Lead Opinion
This сase arises out of the mislabeling of the remains of a stillborn baby, resulting in the funeral and burial of the wrong child. The trial court initially denied summary judgment to the defendant hospital after concluding that under the choice-of-law rule of lex loci delicti, Alabama law would govern the emotional distress claims brought by the plaintiff mother, who first learned of the mishandled remains when contacted at her home in Alabama. The trial court later revisited the issue, however, and concluded that application of Alabama law would violate Georgia public policy because Alabama does not impose an “impact rule” on plaintiffs seeking damages for emotional distress arising from the negligent mishandling of human remains. After сoncluding that Georgia law should apply, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, holding that the mother’s emotional distress claims failed as a matter of law because she could not show physical injury, pecuniary loss, or sufficiently outrageous misconduct by the hospital. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
So viewed, the record shows that Amanda Rae Coon lives in Opelika, Alabama. On February 8, 2011, Coon, who was 37 weeks pregnant, went for a routine prenatal examination at her obstetrician-gynecologist’s office in Columbus, Georgia. During the examination, Coon learned that her unborn baby did not have a heartbeat.
The following day, Coon was admitted to a Columbus hospital owned by The Medical Center, Inc. (the “hospital”), where her labor was induced and she delivered a stillborn baby girl. After the delivery, the hospital’s bereavement coordinator spoke with Coon and her father, who informed the coordinator that the remains of the baby were to be released to a funeral home in Opelika. The bereavement coordinator completеd a mortuary permit and supporting documents that included the pertinent funeral home information and placed these documents with Coon’s patient chart.
The stillborn baby initially remained with Coon in her hospital room, but Coon’s mother later informed the bereavement coordinator that Coon was tired and asked that the baby be removed. The coordinator placed Coon’s baby in a separate holding room on the same floor until someone could take the baby to the hospital morgue. In addition to Coon’s baby, there was a smaller stillborn baby boy, who was less than 20 weeks in gestation, already in the holding room.
When the bereavement coordinator placed Coon’s baby in the holding room with the smaller baby, the hospital floor was in the middle of the evening shift change. A nurse whose shift had just begun volunteered to transport both babies from the holding room to the morgue. Under a hospital policy put into effect two days earlier, identification tags were to be placed on the arm and leg of a stillborn baby and on the outside of the cadaver bag before being delivered to the morgue. The nurse filled out the three tags for both of the babies.
The nurse had not yet had an opportunity to affix the identification tags when a hospital security guard came to the floor and asked the nurse if she was ready for him to escort her to the morgue with the babies. Because the babies were not yet prepared for transport tо the morgue, the security guard decided to assist the nurse with the
When the security guard began assisting the nurse, they mixed up the identification tags. The nurse tagged the smaller baby with the identification tags for Coon’s baby, and the security guard tagged Coon’s baby with the identification tags for the smaller baby. The security guard placed a tag on the outside of the cadaver bag for Coon’s baby, but chose not to “fool” with the tags on the baby’s body because he did not want to remove any of the baby’s clothing. The nurse repeatedly told the security guard that he needed to place identification tags on the body of Coon’s baby, but he chose not to do so.
The nurse and the security guard transported the stillborn babies to the morgue with the wrong identification tags and logged in the remains. Because of the incorrect identification tags, the hospital mistakenly released the wrong baby to the Opelika funeral home.
On February 12, 2011, Coon, her family members, and other mourners attended a funeral at an Opelika cemetery for a deceased stillborn baby whom they believed was Coon’s. Coon and her family members did not view the baby’s remains before or during the funeral service after the funeral director advised against it, given the condition of the remains.
On February 23,2011, the hospital discovered that it had released the wrong baby to the Opelika funeral home. The hospital contacted the director of the Opelika funeral home, informed him of the mistake, and requested contact information for Coon’s family. The funeral director advised the hospital to contact Coon’s father rather than Coon herself because “mentally, she [would] just not [be] able to take it” if she learned of the mistaken identification.
Later that day, the hospital’s chief executive officer cоntacted Coon by telephone and informed her that the hospital had released the wrong baby for burial. The following day, the baby who had been mistakenly released to the funeral home was exhumed from the
After the exhumed baby’s remains were handed over to the representative of another funeral home, the Opelika funeral director retrieved a cadaver bag from the hospital morgue that had an identification tag for Coon’s baby on the outside of it. Yet, when the director returned to his funeral home in Opelika, he discovered that the cadaver bag contained nothing but a blanket, and he had to return again to the hospital morgue to obtain Coon’s baby, whom hospital employees had left in a holding room in the morgue. In violation of hospital policy, no documentation was made in the morgue log book showing when Coon’s baby or the exhumed baby were returned to the morgue or to show when the switch occurred and who was involved.
Once the funeral director obtained the proper remains from the hospital, Coon’s baby was buried at the Opelika cemetery. The hospital paid the costs associated with the exhumation of the misidentified baby and the subsequent burial of the correct remains. Coon did not attend the second burial because she “could not handle having to go through that all over again.”
In March 2011, Coon filed the present lawsuit against the hospital, seeking damages for the emotional distress she suffered as result of the mishandling of her stillborn child’s remains.
The trial court concluded that Alabama law applied and denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. When the hospital moved for reconsideration, the trial court denied the motion but certified its order for immediate review. The hospital then filed an
Follоwing the dismissal of the appeal, the hospital filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, contending that Alabama law should not apply under the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule and that all of Coon’s claims failed under Georgia law. The trial court agreed with the hospital, concluding that the application of Alabama law would contravene Georgia public policy because Alabama, unlike Georgia, does not have an “impact rule” in emotional distress cases involving the negligent mishandling of human remains. Applying Georgia law rather than Alabama law, the trial court further concluded that Coon’s claims failed as a matter of law under the more stringent standard for emotional distress claims in Georgia. Consequently, the trial court granted the hospital’s renewed motion for summary judgment, resulting in this appeal by Coon.
1. Coon argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Georgia rather than Alabama law should apply in this case based on the public policy exception to the rule of lex loci delicti. We disagree.
Under Georgia law, choice-of-law issues in tort cases are controlled by the rule of lex loci delicti, which requires courts to apply the “substantive law of the place where the tort or wrong occurred.”
The general rule is that the place of wrong, the locus delicti, is the place where the injury sustained was suffered rather than the place whеre the act was committed, or, as it is sometimes more generally put, it is the place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.6
Here, pretermitting whether the last event necessary to make the hospital liable for the alleged tort took place in Alabama,
2. Coon also argues that, under Georgia law, the trial court erred by ruling that she did not suffer pecuniary loss as alleged in her First Amended Complaint.
With respect to the costs associated with disinterment and reburial of the correct stillborn baby — which were not inevitable costs of having a stillborn baby — Coon contends that the collateral source rule bars the hospital from benefitting from its payment (or payments by others) of those costs on her behalf.
3. As for the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, Coon
was required to show that (1) the conduct at issue was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law. Moreover, it has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct hаs been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.16
Here, the trial court properly concluded the hospital was also entitled to summary judgment because the hospital’s conduct, while a “tragic mistake,” did not rise to the level of egregiousness or outrageousness necessary to sustain this claim.
4. Finally, the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to Coon’s claim for punitive damages because it is derivative of her other claims which fail as a matter of law.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
Bank of North Ga. v. Windermere Dev.,
The funeral home director later testified that when he received the stillborn baby from the hospital, he had chosen not to take the baby out of the cadaver bag or undress her because of the state of decomposition.
Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc. was named as a defendant in the original complaint but later was dismissed from the case.
Intl. Business Machines Corp. v. Kemp,
(Punctuation omitted.) Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises,
See Kemp,
Under the public policy exception, we will not apply the law of the place where the injury was sustained if it would conflict with Georgia’s public policy. Cf. Alexander v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
See, e.g., Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
See Alexander,
That pleading alleged that Coon suffered “pecuniary loss, mental injury, anguish, and severe emotional distress.”
(Punctuation omitted.) Lee,
(Emphasis in original; punctuation omitted.) Ob-Gyn Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton,
See generally Candler Hosp. v. Dent,
See Littleton,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Canziani v. Visiting Nurse Health Systems,
See id.
See Veatch v. Aurora Loan Svcs.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
Under Georgia’s long-standing conflict of laws jurisprudence, Georgia common law controls the issues in this case, but not because of the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule. Although I agree that the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Medical Center should be affirmed, I do not agree with all that is said in Division 1 of the majority opinion, and thus concur specially.
I agree with the majority that we begin our analysis by applying the choice-of-law rule of lex loci delicti,
Under Georgia’s conflict of laws jurisprudence, once it is determined under the relevant choice-of-law rule
Our appellate courts have taken a markedly different approach when common law rather than statutory law governs. As explained in Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet,
On the other hand, if the other state was never part of the original thirteen colonies or their territories, “[t]here is no presumption that the common law of England exists in such a State” because the state clearly did not “inherit its laws from England.” Nisbet,
Applying these rules here, Coon does not contend that an Alabama statute governs her claims. And, “[w]hile Alabama was not one of the thirteеn original colonies [,] it was formed from a part of the territory of Georgia.” Record Truck Line,
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment by the trial court, albeit for a different reason, and find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the public policy exception applies.
I concur fully to Divisions 2, 3 and 4 of the majority opinion.
Some of our case law alternatively spells this term as “lex loci delecti.” See, e.g., Bailey v. Cottrell, Inc.,
In addition to lex loci delicti for tort cases, Georgia applies the traditional rule of lex loci contractus in contract cases. See Gen. Telephone Co. of Southeast v. Trimm,
I recognize that these presumptions may seem anachronistic and peculiar, but that is the law as set out by our Supreme Court, which has not been overruled. Notably, as recently as 1984, the Supreme Court cited Nisbet favorably and quoted a Court of Appeals case describing Nisbet as “the leading Georgia case explanatory of the law of lex loci contractus.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Trimm,
The dissent asserts that the right for any reason rule does not apply in this instance because the specific argument was not made below. However, it is well established that “[w]e will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it is right for any reason, whether stated or unstated in thе trial court’s order, so long as the movant raised the issue in the trial court and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because Alabama law applies to plaintiff Coon’s emotional distress claims under the choice-of-law rule of lex loci delicti, and the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant hospital thеrefore should be vacated and the case remanded for application of the proper law. Contrary to the majority opinion, the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule does not apply here, given that application of Alabama law in a case involving the mishandling of human remains does not seriously contravene the public policy underlying Georgia’s impact rule. And contrary to the special concurrence, the fact that Coon does not point to an Alabama statute to support her claims has no bearing under the circumstances of this case, where the hospital did not raise that issue in the court below, Coon had no notice or оpportunity to be heard on the issue, and the trial court never considered the issue as part of its summary judgment ruling.
Given the facts of this case, Alabama rather than Georgia law should apply under the choice-of-law rule of lex loci delicti. Under that rule, courts apply the “substantive law of the place where the tort or wrong occurred.” Intl. Business Machines Corp. v. Kemp,
The hospital’s mishаndling of the remains of Coon’s stillborn baby occurred in Georgia, but Coon was at her home in Alabama when she received the telephone call from the hospital in which she first learned of the mistake. Before that telephone call, Coon could not have logically suffered emotional injury as a result of the hospital’s alleged tortious conduct because she had been unaware of what had occurred. It was at that point, upon finding out that the hospital never released her stillborn baby to the Alabama funeral home, that she had buried the wrong baby, and that she was going to have to endure another burial, that Coon began suffering emotional distress related
As the majority opinion points out, application of the rule of lex loci delicti is subject to a public policy exception. See Alexander v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
As the “radically dissimilar” requirement suggests, the fact that the law of another state differs in some respect from our own law does not mean that the law of the other state necessarily violates the public policy of Georgia; otherwise, a choice of law analysis would never be necessary, and the rule of lex loci delicti would be rendered moot. See Southern R. Co.,
The majority opinion concludes that application of Alabama law in this case would conflict with Georgia public policy because Alabama, in contrast to Georgia, does not apply an impact rule in emоtional distress cases involving the negligent mishandling of human remains. But the fact that the emotional distress laws of Alabama and Georgia differ in some respect does not demonstrate, without more, that Georgia public policy would be undermined by applying Alabama law. Indeed, the majority does not specifically
Under Georgia’s impact rule, “[i]n a claim concerning negligent conduct, a recovery for emotional distress is allowed only where there is some impact on the plaintiff, and that impact must be a physical injury.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
First, there is the fear, that absent impact, there will be a flood of litigation of claims for emotional distress. Second, is the concern for fraudulent claims. Third, there is the perception that, absent impact, there would be difficulty in proving the causal connection between the defendant’s negligent conduct and claimed damages of emotional distress.
These three public policy concerns are likewise not present in this case, where the narrow issue is the application of Alabama law in a Georgia court to а claim for the mishandling of human remains. As Lee makes clear, the impact rule is designed to safeguard Georgia courts from a flood of amorphous, potentially fraudulent emotional distress claims by injecting an objective benchmark (physical injury or pecuniary loss) into the analysis. But there is no risk of a flood of litigation in Georgia by simply allowing a plaintiff to pursue an emotional distress claim under Alabama law in the limited context where the lex loci delicti rule makes that law applicable in a Georgia court. Thus, the important gate-keeping function that the impact rule serves will not be undermined by allowing the present case to proceed under Alabama law. Furthermore, concerns about avoiding fraudulent claims, and about proving the causal connection between the
Because Georgia’s public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule does not apply in this case, the trial court erred by relying upon Georgia law rather than Alabama law in evaluating Coon’s emotional distress claims on summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospital and remand for the trial court to consider in the first instance whether the hospital is entitled to summary judgment on Coon’s emotional distress claims under Alabama law. See City of Gainesville v. Dodd,
The allegedly material distinction drawn by the special concurrence between statutory and common law claims for purposes of Georgia’s choice-of-law rules should not change the outcome here. The special concurrence would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the hospital under the “right for any reason” rule because “Coon does not contend that an Alabama statute governs her claims” and Georgia courts allegedly are not bound by Alabama courts’ construction of the common law of emotional distress. But this argument was not presented in the hospital’s motion for summary judgment before the trial court, the issue was not raised by either party on appeal, and Coon has had no opportunity to respond to the argument or explain whether there are any Alabama statutes that bear on her claims.
This is a court for the review and correction of errors committed in the trial court, and an argument that was not made below will not be considered on appeal. Although, as a matter of judicial economy, we will affirm a grant of summary judgment under the “right for any reason” rule, we will generally only do so when the judgment may be sustained upon a legal basis apparent from the record and which was fairly presented in the court below.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail,
Because nothing in the record before us shows that the argument raised sua sponte by the special concurrence was fairly presented in the court below, we should not consider whether to affirm the trial court on that alternative basis. See Bullington,
For these combined reasons, the emotional distress law of Alabama applies in this case, necessitating that we vacate the trial court’s summary judgment order and remand for application of that law. Because the majority opinion and the special concurrence conclude otherwise, I must respectfully dissent.