Cooney v. FooteCooney v. Foote
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Evans
Lead Opinion
The General Assembly in 1912 (Acts 1912, p. 30) proposed a constitutional amendment to art. 6, see. 7, par. 1, of the constitution of this State by adding thereto a provision “that the General Assembly may, in its discretion, abolish Justice Courts and the office of Justice of the Peace and of Notary Public ex-officio Justices of the Peace in any City of this State having a population of over twenty thousand, except the City of Savannah, and establish in lieu thereof such Court or Courts or system of Courts as the General Assembly may in its discretion deem necessary, conferring upon such new Court or Courts or system of Courts, when so established, the jurisdiction as to subject-matter now exercised by Justice Courts and by Justices of the Peace and Notaries Public ex-officio Justices of the Peace; together with such additional jurisdiction, either as to amount or subject-matter, as may be provided by law, whereof some other Court has not exclusive jurisdiction under this Constitution; together also with such provisions as to rules and procedure in such Courts, and as to new trials and the correction of errors in and by said Courts, and with such further provisions for the correction of errors by the Superior Court, or the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court, as the General Assembly may from time to time, in its discretion, provide or authorize. Any Court so established shall not be subject to the rules of uniformity laid down in Paragraph 1 of Section 9 of Article 6 of the Constitution of Georgia.” This amendment was submitted to the people at *650a general election, and was proclaimed by the Governor as having been adopted as the result of the election. Subsequently a municipal court for the City of Atlanta was created; and it was provided that from the judgment of the appellate division of that court an appeal shall lie by writ of error to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Acts 1913, p. 145. The question certified by the Court of Appeals relates to its jurisdiction to entertain writs of error from that court, as dependent upon the proposal of 1912 having been submitted and ratified agreeably to the provisions of the constitution. The basal proposition involved in the first question is the applicability of art. 3, sec. 7, par, 8, of the constitution of Georgia (Civil Code (1910), § 6437) to the proposal of amendments to that constitution by the General Assembly. That provision is as follows: “No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from. what is expressed in the title thereof.”
The word “ordinance” was anciently used to distinguish between certain forms of statutes. “Where the proceeding consisted only of a petition from parliament and an answer from the king, these were entered on the parliament roll; and if the matter was of a public nature, the whole was then styled an ordinance: if, however, the petition and answer were not only of a public but a novel nature, they were then formed into an act by the king, with the aid of his council and judges, and entered on the statute roll‘.” Bacon’s Abridgment (A), Bouvier’s Dictionary. ’ In Webster’s New International Dictionary, it is said to be “An authoritative decree or direction; specif., any public enactment, rule, or law promulgated by *653governmental authority; esp.: (1) Eng. Hist. A law or regulation promulgated without the assent of one of the three powers (Crown, House of Lords, and House of Commons) necessary to an act of parliament. . . (3) A local law or regulation enacted by a municipal government, as ‘a common council, board of aldermen, or the like. . . Historically the lines of distinction between what is an ordinance and what is a statute were not definitely drawn. The term was specifically applied to various enactments including: (a) Any of the decrees of the Ordainers. (b) The Ordinance of the Eorest (33 & 34 Edw. I). (c) The Ordinance of the Staple or statute staple, (d) Any of the acts of the Long Parliament between 1641 and 1649, as the Self-denying Ordinance.” The act of Congress, passed in 1787, establishing the government of the Northwest Territory is known as the ordinance of 1787.
A proposal by the legislature of amendments to the constitution is not the exercise of ordinary legislative functions, and is not subject to constitutional provisions regulating the introduction and passage of ordinary legislative enactments. It has been held that no title is necessary to a proposed amendment, and if one is inserted it may be disregarded. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), 906; In Re Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb. 864 (41 N. W. 981); Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441 (36 Pac. 221); Julius v. Callahan, 63 Minn. 154 (65 N. W. 267); Hays v. Hays, 5 Idaho, 154 (47 Pac. 732); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369 (74 Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. R. 34). We conclude, therefore, that the word “ordinance” in the constitutional provision first above referred to, comprehends any statute or resolution which the General Assembly may constitutionally enact, and does not apply to proposals for amendments to the constitution as initiated by the legislature, pursuant to article 13 of the constitution.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the ruling that the constitutional requirement that no law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof, does not apply to a constitutional amendment, so as to invalidate it after it has been proposed by the necessary vote in the legislature, has been duly published, and has been adopted by the people. But I think some of the discussion is broader than the necessity of the case requires. I accordingly concur in the judgment.