of this evidence prejudices Rosston to the point of outweighing its probative value. The jury is the exclusive judge of Rosston’s credibility and the District Court erred in excluding evidence bearing on thаt credibility. Section 26-1-302, MCA.
We also note that the “collateral matters” rule, as argued by Ross-ton, was abolished in favor of the above relevancy approach upon the adoption of Rule 607, M.R.Evid., in 1977. The Commission Comments on Rule 607 contain the following language pertinent to this issue:
“[T]he Commission intends the broad language of Rule 607, allowing the reliability of a witnеss to be attacked, to mean that impeachment is only limited by the ingenuity of counsel to show any reason to disbelieve a witness’ testimony and by consideration of relevancy under Rules 401 and 403.
“The limitation of impeachment by considerations of relevancy is a change in Montana law to the extent that it abolishes the collateral matters rule.
“The many cases considering collateral matters indicate that it is a troublesome doctrine. The Commission believes that the limitation of impeachment by Rule 401, defining relevant evidence as including impeaching evidence, and Rule 403, allowing the court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by prejudice, confusion, waste of time, will allow the same result to be reached through a more flexible means than currently used with the collateral matters rule. Therefore, Section 93-401-25, R.C.M. 1947 [superseded], (to the extent that it is concerned with collateral matters) and case law stating the collateral matters rule are abolished in favor of the relevancy apprоach.”
Commission Comments, Rule 607, M.R.Evid. We recognize the exis
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tence of post-1977 cases which refer to the collateral matters rule. See e.g.,
Moen,
The evidence proffered by Cooper is also relevant on the issue of punitive damages in this case. It was not until several hours after the accident that Rosston admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle that ran over Cooper, that he had been drinking that evening, and that he knew the identities of the other juvenile boys. Cooper contends that Rosston’s misrepresentations and omissions as to his actions that night deprived the investigating officers of reason to test Rosston’s blood alcohol content. This deliberate attempt to mislead law enforcement officials, Cooper argues, is evidence of Rosston’s willful and wanton conduct. We agree.
In
Lauman v. Lee
(Mont. 1981), [- Mont.-,]
On appeal, Lee argued that the award of punitive damages was excessive. According to Lee, his conduct in wiping the headlights was innocuous and an award of punitive damages was, therefore, the result of the inflamed passion and prejudice of the jury.
Lauman,
“We have recently discussed the jury’s prerogative in setting exemplary damages . . . The jury may consider such attendant circumstances as the malice or wantonness of the act, the injury intended, the motive for the act, the manner of the commission and the deterrent effect on others, as well as the defendant’s wealth . . . The jury had discretion reasonably to calculate a suitable punishment for Lee’s actions after listening to the testimony and weighing the evidence.” [Citations omitted.]
Lauman,
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Sections 27-1-220 and 27-1-221, MCA, authorize an award of punitive damages “where the defendant has been guilty of either actual or implied malice.”
Lauman,
In her second issue, Cooper cоntends that the District Court erred in giving the following instruction:
“A child is not held to the same standard of care as an adult. A child is negligent if he fails to use that degree of care which is ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, intelligence, knowledge and experience under the circumstances then existing.”
A sixteen year old (Rosston) with a valid Montana driver’s licеnse is held to the same standard of care while driving an automobile as an adult in the same circumstances.
Wollaston v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
(1980),
Cooper argues in her third issue that the District Court erred in refusing to submit Cooper’s proposed instructions with regard to the elements of theft, reckless driving, malice, and willful misconduct. She contends that the evidence and testimony create a question of fact as to whether Rosston had committed acts amounting to malice or willful and wanton cоnduct. We agree.
“[W]here a statute specifically proscribes conduct which is actually malicious such as theft. . . punitive damages may be sought for vio
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lation of such a statute.”
Owens v. Parker Drilling Co.
(1984),
“When a person knows or has reason to know facts which create a high degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliberately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or recklessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his conduct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the law of this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed malice.”
Owens,
The evidence in this case gave rise to questions of fact regarding Rosston’s participation in the theft of the beer cooler, his operation of a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and his misrepresentations and omissions to law enforcement officials as previously discussed. The District Court determined that the evidence did not support instructions on theft, reckless driving, malice, and willful and wanton misconduct. We have reviewed the same evidence and conclude that reasonable minds could differ as tо whether Rosston’s actions constituted malicious, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct for which punitive damages may be awarded.
Mallory v. Cloud
(1975),
We note that Cooper аrgues that her recovery would not have been reduced had Rosston been found guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. Cooper cites to
Derenberger v. Lutey
(1983),
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In light of the foregoing discussion, we must also conclude that the District Court erred in striking Cooper’s claim for punitive damages during trial.
First Nat. Bank of Libby v. Twombly
(Mont. 1984), [
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.