ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Bеfore this court is a motion filed by the defendant for summary judgment pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7056. The defendant, who filed a voluntary petition in bankruptсy under Chapter 7 on January 16, 1985, maintains that his actions were not willful within the meaning and import of § 523(a)(6) 1 and that the complaint seeking a determination that the debt due and owing by him to the plaintiff is nondischargeable be dismissed. For reasons stated herein, the court denies the motion for summary judgment.
On June 4, 1983 at approximately 6:30 p.m., the defendant was driving a 1967 Chevrolet Corvette automobile and was proceeding north on County Trunk Highway K, approximately .4 of a mile north of County Trunk Highway E in the township of Hartford, Wisconsin. His wife, Lisa Noller, was traveling with him at that time. The defendant’s vehiсle, while proceeding at a rate of speed of 90 to 95 miles per hour passed another northbound vehicle in a “no passing” zоne. After completing the pass, defendant’s car returned to the northbound lane but the right tires of his auto *38 mobile went onto the east shouldеr of the northbound lane. This caused defendant to lose control of his car which then veered into the southbound lane of County Trunk Highway K and сollided with a southbound automobile being operated by Victor Juneau. Also in the southbound vehicle were Orville Cooper, who was the husbаnd of the plaintiff, and Eugene Becker. As a result of this collision, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Juneau, Mr. Becker and Mrs. Noller were all killed.
This court has cоnsistently adhered to the view that under § 523(a)(6), in order for a debt to be nondischargeable, there must be an intent to injure.
In re Kuepper,
It is recognized that a split of authority as to the appropriate test to be applied in arriving at the meaning of “willful and malicious” fоr purposes of § 523(a)(6) exists. Some other courts require only a finding of an intentional act by the debtor which in turn has caused the injury in order to mаke the obligation non-dischargeable.
In re DeRosa,
“Under this paragraph, 'willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell,193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505 ,48 L.Ed. 754 ] (1902) held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to aрply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.” H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.Seal Ng., 1st Sess. 362-65 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong.Seal Ng. and A.D.News 5963, 6320-21, the S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong. Seal Ng., 2d Sess. 79 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong.Seal Ng. and A.D. News 5787, 5868.
This legislative history makes clear that the “reckless disregard” standard no longer applies and that proof of “deliberate or intentional” injury must be established in order to except the debt from discharge.
In re Compos,
Applying the “intent to injure” standard to the conduct of a defendant who was driving at a speed of 90 to 95 miles per hour and passing in a “no passing” zone, while undoubtedly constituting “reckless disregard,” does not, in and of itself, constitute willfulness.
The plaintiff has cited
In re Adams,
The plaintiff’s argument must be rejected for several reasons.
Adams
is limited to conduct arising from drunken driving because of a specific Congressional
*39
аmendment. Congress has not enacted any legislation holding that debts arising from liability due to driving at an excessive rate of speed are similarly nondischargeable. Furthermore, this court does not agree with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in
Adams
that § 523(a)(9) is merely a clarification of § 523(a)(6) and should be applied retroactively. § 523(a)(9) is a new statute created solely for the purpose of declaring drunk driving debts nondis-chargeable. If § 523(a)(6) had been intended to be clarified, it is more likely that there would have been changes made within that particular provisiоn itself. The better reasoned view is that of the Tenth Circuit in Compos
2
and concurred in by this court’s colleague, Judge Dale E. Ihlen-feldt in
In re Gonzales,
Reaching the conclusion that the proper standard to be applied is “intent to injure,” for purpоses of § 523(a)(6), does not, however, entitle the defendant to be granted its motion for summary judgment. This court stated in
In re Kuepper, supra,
that a court must take into cоnsideration the unique facts of the particular case before it, and no two cases present identical facts. Summary judgment is only аppropriate where it is clear on the record that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact after an examination of the record before it. Case law has established that a party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of such genuine issues of fact.
In re LaCasse,
Therefore, even by adopting the “intent to injure” standаrd, a factual issue remains which can only be resolved at the trial stage and not by a motion for summary judgment.
Notes
. § 523 Exceptions to Discharge :
"(a) A discharge under § 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title dоes not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ...
(6) For willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity ...”
. In a footnote appearing in Compos, the court referred to Adams and stated: "We have carefully reviewed the opinion, but do not agree with its interpretation of § 523(a)(6) or its retroactive application of § 523(a)(9).”