INTRODUCTION
Delbert N. Cooper and Cathryn C. Cooper sued Dolores Paap for negligently omitting a 1960 deed to the State of Nebraska in an abstract Paap prepared for the Coopers during a 1981 land purchase. The Coopers learned of the omitted deed after the State of Nebraska initiated condemnation proceedings in 1997 based on rights granted to it in the omitted deed, and the Coopers subsequently sued Paap in 1999. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Paap, holding that the Coopers’ claim was time barred. The Coopers appeal alleging, restated, that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against them based on the statute of limitations because (1) the statute of limitations clock *245 should not have started running until they learned of Paap’s omission in 1997 and (2) abstracters are not professionals for the purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222 (Reissue 1995) and therefore that section did not apply. We hold that (1) abstracters are professionals for the purposes of § 25-222 and that (2) § 25-222 bars the Coopers’ claim because they failed to file within 1 year of discovery and further because even if they had filed within that timeframe, their claim was still beyond the 10-year absolute bar for professional negligence claims.
BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the material facts in this case. The Coopers purchased a tract of land in Otoe County, Nebraska, on April 3, 1981. Paap, a registered abstracter in the State of Nebraska, completed the abstract on the land for the sale and attached her certificate on January 8, 1981. The abstract was then delivered to the Coopers’ attorney who reviewed it and approved the sale. Subsequently, the Coopers purchased the property on April 3.
On October 14, 1997, the State of Nebraska initiated a condemnation proceeding to acquire a right-of-way for the U.S. Highway 2 project. At that time, the Coopers learned that their land had an access to the highway which was limited by a warranty deed given by the then owner to the State of Nebraska and filed in 1960. This deed restricted the highway access to a farmstead entrance for the movement of farming implements and crop equipment consistent with normal farming operations. This deed was not listed in the abstract which Paap prepared. Delbert Cooper’s affidavit states that the Coopers did not become aware of this deed until the time of the condemnation proceeding, but the record does not otherwise specify how and in what manner the Coopers discovered Paap’s omission. Likewise, Paap did not learn of her omission until she received a letter from the Coopers’ attorney regarding the matter.
The Coopers filed the instant action against Paap on April 20, 1999. The Coopers’ petition alleged that they relied on Paap’s abstract in the purchase of the land and further that they could not have reasonably discovered her omission before the condemnation proceeding initiated by the State in 1997. The Coopers there *246 fore sought damages in the amount of $14,117.49, which their petition alleged was their cost in removing the defect in title and restoring unlimited access to the highway from their property.
Paap answered by denying the Coopers’ claim and alleging that their cause of action was time barred. Paap’s amended answers alleged application of statutes of limitations for professional negligence, statutory claims, negligence claims, and a catchall provision for any other claims. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court took evidence on the above facts and heard arguments by counsel on February 7, 2000.
After receiving written arguments subsequent to a hearing on the matter, the trial court issued its decision on March 10, 2000. The trial court recited the undisputed facts given above and stated that this case was appropriate for summary judgment and a decision as a matter of law. The trial court held that the Coopers’ claim was time barred and therefore sustained Paap’s motion for summary judgment, overruled the Coopers’ motion for summary judgment, and accordingly dismissed the Coopers’ cause of action. The trial court also taxed all costs of the litigation to the Coopers.
The Coopers subsequently perfected this appeal. Additionally, the Nebraska Land Title Association has filed a brief with this court as amicus curiae. The association asserts that abstracters are professionals under § 25-222.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Coopers allege that the trial court erred in (1) finding that their claim was barred by the statute of limitations, (2) finding that their claim accrued at the time Paap delivered the abstract, (3) failing to hold that the statute of limitations began to run at the time the Coopers discovered Paap’s omission, (4) failing to find negligent misrepresentation in Paap’s certification of the abstract, and (5) failing to hold that the Coopers’ claim accrued when they knew or should have known of Paap’s negligent misrepresentation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In
Morrison Enters.
v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 260
Neb. 634, 639,
*247 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
(Citations omitted.)
In reviewing questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of determinations reached by the lower courts.
Kissinger
v.
Genetic Eval. Ctr.,
ANALYSIS
The parties cite various statutes of limitations which potentially have applicability to this case depending upon their alternative theories as to the classification of abstracters and of this type of claim against an abstracter. At the forefront of the parties’ dispute is whether abstracters are professionals for the purposes of applying § 25-222. Section 25-222 states:
Any action to recover damages based on alleged professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to render professional services providing the basis for such action; Provided, if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, then the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier; and provided further, that in no event may any *248 action be commenced to recover damages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action.
Under § 25-222, a plaintiff must bring his or her cause of action for professional negligence within 2 years of the negligent act or omission unless the plaintiff did not and reasonably could not have discovered the negligent act until after that time, in which case, the plaintiff must bring his or her claim within 1 year of reasonable discovery. However, § 25-222 bars all claims for professional negligence brought more than 10 years after the service is rendered.
“ ‘[Professional misconduct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary duties is ‘malpractice’ and comes within the professional or malpractice statute of limitations.’ ”
Schendt
v.
Dewey,
In
Tylle
v.
Zoucha, 226
Neb. 476, 480,
*249 “[A] calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive preparation including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods, maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued study and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service . ..
In
Georgetowne Ltd. Part.
v.
Geotechnical Servs.,
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court subsequently reused its definition from
Witherspoon
in
Board of Regents
v.
Wilscam Mullins Birge,
In
Jorgensen
v.
State Nat. Bank & Trust,
Applying the Tylle definition to the instant case, we can conclude only that Bank’s employees were not professionals and did not render professional services. Neither [bank employee] had any specialized knowledge requiring long and intensive preparation. According to [one employee], Bank’s employees were expected to do nothing more than fill out forms. Bank’s employees did not hold licenses and did not regularly supplement their educations, such as they were, nor were Bank’s employees subject to an ethical code enforced by a disciplinary system. In the absence of such characteristics, we cannot say that they maintained by force of organization high standards of achievement and conduct or committed themselves to continued study. Finally, there is no evidence that the kind of work performed by Bank’s employees in the instant case had for its *251 prime purpose the rendering of a public service. Based on the evidence adduced, we conclude that Bank’s employees, even if characterized as “retirement planners,” were not professionals.
Based on the definition the court in Jorgensen affirmed and the factors it articulated in reaching its conclusion with respect to bank employees, we find and hold that abstracters are professionals for the purposes of § 25-222. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-535 et seq. (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2000) is the Abstracters Act and governs the “[b]usiness of abstracting” as defined in § 76-537(3). The act’s purpose is “to safeguard the welfare and property of citizens of this state and to insure that abstracters serving the public meet minimum standards of proficiency and competency.” (Emphasis supplied.) § 76-536. The act provides that anyone engaged in the business of abstracting must be licensed as provided in the act. § 76-538. The act further establishes an Abstracters Board of Examiners to carry out and enforce its provisions. § 76-540. The board may revoke or suspend an abstracter’s license or censure an abstracter or issue a letter of reprimand for violations of the act including unfair practices, the conviction of a felony, habitual carelessness, or fraudulent practices.
Further, applicants must prove to the board’s satisfaction that the applicant has at least 1 year of verified land title-related experience, see § 76-542, as well as pass a written examination to determine the applicant’s proficiency, see § 76-543. Once registered and licensed, an abstracter must “complete and certify to the board that he or she has successfully completed three hours of board-approved professional development credits.” § 76-544. As noted by the Nebraska Land Title Association, the Legislature specifically changed this requirement in 1985 by deleting reference to “‘continuing education programs’” and inserting instead the phrase “ ‘professional development credits.’ ” Brief for amicus curiae at 6.
Other authorities have also recognized an abstracter’s knowledge, care, and skill:
*252 From its nature, the business of abstracting titles requires special knowledge and qualifications, and while, as discussed [in a later section], it is not a function of an abstracter, as such, to give an opinion as to the legal effect of the facts or instruments noted, he [or she] must, in order properly to perform his [or her] duties, have an understanding of the law relating to conveyances, descents, devises, and other matters affecting the title to real property, and be able to determine what constitutes a lien or encumbrance thereon. Moreover, an abstracter is bound to use sufficient diligence to discover and show on his [or her] abstract all relevant instruments and facts properly made a matter of record.
Similarly, he [or she] must read or examine the whole of each instrument, and take care to discover material matter contained anywhere therein; and it is no excuse for omitting a material matter that it was contained or set forth in a part of the instrument other than that in which it would normally be expected to be found. He [or she] must examine the actual records, and is not justified in relying upon marginal notes or references, or upon the index.
1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 9 at 371-72 (1985). Corpus Juris Secondum adds, in pertinent part:
There is a rigorous duty imposed upon an abstracter ... to conduct a proper and painstaking search and examination of the public records, and to set forth in his [or her] abstract all the material facts of record which relate to, or may affect, the title under investigation. . . .
. . . [I]f in his [or her] search or examination of the records, he [or she] is put on notice of anything outside thereof which may affect the title, he [or she] should either investigate the same, or call attention thereto in the abstract so that interested persons may make further investigations.
Id., § 10 at 373.
Based on the above authority, we believe abstracters meet the factors annunciated in
Jorgensen
v.
State Nat. Bank & Trust,
We also note that while the Nebraska Supreme Court has not dealt with this issue directly, it has given indications that it considers abstracters professionals. In
Heyd
v.
Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
The duty imposed upon an abstractor of title is a rigorous one: “An abstractor of title is hired because of his [or her] professional skill, and when searching the public records on behalf of a client he [or she] must use the degree of care commensurate with that professional skill ... the abstractor must report all matters which could affect his [or her] client’s interests and which are readily discoverable from those public records ordinarily examined when a reasonably diligent title search is made.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Id.
at 302-03,
In
Tess
v.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.,
With respect to cases beyond this jurisdiction, we found only one which has addressed this issue, that is, whether an abstracter is a professional for the purposes of applying statute of limitations rules to professionals. In
Chapman
v.
Alexander,
The Coopers assert that the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in
Tylle v. Zoucha,
Given that we find abstracters are professionals for the purposes of § 25-222, we turn now to that section’s application to this case. The Coopers’ claim fails this section twofold. First, they failed to file their claim within 1 year after they discovered Paap’s omission, assuming but not deciding that reasonable discovery did not occur before that time. Second, even if they had filed their claim within 1 year of the condemnation proceeding, their claim was clearly beyond the absolute 10-year bar on professional negligence suits. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s order sustaining Paap’s motion for summary judgment based on § 25-222 and denying the Coopers’ cross-motion was proper. Because of our holding on this issue, we do not address the Coopers’ remaining arguments regarding when the statute of limitations clock began to run.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we hold that abstracters are professionals for the purposes of § 25-222 and that therefore the trial court properly applied § 25-222 and correctly found that the Coopers’ claim was time barred.
Affirmed.