*1 COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. AVIALL
SERVICES, INC. No. Argued 02-1192. October 2004 Decided December *3 Thomas, J., Court, Rehnquist, delivered the opinion of the in which J., O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, C. and Souter, Breyer, JJ., joined. and Ginsburg, J., Stevens, J., filed a in which dissenting opinion, joined, post, p. 171. Reynolds
William the cause for argued peti- Bradford Hsiao, briefs were Lisa K. Dale E. tioner. With him on the Stephenson, Kacenjar. and Allen A.
Jeffrey P. Minear the cause for the United States argued as amicus curiae reversal. With him on the brief urging Attorney Olson, were former Solicitor General Assistant Deputy Hungar, Dep- Sansonetti, General General Solicitor uty Attorney Clark, Assistant General and Paul S. Weiland. With cause for Faulk
Richard O. respondent. argued Gaba, M. J. Bishop, Jeffrey brief were Cynthia him on the Harris* Pamela Walter Dellinger, of the Court. delivered opinion Thomas Justice Re- Environmental of the Section Comprehensive (CERCLA)1 Act of 1980 and Liability Compensation, sponse, to clean efforts up have who allows undertaken persons seek substances hazardous by contaminated properties under CERCLA. liable from other parties contribu- obtain specifies party Section civil action” under CERCLA any tion following “during 107(a). is whether we must decide The issue §106 or State of were filed affirmance urging of curiae * Briefs amici York, Caitlin of Attorney General New et al. Eliot by Spitzer, New York Easton, Gen General, H. Assistant Solicitor Robert Solicitor Halligan, J. Johnson, Lehner, and Gordon J. Kaufmann, R. eral, H. Karen and Peter Justice General, Secretary of by Rodriguez, Anabelle Attorneys Assistant respective for their States Rico, General Attorneys Puerto of California, Ken Arizona, Lockyer Bill of of Goddard Terry as follows: Connecticut, Jane Brady M. Colorado, Blumenthal of of Richard Salazar Jr., Louisiana, Foti, Illinois, Charles C. of Delaware, of Madigan of Lisa Massachusetts, Cox of Jeremiah Michigan, A. Michael Reilly F. of Thomas Montana, Sandoval Missouri, Brian Mike McGrath Nixon of (Jay)W. Ohio, Dakota, W. A. Petro of Jim Nevada, North Wayne Stenehjem Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Pappert J. Gerald Drew Edmondson Carolina, Island, McMaster of South Henry of Rhode C. Lynch Patrick *4 Washington, Tennessee, O. Gregoire Christine Paul G. Summers Wisconsin, Wyoming; J. Patrick Crank and Lautenschlager of A. Peggy Cohen; for Albert M. M. Gross and Joel by Co. et al. Atlantic Richfield for McGahren, H. Bress, David P John by et al. Richard Co. ConocoPhillips A. Mulliken; Corp. by Miguel Martin for Lockheed Becker, L. and David Super for the Tulumello, Buckley; R. and Estrada, and James Andrew S. Ng,M. Harry W. Steinberg, by Michael Project et al. Settlements fund Weissman, Meade, and Paul R. Colleli, Jr., William R. Kenneth J. Ralph D. Ackerman. 1 § We refer 42 U. S. C. codified at is Section than the rather of CERCLA to part, sections for the most throughout, U. S. Code.
161 private 107(a) party § § who has not been sued under may § nevertheless obtain contribution under from parties. other may liable We hold not.
I Under CERCLA, 2767, Stat. the Federal Government may up § clean a contaminated may itself, area see or it 104, compel responsible parties perform cleanup, see 106(a). § Key Corp. See Tronic States, United 511 U. S. (1994). 809, 814 case, either the Government re-* response (2000 cover its costs 107, 42 U. S. C. 9607 I), Supp. ed. and recovery” the “cost section of CERCLA. 107(a) Section potentially lists four responsible classes of (PRPs) persons provides they and “shall be liable” for, among things, other “all costs removal or remedial action by incurred United States Government... not inconsist- 107(a)(4)(A).2 ent with the contingency plan.” national provides Section further that PRPs shall be liable for “any necessary response other costs of any incurred other person consistent with contingency plan.” the national 107(a)(4)(B).
After litigation CERCLA’s enactment in 1980, arose over allowing 107, addition to the Government and private parties certain costs recover from PRPs, also al lowed a response PRP that had incurred costs to recover costs from specifically, other PRPs. More was private whether a party response that had incurred costs, but voluntarily that had done subject so and was not itself to suit, had a cause of against action for cost 107(a)(4)(B) PRPs. Various courts prede held and its cessors authorized such g., cause e. See, action. Wick land Oil Asarco, Terminals v. Inc., 792 F. 2d
2The national contingency plan specifies procedures preparing responding to contaminations and was promulgated by the Environmental (EPA) Protection Agency pursuant CERCLA C. (2000 I). (2004). ed. Supp. plan The pt. CFR codified *5 311, Corp., 2d (CA9 1986); 761 F. Resource v. Waste Walls (CA6 Co., Stepan 1982). 1985); Philadelphia Chemical v. 317-318 (ED Pa. Supp. 1135, 1140-1143 F. over the litigation passage, ensued also After CERCLA’s entity had been private separate or (by the Government action in a cost sued PRP) PRPs. from contribution obtain could another provi no contained 1980, in CERCLA originally enacted As for contribu right of providing action for a expressly sion that, held nonetheless Courts of District A number tion. “contribution,” the word although did not mention CERCLA of the provisions impliedly from right either arose such g., See, e. law. common federal matter of as a statute, or Supp. 1258, County, F. v. New Castle United States 1986) com (contribution (Del. federal under arises 1263-1269 Supp. 1484, F. law); Inc., 608 ASARCO, v. Colorado mon Agribusi (Colo. 1985) Syntex (same); v. Wehner 1486-1493 (contribution 1985) (ED Mo. Supp. 27, F. Inc., 616 ness, 107(e)(2)). de was That conclusion implied from to refused Court light of two decisions in batable rights to contribution implied common-law recognize or Rad Industries, v. Inc. Texas See statutes. other federal (1981) (refusing 630, 638-647 Inc., Materials, cliff right to contribution implied recognize or common-law Airlines, Act); Northwest Clayton Act or the Sherman (refus (1981) S. Transport Workers, 451 U. Inc. right implied or common-law recognize ing to Rights the Civil ofVII Pay Title of 1963or Equal Act in the 1964). Act of Super- in the subsequently CERCLA amended
Congress
(SARA),
of 1986
Act
and Reauthorization
fund Amendments
for con-
of action
express cause
provide an
100 Stat.
113(f)(1):
as CERCLA
codified
tribution,
per-
any other
from
“Any person
seek
section
liable
potentially
liable
who is
son
*6
9607(a)
during
following any civil action
title,
or
of this
or under section
9606 of
title
under section
brought in accordance
Such claims shall be
of this title.
of
Proce-
and
Federal Rules Civil
with this section
governed
law.
In resolv-
dure,
be
Federal
and shall
response
ing
the court
allocate
claims,
using
equitable
among
parties
factors
such
liable
costs
Nothing
appropriate.
court determines are
as the
any person
to
shall
this subsection
diminish
bring
in the absence of civil
an action for contribution
section 9607
of this title or
action under section 9606
in 42
Id.,
as codified
U. S. C.
of this title.”
separate express right of contribution,
also created
SARA
113(f)(3)(B),
liability
person
“[a]
resolved its
to
who has
response
or all of a
or a
for some
the United States
State
in an
costs of such action
or for some or all of the
action
judicially approved
short,
In
settlement.”
administrative
provided
cost
for a
to
SARA,
after
CERCLA
107(a),
rights
separate
to con-
circumstances,
and
in certain
113(f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B).3
§§
circumstances,
in other
tribution
II
engine
aircraft
case concerns four contaminated
This
Cooper
Inc., owned
Industries,
maintenance sites Texas.
operated
it sold them to
until
when
and
those sites
operated
for a
sites
Services, Inc. Aviall
the four
Aviail
Ultimately,
years.
that both
Aviall discovered
number
petroleum
Cooper
the facilities when
and
had contaminated
States,
(1994), we observed
v. United
Corp.
Tronic
and other hazardous substances spills. storage underground tanks ground through water Conservation Resource the Texas Natural Aviall notified (Commission) Com- The the contamination. Commission violating state environ- that it was Aviall mission informed threat- up site, to clean laws, mental directed Aviall to if Aviall failed pursue an enforcement action ened nor the Commission remediation. Neither undertake judicial measures or administrative however, took EPA, cleanup. compel supervi- up properties the State’s cleaned properties a third beginning Aviall sold the
sion, in 1984. *7 contractually responsible party 1996,but remains 1995 mil- approximately cleanup. $5 Aviall has incurred for the greater. may be even cleanup costs; total costs lion in the Cooper in the against August action Aviall filed this 1997, District Northern for the District Court United States original com- cleanup The seeking costs. to recover Texas, recovery under CERCLA cost plaint a for claim asserted §107(a), under CERCLA separate for contribution claim 113(f)(1), § later amended claims. Aviall and state-law single, claims combining into complaint, two CERCLA its pursuant alleged that, joint That claim claim. CERCLA from §113(f)(1), contribution entitled seek Aviall was 107(a), § response costs and Cooper, for a PRP under as facili- the Texas with liability in connection Aviall incurred well. as claims state-law to assert continued ties.4 Aviall Dis- summary judgment, and parties moved Both for held The court Cooper’s motion. granted trict Court 4 Fifth by compelled manner its claim the that it framed Aviall asserts §107 claim. type §113 is a claim holding that precedent Circuit also, (2000); Inc., 917, see 924 Miller, 3d v. Conoco 234 F. Inc. Geraghty & Corp., 3d F. Scrap Metal 153 Iron & v. Acme Serv. Co. g., Centerior e. Inc., F. 3d Co., Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. (CA6 1998); Sun 349-353 F. 3d Mining Corp., Group Newmont (CA10 1997); Pinal Creek 1997). (CA9 1298, § having Aviall, sought claim, abandoned its 107 § 113(f)(1) only under The held that court relief was unavailable to it had not been because sued under Having or CERCLA 106 107. dismissed Aviall’s federal jurisdiction claim, the court declined to exercise over the state-law claims.
A divided panel
Appeals
of the Court of
Fifth
Cir-
(2001).
cuit affirmed.
majority,
relying
F. 3d 134
The
principally
“during
following”
on the
language in the first
or.
§ 113(f)(1),
sentence of
seeking
held that “a PRP
from other PRPs
pending
under
must have a
or
107(a)
adjudged 106
administrative order or
cost
against
action
Id.,
it.”
The
145.
dissent reasoned that
§ 113(f)(1),
the final
saving
sentence
clause,
clarified
that the federal common-law
to contribution survived
§ 113(f)(1),
§106
enactment
even absent a
or
J.).
civil
(opinion
Id.,
action.
at 148-150
of Wiener,
rehearing
On
en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed
a di-
holding
vided vote,
allows a PRP to obtain
regardless
contribution from other PRPs
of whether the
§106
§107.
PRP has
sued
been
Ill A 113(f)(1) Section does not authorize Aviall’ssuit. The first enabling sentence, the clause that the establishes may seek contribu- “Any person provides: contribution, of section any under during following civil action or . . . tion 9607(a) title,” 42 this of section title or under of this added). meaning 9613(f)(1) § natural (emphasis The U. S. C. sought only may sub- be is that contribution sentence of this following” “during namely, or specified conditions, ject to the specified civil action. a permissively, “may” be read should that
Aviall answers one, but not is following” action “during a civil or that such may contribu- seek person which instance in exclusive, the mean- the natural just noted, disagree. as First, We tion. enabling is that clause “may” of the in the context ing of satisfy the actions—ones certain contribution authorizes no others. subsequent specified condition—and 113(f)(1) § read to authorize were relatedly, if Second, existence regardless of the any time, actions contribution Congress not have need then action, civil or of following” In “during condition. explicit or included part the stat- reading render would words, Aviall’s other See, do. loath to something arewe entirely superfluous, ute (2004). Likewise, if S. g., Winn, 542 U. Hibbs v. e. any time, actions contribution authorizes set- after actions 113(f)(3)(B), permits contribution which why no reason There is superfluous. equally tlement, which specify conditions Congress would bother time at the same claim, bring may person a contribution conditions. absent those actions contribution allow not saving does 113(f)(1), clause, The sentence last “Nothing in provides: sentence change That our conclusion. person any right diminish shall subsection this ac- civil of a the absence bring for an action this 9607 of section title section 9606 tion under 9613(f)(1). sen- function sole The C. title.” nothing to “diminish” clarify does is to tence inde- cause(s) exist any of action re- words, sentence pendently of *9 (cid:127)167 any presumption express right of contribution buts provided by enabling is the exclusive cause of ac- clause sentence, a The how- tion for contribution available to PRP. action; a cause of nor does ever, does not itself establish 113(f)(1) § expand it authorize actions not § § brought “during following” action; civil or a 106 or specify contribution, if nor what causes of action for does 113(f)(1). § any, Reading saving clause to exist outside 113(f)(1) § just “during actions or authorize not following” action, a such action, civil but also before an again possible, must, would rule that if violate the settled we every operative give a statute to word some construe effect. Village, Inc., v. Nordic See United States (1992). § simply conclusion from itself, Our follows not § § pro- above, but also from the whole of 113. As noted 113(f)(1)(“dur- express two avenues for vides contribution: 113(f)(3)(B) actions) ing following” specified civil or (after judicially approved an administrative or settlement State). liability to the resolves United or a Sec- States 3-year 113(g)(3) provides corresponding tion then two limita- periods beginning actions, one tions for contribution judgment, beginning 113(g)(3)(A), date of and one at the Notably 113(g)(3)(B). settlement, date of absent from any provision starting period 113(g)(3)is the limitations judgment with occurs, if a or settlement never as is the case provision purely voluntary cleanup. The lack of such supports that, the conclusion a contribution claim assert 113(f), satisfy party must the conditions of either 113(f)(3)(B). § purpose
Each side bolsters insists that the of CERCLA its reading meaning text, the clear of the Given dispute there no or to consult the need to resolve “[I]t purpose at all. have said: is ulti of CERCLA As we mately provisions principal of our laws rather than the legislators by governed.” our which we are On- concerns of *10 168 Inc., 75, 79 Services, 523 U. S. v.
cale Sundowner Offshore (1998). 113(f)(1), contri authorizes 1647, Stat. 100 Section following” under only “during civil action a claims bution § never 107(a), undisputed § Aviall has that it is 106 or no has Aviall therefore subject an action.5 to such been § claim.
B in the that, contend Martin Lockheed amicus Aviall 113(f)(1), § under for contribution to an action alternative 107(a)(4)(B) though § it even recover costs Aviall We decline so hold. have us a PRP. The dissent would the Court, nor the District the issue. Neither to address sitting con- en banc panel, Circuit nor the Fifth Fifth Circuit § above, Aviall fact, as noted 107 claim. sidered AvialPs § original its com- in separate 113 claims 107 and included § 107/§ in claim its 113 plaint, then “combined” but asserted this consoli- took complaint. The Court District amended § 107 “not relying on was claim mean Aviall dated only “to the extent independent action,” but cause of as an claim.” necessary maintain viable (ND 2000), 13, Tex., Jan. 3:97-CV-1926-D Action No. Civ. saw Consequently court the App. 94a, 2. n. to Pet. Cert. Fifth freestanding claim. The any no to address need longer ad- no Aviall panel likewise concluded Circuit §107 n. 2. 3d, 263 F. claim. a stand-alone vanced unnecessary whether decide found The en banc court it held Aviall claim, because waived the 107 had Thus, 685, n. 15. rely 3d, 113. 312 F. on instead could the mer- let alone issue, waiver address the did not the court § 107 claim. its of instance issues in first ordinarily do not decide
“We Mineta, v. Inc. Constructors, Adarand below.” not decided 106; order under administrative subject to an been has Aviall Neither “civil qualify as would an order whether such thus, we need not decide 9607(a)” of CERCLA. section 9606 ... or under action under section U. C.S. curiam) (internal (2001) (per quotation 103, 109 534 U. S. omitted). Although we have deviated from this rule marks Mendenhall, exceptional circumstances, in United States (1980), 551-552, n. 5 the circumstances here §107 question against resolving claim. Both the cut underlying Aviall has waived this claim and waived) (if may depend part it is not on the §§ relationship relationship between 107 and That is a 113. right. beyond significant issue its own It is also well *11 presented, scope briefing question and, indeed, of the the simply private “may bring party a which asks whether an pursuant seeking action to Section CERCLA 113(f)(1).” prelim- Pet. for i. The 107claim and the Cert. inary question by waiver merit the courts full consideration below. parties of
Furthermore, cite numerous decisions the Appeals holding private party of as a that is Courts pursue against itself a PRP not a other action joint liability. g., See, PRPs for and several e. Af Bedford (CA2 1998); Sills, 416, v. 156 F. 3d 423-424 Centerior filiates Scrap Corp., 344, Co. Serv. v. Acme Iron & Metal 153 F. 3d (CA6 1998); Corp. High Point, 349-356 Pneumo Abex T. v. & (CA4 1998); Group D. F. 3d Co., 769, R. 142 776 Pinal Creek (CA9 Mining Corp., 1298, v. Newmont F. 118 3d 1301-1306 1997); County Corp., New Halliburton 111 F. Castle v. NUS (CA3 1997); Redwing Carriers, 1116, 3d 1120-1124 Inc. v. (CA11 Apartments, 1489, 1496, F. 3d and n. 7 Saraland 94 1996); E. R. 3d Co., United States v. Colorado & F. (CA10 1995); Corp. Technologies 1534-1536 United 1994). (CA1 Browning-Ferris Industries, F.33 3d may pursue action, To here a 107 we would hold correct, an have to consider whether these decisions are flagged might And we issue that Aviall has but not briefed. briefed, issues, have to consider other also not such as of its Aviall, which seeks to recover the share cleanup fairly Cooper, may pursue chargeable a 107 costs liability than form action for some cost prudent to withhold joint think it more and several. We judgment on these matters. the ab- importance issue and of the 107 view of the
In we are below, briefing the courts and decisions sence resolve would have it—to prepared the dissent not —as Key Tronic. solely of dictum on the basis “ attorney’s ‘neces- fees were not held there that certain We ” 107(a)(4)(B). meaning of sary response’ within the costs address, relevance, not 818-821. But we did S., 511 U. rela- Key a or confront the any, if status as PRP Tronic’s discussing §§ 107,we did tionship and 113. between recovery or a classify precisely of cost as not even descriptions deci- of the contribution, the dissent’s as J.) (describ- (opinion of Post, sion reveal. Ginsburg, “ recovery of recognizing right ‘seek ing Key Tronic as 818), follow- but in the cleanup (quoting atS., 511 U. costs’” “right to Key ing paragraph saying Tronic identified contribution”). merely record, lurk which “Questions upon, brought court nor ruled of the neither attention having as to been so decided as be are not to considered *12 Fall, 266 U. S. precedents.” v. Webster constitute (1925). for fuller examina- recognizes need the Aviall itself re- simply requested we that it has claim; tion of the the we claim, not that resolve of that mand for consideration the first instance. claim in
C cost open seek leaving Aviall whether In addition supra, decide we decline to III-B, 107, Part under right implied to contribution has whether Aviall an might opinion below of Fifth Circuit’s the 107. Portions at 3d, action, 312 F. of cause latter to endorse the be taken such whether appear the to reserve 687; others extent 15. To id., 685, n. the exists, cause of action im- an as on remand 107 claim its to frame Aviall chooses (as cost rec of contribution to a of opposed plied of we note has visited the subject Court overy),6 Industries, before. See Texas implied rights Airlines, Northwest S., at 90-99. S., 451 U. 451 U. 638-647; 113(f)(1), that, We also note explicitly enacting Congress (claims set following” particular “during recognized actions) civil of the contribution rights previously specified com and the courts from CERCLA provisions implied Mortgage Advisors, Inc. mon law. Cf. Transamerica Lewis, (1979). not and 11, 19 we need Nonetheless, U. S. not decide do today any judicially implied right contribution survived the SARA. passage [*] [*] [*] Aviall’s suit. We hold does not only support Fifth We therefore reverse the Circuit judgment remand the case for further consistent with proceedings this opinion. ordered.
It is so with whom Justice joins, Justice Stevens Ginsburg, dissenting. Industries, from Services, Inc.,
Aviall purchased Cooper hazardous sub- Inc., that was contaminated with property Natural Re- stances. the Texas after Shortly purchase, it would notified Aviall that source Conservation Commission Aviall action if failed to remediate institute enforcement now cleaned site and up promptly property. view, the Court seeks reimbursement from Cooper. my to re- decision on Aviall’s entitlement unnecessarily defers costs cover from cleanup Cooper.
6 above, recovery a action whether 107 cost As noted we do not address (if waived) joint liability form of other than not seek some and several.
172 Key Corp. States, Tronic v. United 809, 818 (1994), all Court Members agreed Environmental Comprehensive Response, Compensation, (CERCLA), §9607, “un- Act of 1980 42 U. S. C. Liability re- a cause of action for questionably provides [potentially (PRPs)] to seek costs.” sponsible persons cleanup ¿nd The Court rested determination on solely squarely any has 107(a)(4)(B), which who incurred allows person costs for a to recover all or hazardous waste site cleaning up a of those costs from liable under other portion any person CERCLA.1 Key Tronic Court
The on the divided, however, 107(a)’s text, whether to in implicit 107(a) as the or determined, majority expressly as The confers the majority dissenters right, urged. com- stated: Section 107 does not expressly “implies —but mand —that have claim for [a PRP] may 818, atS., treated 511 U. those as tortfeasors.” against joint added). “Sec- and n. 11 The dissent maintained: (emphasis 107(a)(4)(B) be, that states, clearly tion as as can ‘[c]overed ... shall be liable for... costs response persons necessary shall incurred to that A say by any Surely person.’ express of a of action.” be liable B is the creation Id., doubt no Justice the slightest 822. But expressed covered per- did a PRP sue other indeed enable costs reimbursement, sons for in whole cleanup part* the PRP incurred. legitimately 107(a) PRP, Key Tronic, cost-recovery claim asserted a clean allegedly incurred recoup approximately $1.2 million in costs that States, v. United Key Corp. Tronic
ing up its “at its own site initiative.” (CA9 1993). portion Although Key F. Tronic settled 2d (EPA), claim Agency Protection liability of its with the Environmental action taken remedial advanced suit rested on Key Tronic’s settle figure not involvement, remediation that did before the EPA’s States, S. Corp. United 1026-1027; 511 U. Tronic Id., Key ment. (1994).
173 §107 In its Aviall identified as the original complaint, claim federal-law basis for an cost-recovery independent §113 and as the basis for a contribution Cooper, against 8A, In amended Aviall claim. 16A-17A. App. pleadings, §§ both 107 and 113 as the federal for alleged underpinning Id., 27A, Aviall’s its contribution claim. 48A. use §§113 and 107 in tandem to assert a contribution claim con- formed its Fifth Circuit prece- pleading then-governing arises dent, which held that a CERCLA contribution action §§ and See joint through operation Geraghty Miller, Inc., Inc. & Conoco 3d F. (“[Wjhile 113(f) (2000) the vehicle for section bringing action, contribution it does not create a new cause of action Rather, create new liabilities. it is a for mechanism any costs that are recoverable under section 107.” apportioning (footnote omitted)). A circuit party obliged by precedent in a certain can be have deemed to waived plead way hardly could have maintained had the law of the plea party ante, circuit him But permitted to do so. cf. at 168-169. view, § In the Fifth Circuit’s of ac- supplied 113(f)(1) tion for Aviall’s claim, and prescribed proce- (2002) (en dural 677, 683, framework. 312 F. 3d and n. 10 banc) authorizes a cause of ac- 107 “impliedly (stating 113(f) tion for contribution” and “govern[s] regulate[s]” Geraghty Miller, & 3d, 924; the action 234 F. inter- (citing omitted)); nal marks for see quotation (calling of “Federal law” and the of “the Fed- governance application Procedure,” re- eral Rules of Civil arid specifying “[i]n allocate claims, contribution the court solving response such factors as the costs liable equitable among parties using court determines are Aviall ex- Notably, appropriate”). that, in the were the court Court pressly urged Appeals §113(f)(l)’s to conclude or following” “during language case, to this Aviall’s suit excluded of that section application 107(a). See should be adjudicated independently Inc., to the Amicus Services, Response Appellant (CA5), p. 24 in No. Curiae Brief United States (“[PJarties seeking who are excluded from to them under section must therefore have available [covering recov- cost both full the broader 107(a).”); ery Key contribution] Tronic, cf. under section (“[T]he expressly S., authorizes a at 816 statute now U. impliedly of action for in 113and author- cause *15 107.”). remedy overlapping in izes a similar and somewhat by litigation requiring protracting I for see no cause essentially has the Fifth to revisit a determination it Circuit already: prior the enactment of courts, made Federal 113(f)(1), correctly “recover had held that PRPs could §107] proportionate [under in of their costs actions share against 3d, 687;2 at PRPs,” for 312 F. ibid, §113 (noting nothing right, retracts 113(f)’s preexisting saving preserves all state and clause including rights the 107 contribution, federal of action for implied recognized Key Tronic, U. 511 S., this Court 816). ruling Accordingly, I a definitive at would not defer may pursue this Court on the against Cooper. 107 claim for relief Industries, ante, Texas refers, which Court at The cases to Inc., Air Materials, (1981), Northwest and Inc. Radcliff v. Workers, (1981), lines, do not address S. 77 Transport Inc. U. Texas under CERCLA. of action implication of a 639-646; Acts, S., 451 U. Clayton Sherman Industries concerned the Civil Airlines, VII of Pay Title Act of Northwest Equal in one S., suitable 90-99. A determination Act 451 U. Rights statutory carry different over statutory necessarily not context does setting.