Cooper, Appellant, v. McDermott.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
March 22, 1960
403 Pa. 161
Order affirmed.
Cooper, Appellant, v. McDermott.
Argued January 13, 1960. Before JONES, C. J., BELL, MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.
Thomas A. Masterson, Deputy City Solicitor, with him Anthony J. Ryan and John M. McNally, Jr., Assistant City Solicitors, and David Berger, City Solicitor, for appellee.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE EAGEN, March 22, 1960:
Six of the appellants, citizens of the State of California, stand indicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, charged with the violation of, or conspiracy to violate, Section 524 of the Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, as amended by the Act of July 17, 1957, P. L. 972,
Pursuant to the indictments and at the request of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, the Gоvernor of Pennsylvania issued warrants of extradition commanding that the defendants be taken into custody and returned to Philadelphia County for the purposes of trial.
This appeal involves three separate complaints in equity (in two actions the six individuals charged with the criminal violations involved are plaintiffs and in the other action three taxpayers, residents and citizens of the City of Philadelphia, appear as plaintiffs), which seek to enjoin the defendant, the Chief of County Detectives in the office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, from taking any action in furtherance of the execution of the extradition warrants.
It is charged that the statute of 1939, supra, upon which the criminal charges are based is vague and on its face unconstitutional and is in violation of the
All actions were consolidated for the purposes of disposition and the court below denied injunctive relief and dismissed the request for a preliminary injunction. An appeal to this Court followed.
Equity has no jurisdiction under the circumstances presented. As a general rule, the office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by statute, are limited to the protection of the rights of property and do not invade the domain of the courts of the common law. Equity‘s jurisdiction does not involve control of the prosecution, punishment and pardon of crimes or misdemeanors: In re Sawyer et al., 124 U. S. 200 (1888); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943). These important functions, for most compelling reasons and sound public policy, are performed exclusively in courts exercising criminal jurisdiction: Meadville Park Theatre Corporation v. Mook et al., 337 Pa. 21, 10 A. 2d 437 (1940). As stated in that opinion, page 24: “Only confusion and frustration in the enforcement of these laws would result if а person arrested or about to be arrested for their violation could by transforming himself into a complainant and a district attorney into a defendant, in civil proceedings, have his guilt or innocence adjudicated by a court of equity.”
While there have been rare and unusual instances wherein courts of equity have enjoined public officers from proceeding with the enforcement of penal statutes, in those cases the validity of the statutes under which the proceedings had begun was seriously and substantially challenged and, in addition, it was clearly apparent that irreparable damage and harm would be done to property by a continuation of the prosecution. Both of these elements are indispensable: Martin v. Baldy, 249 Pa. 253, 94 A. 1091 (1915); M. & S. Ry. and L. Co. v. New Castle, 233 Pa. 413, 82 A. 501 (1912); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923); Truax and the Attorney General of Arizona v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated in Cavanaugh et al. v. Looney, Attorney General of Texas, 248 U. S. 453, 456 (1919): “No such injunction ‘ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt;’ and when necessary to prevеnt great and irreparable injury.”
In this instance the only resulting harm to the individuals under indictment will be the inconvenience, personal expense and embarrassment incident to the extradition and prosecution. This follows from and is entirely due to acts of their own making and is in no way attributable to any act or wish of the Commonwealth or the people it represents. Such vexation will not cause equity to intervene: Long et al. v. Metzger et al., 301 Pa. 449, 152 A. 572 (1930).
These defendants are free to litigate the question of the unconstitutionality of the statute through orderly methods of criminal procedure and thereby to enjoy a complete and adequate remedy at law.
As to the complaining taxpayers, the harm feared is infinitesimal and is not the “irreparable injury” to a property right that the law contemplates as worthy of equitable intervention in criminal prosecutions by duly constituted public officials. If courts were to adopt the policy advocated by these aрpellants, the cost of criminal enforcement would be greatly increased to all taxpayers.
Appellants also contend that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act adopted in Pennsylvania July 8, 1941, P. L. 288 (
It is to be noted also that both in Ex Parte Morgan and in Cassis v. Fair, supra, it was strongly urged that the provisions of the Uniform Extradition Act in regard to the extradition of those accused of crime, who were not in the demanding state at the time of its commission and who, therefore, had not fled therefrom, are unconstitutional and in violation of the laws of the United States. This contention was rejected therein, as it has been consistently so when raised in other jurisdictions: Ennist v. Baden, 158 Fla. 141, 28 So. 2d 160; English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E. 2d 898; In Re Campbell v. Murray, 147 Neb. 820, 25 N.W. 2d 419; and, Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E. 2d 807.
The order of the lower court is affirmed at the appellants’ costs.
Mr. Justice Bok dissents.
It is with great regret that I feel compelled to dissent. Six citizens of California were indicted in Philadelphia County for conspiracy to violate Section 524 of The Penal Code of Pennsylvania---exhibiting in Philadelphia obscene vile literature which they sent from California through the mails. If they are guilty of the crime charged, they should certainly be swiftly and commensurately punished in the proper criminal court.
We have taken an oath to obey, support and defend the Constitution. Constitutionally guaranteed rights must be safeguarded and sustained, even though sometimes a murderer or felonious criminal thereby escapes his just punishment. Fortunately, no such result will occur in this case, because these six complainants can be indicted, tried, and if guilty, convicted in California, and in a Federal Court for these same offenses.
The question here involved is whether a Court of Equity can enjoin the extradition of these complainants from California to Philadelphia County for trial here.
It is conceded (a) that said complainants were not in Pennsylvania, the demanding State, at or about the date of the commission of the crime (or at any other time), and (b) that they have never fled from Pennsylvania. These are indispensable prerequisites to extradition proceedings where a State Criminal Statute has been allegedly violated. In Cоmmonwealth ex. rel. Dronsfield v. Hohn, 390 Pa. 434, 135 A. 2d 757, the Court said (pages 436, 437): “Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act of July 8, 1941, P. L. 288, the Courts of an asylum state cannot determine the guilt or innocence of the person sought to be extradited: Commonwealth ex rel. Hatton v. Dye, 373 Pa. 502, 96 A. 2d 127; Commonwealth ex rel. Mills v. Baldi, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 321, 70 A. 2d 439. The requisition will be sustained and extradition ordered (1) if the subject of the extradition is charged with a crime in the de-
Complainants charge that “obscene” literature proscribed in §524 of The Penal Code is so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. With this I strongly disagree. See Roth & Alberts v. United States, 354 U. S. 476; also my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417, 422, 153 A. 2d 227. Nearly everyone knows the meaning of obscene, indecent, lewd and lascivious in my opinion these adjectives are words of such general and common usage that they have acquired a well and commonly understood meaning. It is not necessary for a statute or an indictment to charge defendants with conduct or “material, the dominant theme of [which] taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”
Until the word “prurient” interest was employed in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Roth and Alberts case, supra, I doubt if more than one juryman in ten thousand knew its meaning. I shall assume thаt Section 524 of The Penal Code is, as the Commonwealth contends, valid and constitutional.
It is a wise and universally accepted general rule that criminal cases should be tried and disposed of in Criminal Courts and not in Courts of Equity. “[A Court of Equity] has no jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment or the pardon of crimes or misdemeanors...“: Ex Parte Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157. As this Court
There is not the slightest doubt that the general rule above enunciated is sound, wise and necessary for the protection of society. Nevertheless certain exceptions have been recognized. While Equity generally confines itself to equitable protection and relief of property rights, its jurisdiction has been extended to include the protection of personal rights, even though the act against which an injunction is sought involves a crime as well as irreparable damage to property or to personal rights, or a multiplicity of suits. In Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A. 2d 383, the Court enjoined the owners of 4 acres and refreshment stands known as Boulevard Pools from excluding negroes therefrom.* The Court, speaking through former Chief Justice STERN, in a lengthy and learned review of the authorities, said (pages 128-129): “It being clear, then, that plaintiffs have a right to proceed against defendants in a civil action to recover damages, have they also a right to equitable relief by way of injunction? Defendants urge two reasons why such relief should not be granted: (1) because of the penal section attached tо the statute, and (2) because no property right of plaintiffs is involved.
No legal rights of the plaintiffs qua taxpayers have been violated. If the Constitutional rights of the complainants who have been indicted are being violated, are they entitled to injunctive relief against extradition, or are they restricted to raising these Constitutional questions at the time of their criminal trial?** This is the most important question here involved.
Can citizens of California be extradited to Philadelphia for a crime which, if committed at all, was committed in California against the laws of California as well as against the laws of the United States*** and against the laws of Pennsylvania.*** Will Equity enjoin
The Governor of Pennsylvania has no common law or inherent Sovereign power to demand, or to grant or to compel extradition. Authority for extradition must be found either in the Constitution, or in a Statute which authorizes extradition withоut violating the Constitution.
Section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act of 1941, upon which the Commonwealth relies to sustain the present extradition proceedings, (a) must be strictly construed: Commonwealth ex rel. Spivak v. Heinz, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 158, 14 A. 2d 875; United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, Sheriff, 75 F. 2d 716; (b) it does not authorize an extradition in this case, and (c) it clearly violates the
“The Governor of this State may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state---[there was no demand by California]---any рerson in this State---[the complainants are not persons in the State of Pennsylvania]---charged in such other state [California] in the manner provided in section 3 with committing an act in this State or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand, and the provisions of this act not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime
and has not fled therеfrom.” Analysis makes clear that the limited language of this section gives authority to the Governor of Pennsylvania to surrender an accused who is in Pennsylvania, but no authority to demand the return to Pennsylvania---for trial here---of a person in California who was never in Pennsylvania.
Far more important, however, this section as interpreted by the majority is, as we shall see, unconstitutional.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recognized the doubtful constitutionality of Section 6 of the Extradition Act, and attempted to very narrowly limit and restrict it. In the Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, 1926 (pages 586-587) the Commissioners stated with respect to Section 6 “... we have included a provision as Section 6 of this draft, authorizing the extradition of persons who may have never fled from justice at all, but who have committed homicide across the border of a state by shooting or other means coming within the common judicial conclusion that thе crime is committed at the place where the person is killed.”
I am convinced that Section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was never intended to be applicable to a use of the mails (for illegal purposes), or to make a conspiratorial act in California an extraditable crime in Pennsylvania; and if so interpreted, it violates the Federal Constitution.
The Federal Constitution thus clearly provides, expressly or by necessary implication, that a person accused of crime can be tried only by a jury of the district in the State where the crime was committed, and can be extradited only when he has fled from the demanding State. The purpose of these Constitutional provisions was to prevent a citizen from being deported from State to State except if and as specifically authorizеd by the Constitution; and these privileges and immunities from extradition must be liberally construed in favor of citizens and other persons accused of crime.
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280, expressly and specifically holds that the extradition herein sought would violate the Federal Constitution. Mr. Justice HOLMES delivering the opinion of the Court said (pages 281, 283, 284-285): “This is an appeal from an order on habeas corpus discharging the respondent, Daily, from custody under a warrant of the Governor of Illinois directing his extradition to Michigan as а fugitive from justice from that State. Daily, it appears, had been indicted in Michigan for bribery and also for obtaining money from the State by false pretenses, and
...
“We come then to the other question, whether the facts show that the defendant is a fugitive from justice.
...
“If a jury should believe the evidence and find that Daily did the acts that led Armstrong to betray his trust, deceived the Board of Control, and induced by fraud the payment by the State, the usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power. Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 Allen, 243, 256, 259. Simpson v. State, 92 Georgia, 41. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 356. Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Massachusetts, 1, 6, 18. We may assume therefore that Daily is a criminal under the laws of Michigan.
“Of course we must admit that it does not follow that Daily is a fugitive from justice. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 712. On the other hand, however, we think it plain that the criminal need not do within the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then absents himself from the State and does the rest elsewhere, he becomes a fugitive from justice, when the crime is complete, if not before. In re Cook, 49 Fed. Rep. 833, 843, 844. Ex parte Hoffstot, 180 Fed. Rep. 240, 243. In re William Sultan, 115 No. Car. 57. For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the
I recognize that these accused persons could litigate the question of the validity and constitutionality of Section 524 of The Penal Code of Pennsylvania, and of Section 6 of the Extradition Act, at the time of their criminal trial on the present indictment. In the meantime, however, unless granted injunctive relief, they will be taken from their homes in California and extradited to Philadelphia, with consequent loss of liberty, and with a resultant enormous expense to defendants of transporting to and maintaining in Philadelphia themselves and their witnesses who live in California.
In the light of all these unusual facts and circumstances and under the principles laid down in the authorities hereinbefore cited and quoted, I would hold that Equity has jurisdiction, and that the extradition proceedings should be enjoined; otherwise these persons will bе deprived of due process. Cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280; Roth & Alberts v. United States, 354 U. S. 476; Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa., supra; Adams v. New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A. 2d 392; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197; Mahoning & Shenango R. & L. Co. v. New Castle, 233 Pa. 413, 82 A. 501; Kingsley Pictures Corporation v. Blanc, 396 Pa. 448, 153 A. 2d 243.*