109 Ala. 338 | Ala. | 1895
Upon the former appeal in this case (Lindsay v. Cooper, 94 Ala. 170), in reversing the decree of the chancellor, who had denied relief to the .complainant, we held: First, that there was-an estoppel upon W. H. Price, by reason of the facts stated in the opinion, to deny that by the sale of the land in controversy, at which Thomas, E. Winston became the purchaser, there passed anything less than an absolute, unincumbered fee ; Second, that the defendants who were in possession, claiming under Price and through a purchaser at a judicial sale, were bound by said estoppel as fully as Price was ; and, third, that the right' of the complainant to maintain the bill was not affected and could not be defeated by any claim of laches, the statute of limitations, or the doctrine of prescription. Upon the remandment of the cause, an amendment was made to the answer of Mrs. Cooper, who now prosecutes this appeal, and this amendment presents the only new feature of the case. In all other respects the record is conceded tobe substantially the same as upon the former appeal. This amendment may be disposed of in a few words. Briefly stated, it sets up that, upon a voluntary division, without administration, of the estate of Judith M. Winston, deceased, made by her adult children, there was allotted to the complainant, a grand-daughter, (and paid to her guardian for her benefit, she being then a minor of tender years) a sum of money, and to the defendant Mrs. Cooper, as for her share in said estate, a note of one Murdock, upon which she indulged him, and to secure which she took from him a mortgage on the land in controversy. This mortgage she subsequently foreclosed, and at the sale she purchased the land for the debt. These facts are made the basis for the argument that complainant is estopped, because she .had the benefit of the money paid her guardian, to take from Mrs. Cooper any part of the laud she claims through Murdock, and the mortgage foreclosure. The proposi-' tion is thus stated by appellant’s"counsel: ‘‘The contention made by her amended answer is, that after the
The case is, therefore, before us in the same plight as at the former hearing in this court, and, if the opinion we then announced be adhered to, an affirmance of the decree from which this appeal is prosecuted must follow. - That opinion, delivered by Justice McClellan, fur
In order to show that the defendants, who claimed under Price and through Barton, a purchaser at a judicial sale, were not entitled to protection as innocent purchasers for value, in good faith, without notice (waiving a direct decision on the question upon which the court was divided, whether mere privity with him who is estopped is sufficient to bind the party by the estoppel, notwithstanding good faith, want of notice, and payment of a valuable consideration), we used this language : “Our conclusion that the respondents are bound by the estoppel which rested on Price will be rested upon another consideration. They are purchasers, it is true, in good faith, without actual notice, and for value. They are also, however, purchasers at a judicial sale, the sale made by Price’s administrator to Barton in 1872, under an order of the probate court. To such sales the rule of caveat emptor applies in its utmost vigor and strictness. The court orders the sale, in such cases,only of such interest and estate and rights in the premises as he had and could have asserted ; no more, no less. The purchaser succeeds to his rights and attitude in respect of the property sold, ‘takes his shoes,’ stands in his place, acquires his interest as the same existed in his hands, subject to all infirmities of title then attaching to the estate, and to all equities, known or secret, which operated a limitation upon the nominal or apparent estate of the intestate in his lifetime. The purchaser buys at his peril; he takes upon himself the risks of any out
The foregoing extract from the opinion is now cited by counsel for appellant, with the suggestion that Thomas E. Winston was himself a purchaser at a judicial sale, and that, therefore, the same rale and its logical result would apply to his purchase at the sale of the interest of Walker’s estate by Price, the administrator. Pursuing the argument, counsel ask a series of questions in reference to said purchase by Winston, as follows: “What prevents the doctrine of caveat emptor from applying to his purchase and to all those who were privy in blood or estate to him? Did Winston succeed by his purchase at that judicial sale to anything more than the decedent’s rights and attitude in respect of the property sold? Did he not take the decedent’s shoes, stand in his place, acquire his interest as the same existed in his hands, subject to all infirmities of title their attaching to the estate, and to all equities known or secret, which operated a limitation upon the nominal or apparent estate of the intestate in his lifetime?” These questions are followed in the brief by the following reasoning: ‘ ‘The sale of the interest of Walker’s estate, through which Winston only can claim, was made by the cpurt. It could order in such cases the sale of only such interest and estate and rights in the premises as he (the deceased) had and could have asserted, no more, no less. If this doctrine be sound, and no one can question it, then we have the respective sides to this controversy standing upon the same level, at least in this respect. The conflicting titles are each and both derived through judicial sales, to both of which alike the rule of caveat emptor applies.- Then neither can claim any advantage over the other by virtue of this rule, uuless, as we have said, the rule depends for its efficacy and effect, not upon the naked fact of its application here to judicial sales, as all the authorities insist it does, but varies as to the personnel of the representative.’’ The answer to all this is not difficult. No one doubts for a moment that Weston was a purchaser at a judicial sale, and that, in a controversy-with any one in a position to raise the question or institute an inquiry into the extent of Walker’s interest, it
The exact advantage which the complainant enjoys over the defendant here is that she is in a position to- institute an inquiry into the extent of his title, which Barton procured by his purchase, while the defendant,bound by the estoppel, will not be heard or permitted to question Walker’s absolute ownership, or to set up any rights founded upon the claim or lien which Price had at the time of his sale to Winston. The question here is, not so much what Walker actually had, but what estate Price led Wihston to believe he had, There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the two positions taken by the court in this case. No reason can be given why the doctrine of caveat emptor may not have full play with respect to judicial sales, and, at the same time, the doctrine of estoppel be successfully invoked in a proper case, in favor of a purchaser at such sale. The argument of counsel to which we have adverted, when forced to its logical conclusion, would drive them into maintaining the proposition that, be
As thus stated, we doubt if counsel would seriously contend for the proposition, and for such a position we are quité sure there is no authority. Certainly full scope can be given to the rule of caveat emptor without requiring such consequences.
The decree of the chancery court is affirmed.