14 Ga. App. 63 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1913
Eicketson brought suit against Cooper, returnable to the March term, 1910, of the city court of Bainbridge, upon three promissory notes. No one of the notes appeared on its face to be due at the time the suit was filed, but in each note there was a recital that it was one of a series of notes, and that the failure to pay any one of the notes or the interest due would operate to mature all of the notes. The petition alleged generally that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of the notes sued on, and recited that the notes sued on were of a series of nine notes, all executed for the purchase-price of a certain plantation, upon the agreement that the failure to pay any one of the notes would mature all of them. In the 8th paragraph of the petition it was alleged that time was of the essence of the contract, and that all of the notes were just and legally due. In the 10th paragraph it was distinctly alleged that one or more of the notes of the series was past due and unpaid, and that this operated to mature all of the notes. Personal service of the petition was made on the defendant by J. II. Emanuel, sheriff. No defense was filed at the March term, and the following judgment was entered: "There being no issuable defense filed in the above-stated case on oath nor affirmation, it is hereby ordered, considered, and adjudged by the court that the plaintiff, J. E. Eicketson, recover of the defendant, C. E. Cooper, the principal sum of $1,500, and the further sum of $390 interest to date of this judgment, and all future interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum after the date of this judgment, and costs of this proceeding. This the 16th day of March, 1910. [Signed] Eich & Nelson, attys. for plaintiff. W. M. Harrell, Judge, City Court of Bainbridge.” Execution was issued on the judgment and levied upon certain property of the defendant. Thereupon the defendant interposed an affidavit of illegality, alleging that the execution was proceeding illegally because the defendant had not been legally served, by reason of the fact that J. H. Emanuel had not qualified as sheriff of the city court of Bainbridge by executing the bond required by the act of the General Assembly establishing that court. Other grounds of the affidavit of illegality were, that the judgment by default was upon a conditional promise to pay money, and was entered by the court without the intervention of a jury or tender of proof; and that the court was not lawfully in session, because the minutes of the court had not been read
There are no material conflicts in the evidence. From the evidence it appeared that Emanuel was elected sheriff of Decatur county in 1908, and gave bond as such sheriff. In addition to this he gave bond in the sum of $5,000 as sheriff of the city court of Bainbridge, which bond was duly approved by the county commissioners and the ordinary of Decatur county on the first Monday in December, 1908, and was filed and recorded in the office of the ordinary. Since that time Emanuel has been acting as sheriff of Decatur county, as well as of the. city court of Bainbridge. The bond given by him as sheriff of the city court of Bainbridge was executed in good faith, upon advice that it was a lawful bond; and since the execution of this bond he has been generally recognized as the sheriff of the city court of Bainbridge, has served all of its papers and processes, and acted as such sheriff during the years 1909 and 1910.
The objection that the judgment was void because entered up without proof, upon a conditional contract, having been expressly abandoned by the defendant, can not be insisted upon in this court. Upon this question, however, see Howard v. Wellham, 114 Ga. 934 (41 S. E. 62); Harrell v. Davis Wagon Co., 140 Ga. 127 (78 S. E. 713); Turner v. Bank of Maysville, 13 Ga. App. 547 (79 S. E. 180).
There is a clear distinction between the present case and that of McCalla v. Verdell, 122 Ga. 801 (50 S. E. 943). In thgfc ease the act creating the city court of Elberton provided that the sheriff of Elbert county should be ex-officio sheriff of the city court, and before entering upon-the discharge of his office should execute 'a bond with good security; and the act further provided that the sheriff should have the power, with the consent of the court, to appoint a deputy who should also, before beginning the discharge of his duties, give a bond. Service of process was made by one claiming to be the deputy sheriff of Elbert county. It did not appear that this person had been appointed deputy sheriff of the city court in the manner provided by the act, or that after such appointment he had attempted to qualify himself to discharge the duties of the office. The deputy sheriff of Elbert county had no more authority to serve processes in the city court of Elberton than did the deputy sheriff of Eulton county. If it had appeared that the person who served the process had been appointed deputy sheriff of the city court and had attempted to qualify, and in so doing had failed to give bond in strict conformity with the statute, then the’ question would have been the same as that now presented, and we apprehend that the Supreme Court would have reached an entirely different conclusion from that announced in the- decision in that case. See, in this connection, Smith v. Davis, 3 Ga. App. 419 (60 S. E. 199). The precise question involved in the case of McCalla v. Verdell, supra, was raised with reference to the city court of Bainbridge in Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Anderson, 12 Ga. App. 117 (76 S. E. 1056). In that ease an attempt to serve was made by the deputy sheriff of the county, who
Judgment affirmed.